The Coronavirus Crisis in Israel
Indeed, the Light at the End of the Tunnel?

Insights from the Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS)

by the IPS team | May 3, 2020

The Israeli government has decided to ease the lockdown in the framework of an exit strategy. This in light of the statistical evidence of improvement in the situation: a decrease in the number of fatalities and contagion, and an increase in the scope of testing. But the Coronavirus crisis is still raging, and on the horizon an additional crisis, no less grave - in the socioeconomic realm.

Parallel to this, there are signs of familiar security threats. The military action by Hezbollah on the northern border (April 18, 2020) damaging the fence in three different spots simultaneously, demonstrates how narrow the distance is between a period of calm and
a state of emergency. At the epicenter is the issue of home front preparedness on the whole, that under circumstances of a security crisis could be far graver than inflicted by the Coronavirus crisis. Prominent in this context, the fact that the IDF is not operating in accordance to an approved multi-year plan, and even American military aid (whose weight is very significant) is not being utilized in the absence (and failure) of decision-making by the government, due to the political stalemate.

The primary national challenge at the present time, which must stand at the core of
a probable new government’s agenda, is to provide comprehensive solutions to the multidimensional crisis in health, the economy, society and safeguard of democracy -and parallel to this, to address the security domain, as well.

The following document focuses on the key challenges and the response to them.

Managing the Crisis and an Exit Strategy

The primary shortcoming emanates from the lack of quality intelligence (which is, testing – that is speedy, comprehensive and precise) as a foundation for decision-making. At times it seems that the lockdown was imposed on a massive scope in the absence of a precise intelligence picture. Israel has the ability to achieve what is necessary for this, if it will mobilize all the resources at its disposal - organizational, technological and scientific. An intelligence picture is also needed for a wiser and more effective exit from extreme forms of social distancing and the economic detriment of the lockdown.

There are significant weak points in the lack of an overarching organizational system- that is, a ‘Coronavirus cabinet’ with one control center in the critical domains of the economy and hasbara; Another shortcoming, is management without staff work, an administrative hub and orderly decision-making due to absence of command and control and synchronization in operating the arms of government to relative advantage. Also, decisions on exiting the crisis have been flawed - a large portion have been confusing, were presented to the public and published in a hurried fashion - some by reporters and commentators before they were brought for approval by the government.

The government embarked on an exit strategy without presenting a comprehensive plan of actions to the public based on a clear strategy, setting forth the goals needed to be reached in stages, and clear measurable objectives. It is not clear how the country plans to prevent the economic and social catastrophe at the door. To date, the assistance that has been allocated by the government to help the citizenry (and first and foremost the elderly whose abandonment is paramount to moral bankruptcy) is a drop in the bucket compared to the needs, and significantly close-fisted compared to western nations.

Under such circumstances, significant erosion is evidenced in public trust in governing institutions and there is growing despair among a large number of citizens.

Security and Civil Challenges

The Coronavirus exposed substantial gaps in the preparedness of the home front for war or natural disaster. Comparison with European nations is irrelevant because war in the foreseeable future is not expected there. In Israel a major military conflict is a likely possibility, and the ramifications of war for the population is expected to be far more grave than the Coronavirus crisis: collapse of buildings, damage to operational continuity and strategic infrastructure of water, power and energy, loss of life and more.

Especially at a time like this, one must not lose sight of known threats that under cover of global focus on the Coronavirus are intensifying: Iran continues to broaden its nuclear program, establish itself as a military threat in the region, and arm Israel’s enemies (particularly Hezbollah) with precision capabilities that can inflict a high toll to Israel’s home front.

Against this backdrop, it is alarming that the IDF has not succeeded in carrying out its multi-year build-up plan and prepare for security challenges awaiting. Use of the generous military aid that the United States has put at Israel’s disposal is ‘stuck’ - along with other crucial decisions regarding force build-up of the IDF and for the Israeli air force.

On a regional level, instability, uncertainty and despair intensified by the Coronavirus crisis are liable to cause serious ‘secondary shock waves’ in the Palestinian Authority and neighboring Arab countries where Israel’s ability to monitor the situation and foresee turning points is very limited.

Democracy in Danger

The inability of the country to formulate a precise “map of hotspots” of the disease has led the government to relay on classified security capabilities for epidemiological tracking. Such surveillance involves breach of privacy and impinges on the legal rights of citizens of a scope and depth unprecedented in western nations. Beyond the potential injury to democracy, solving flaws in testing this way are liable to endanger strategic capabilities of the General Security Service. That is, the methods and the advanced technological tools the GSS employs against Israel’s enemies (that are consider classified state secrets) are in jeopardy of being exposed in the process to the prying eyes of world powers and enemies alike.

Outlining the Response

The responses to challenges and to the trail of crises that the pandemic will leave include a string of steps the possible new government must urgently take to prevent a worsening of the situation:

Dramatic upscaling of the scope of tests and their utility as a basis for significant easing of the lockdown.

Establishment of a ‘Coronavirus cabinet’ and a single national emergency center for combating the pandemic that will operate in a synchronized manner and assign missions to taskforces in the health system, the military and the police force.

Authorization for one director for the campaign who will lead, coordinate, and oversee the struggle with the pandemic and its broad ramifications, and provide directives to all the operational agents and local governing bodies. The campaign director will create a rank between the country’s leadership and the executive arms, allowing the government to concentrate on managing the campaign strategically, free from dealing with tactical issues.

Operation of a single hasbara (public information) alignment for the campaign that will present up-to-date realistic situation reports, with transparency vis-à-vis the public, in a manner that will prevent confusion and unattainable expectations.

Urgent implementation of an emergency plan to deal with the elderly and senior facilities, now that a project manager slowly for this mission has been appointed.

Establishment of a national commission of inquiry to examine the shortcomings of the health system and the home front and recommend steps to correct them.

Refrain from a decision at the height of the crisis on annexation of parts of the West Bank (Judea and Samaria and the Jordan Valley). Annexation is liable to turn out to be a strategic catastrophe in the long run that will harm Israel’s national security and impact negatively on the Jewish and democratic character of the state; on the Palestinian Authority, and Israel’s relations with other countries in the region, particularly Jordan.

Immediate executions of adjustments to the IDF’s multi-year plan and pressing decisions in the shadow of changing priorities, about the directions force build-up should go, while acting without delay to fully utilize American aid.

Ranking Iran and its moves in the region and towards nuclearization as the top priority, while parallel to this continuing to deal with the dangers emanating from the Coronavirus crisis.

In the regional domain - preserve and deepen cooperation with the Palestinian Authority and further strengthen it; urgent assistance with no provisos to Gaza, to assist and prevent internal collapse and a humanitarian crisis; an effort to assist Egypt and Jordan.

Strengthen the gatekeepers who safeguard Israel as a democratic country; and maintain close supervision to ensure that the health crisis will not be exploited unnecessarily in ways that curtail the legal rights of the public to freedom and privacy.

Providing a clear and implementable response to growing distress in the socioeconomic realm (marked by despair among the citizenry of unprecedented magnitude)—this in order to prevent the creation of a "socioeconomic pandemic" whose damage would be of a magnitude even greater than that of the Coronavirus.

This document was written by the team of the Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS)

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