Although Israel is currently experiencing a lull in its security reality, the challenges to its national defense are mounting. Israel’s adversaries have been focusing more on building force and less on using it, and are avoiding escalating the friction in view of the high price that would be exacted from them, to say nothing of their own serious internal problems that also need to be addressed. At the same time, in view of these processes involving mounting challenges and force buildup, the strategic threat to Israel’s security is growing.
The thwarting of Hamas’s terror infrastructure in Judea and Samaria highlighted the seriousness of the terror threat and the success of Israel’s security forces in maintaining stability and security. As in the case of the escape of the Islamic Jihad operatives from Gilboa Prison, the ability of the security forces to rapidly close the circle prevented a tactical event from turning into one of strategic significance. This success represents an impressive operational triumph, but at the same time highlights the fragility of the security lull and the considerable potential for rapid, overall escalation.
In Judea and Samaria, Israel is working to improve the day-to-day reality as the basis for security calm, so as to prevent broad public enlistment in the struggle against Israel. Hamas, on the other hand, is trying to challenge this equation and position itself in Palestinian society so that it is poised to take control of the PA's political system after Abu Mazen demise. The Hamas infrastructure discovered in the recent IDF operation is the largest and most significant uncovered since 2014 and reflects an ongoing effort on the part of Hamas to rebuild its strength on the West Bank. In the Gaza Strip, the efforts to reach an agreement, brokered by Egypt, are moving ahead, and at this stage, it is in the interest of both parties to contain the situation and not provoke another round of fighting. At the same time, the ongoing endeavors on the part of Hamas to maintain low-intensity friction in order to extract more significant achievements could lead to yet another campaign in the near future.
In the political-diplomatic sphere, the speech given by the Israeli prime minister in the UN and the one given by the chairman of the Palestinian Authority highlighted the yawning chasm separating the sides, along with the fact that there is no actor on the international scene willing to exert pressure to jumpstart the political-diplomatic process between Israel and the Palestinians.
On the Israeli domestic scene, the situation in Arab society is developing into a strategic challenge of the first order. The widespread crime, proliferation of weapons, loss of deterrence on the part of law enforcement and loss of governance in much of Arab society (especially in the south) require a multidimensional civilian and security response. The potential of criminal crime to develop into terrorist crime was recently demonstrated in Operation Guardian of the Walls, further highlighting how urgent it is to develop a response at the national level.
In Iran, the negotiations to renew the nuclear deal have not yet gotten off the ground, and Teheran has expanded its nuclear project in order to establish itself as a “threshold state,” so that when talks are renewed, it will already have the technology and knowledge to continue the project once the decision to do so is made. In consideration of this situation, even with an agreement that requires the dismantling of Iran’s stockpiles of enriched uranium, Iran will be able to fill the gap using the advanced enrichment systems it developed relatively quickly.
At the same time, Iran continues to expand its regional clout and establish advanced capabilities that can pose a systemic threat to Israel. In concrete terms, Iraq and Yemen may become challenging arenas for Israel in the event of escalation scenarios. In this context, Iran has expanded its assistance to force buildup of its proxies. Israel’s Defense Minister recently revealed that Iran is training terrorist operatives to fly advanced drones at the Kashan base, Iran’s key base for the training of terror operatives to operate aerial weapons.
The United States’ chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan continues to send shockwaves throughout the region and affect America’s credibility among its regional allies. These include question marks regarding the United States’ continued presence in Iraq and Syria, Washington’s pursuit to renew the nuclear deal with Iran and the cracks in the wall of sanctions on the Assad regime in Syria. All this plus the absence of a clear American strategy in the region are leading to regional agitation that crisscrosses camps and alliances.
In Syria, the United States has allowed Egypt and Jordan to move the gas pipeline to Lebanon through Syria, but is unwilling to lift sanctions against the Assad regime. The strategic dialogue between Russia and the United States has not proceeded, and Washington has still not yet offered a coherent strategy regarding Syria. At this stage, there is no expectation of a withdrawal of American forces from eastern Syria, where they hinder Iranian expansionist efforts and Turkish endeavors in the region. The withdrawal from Afghanistan, which the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff called a “strategic failure,” constitutes a barrier to further withdrawals from Syria or Iraq, at least for the time being.
Although Jordan, Egypt and the Gulf States are cautious not to fully legitimize Assad’s regime, they are making use of economic and political “carrots” to establish their influence in the country. King Abdullah’s conversation with Bashar Al-Assad (3 October), in which the king expressed his support for a united, sovereign, and stable Syria, constitutes a significant step in bringing their countries closer together and in recognizing the legitimacy of Assad’s regime. The United States is not enforcing the sanctions and its lack of response allows the continued talks and steps taken between the countries.
In Lebanon, international efforts in recent weeks to stabilize the political system, led by France and the United States, have intensified, while completely ignoring the continued buildup of Hezbollah's forces and its presence in the new Lebanese government. Hezbollah continues to fortify its political and military power in Lebanon undisturbed, and the government of Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati, a friend of Bashar al-Assad, has neither the will nor ability to curb the organization's activities. The problem of Hezbollah’s growing power grows worse as the organization continues to arm itself with precision missiles and other advanced capabilities.