Coronavirus and the Annexation:
Different Crises, Similar Failed Actions
and Flawed Governance
Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
Executive Director
July 14, 2020
26-3-20main-...
Photo: Kobi Gideon - GPO
Events in recent weeks have exposed in force the thread that links serious failures that have characterized the actions of the Israeli government on two fateful issues – Coronavirus and the Annexation. This relates to two crises that the ability to contain them and influence their outcomes hinge primarily on Israel itself, in the efficacy of its actions and political wisdom.

The sharp rise in the rate of contagion and morbidity, and the outbreak of a ‘second wave’ underscore the fact that the government failed to take advantage of the ‘time out’ that flattening the curve provided in checking the advance of the disease, in order to organize properly. As noted, such breathing space was won thanks to public response to social distancing degrees, mass sheltering-in-place and curtailment of freedom of movement, at the price of a serious blow to the economy that created a grave crisis of mass unemployment and social disruption.

The renewed outbreak of Coronavirus reflects a rush and uncontrolled exit from the quarantine, during the course of which the government simply turned its attention to other matters, first and foremost – the annexation, a controversial topic on all levels – domestic, regional and global. This took place, in lieu of ensuring the achievements of putting the Coronavirus in check would be preserved, enabling the government to begin addressing the burning issue of the citizenry’s distress.

A ‘vacuum in governance’ and the lack of a guiding hand are evident at every turn. The failure and gaps in cutting the chain of contagion, led, the government to turn again to excessive reliance on classified intelligence capabilities that both involved breach of the right to privacy and heightened risk of revealing technological tools, methodologies and strategic operational capabilities of the GSS (Shin Bet).

In addition, the decision to return children to classrooms, then shortly after to declare the end of the school year was rife with zigzagging and inconsistent improvisations and conflicting messages to parents coupled with chaotic decision-making that oft appeared to be in response to specific pressures from this or that quarter. This state of affairs  also epitomized resumption of mass public transportation and the cultural sphere.

A series of failures and lack of planning are not surprising considering the flawed performance of the government up until the first stages of the outbreak of the pandemic. There as well, the system suffered from similar flaws, but the mass quarantine did not require the government to exhibit high-resolution precision control, command and navigation that an exit strategy demands – the latter accompanied by dilemmas and deep tensions between health and socioeconomic calculations.

The State of Israel did not act wisely to implement lessons that could have been learned, to close gaps and correct failures that became evident in the initial stage of bringing the pandemic in check. Thus, among other things, no one was appointed and authorized as a Coronavirus "Czar" who could lead, coordinate and oversee the battle with the virus and its multi-dimensional ramifications. Flaws in explanations and contact with the public-at-large were not corrected. Work processes in staff work and coordination between ministries were not improved. There was no sign answers were taking shape how to address the crises that various sectors of the population faced.

Under such conditions – where an “inflated” Israeli government appears to be occupied primarily in political sparring and to have lost interest in the Cronavirus crisis, turning its attention to the annexation – public trust in officialdom has been sorely undermined. This milieu has radiated negatively on the public’s level of compliance with government directives and damaged prospects of cooperation on a broad scale by the public, should there be the need to return to extreme measures of social distancing. The more the scope of the socioeconomic crisis becomes evident (reflected in gloomy forecasts regarding unemployment and close businesses that will not reopen) the deeper the crisis in public confidence, accompanied by a sense of loss of control by the central government.

Failures in suitable conduct and gaps in grappling with the Coronavirus also typify the way the government is handling the annexation issue.

The government is handling a sensitive move – whose potential strategic risks and damage diplomatically and militarily are becoming more and more evident from day to day – in a reckless, impulsive and erratic fashion.

The political echelon has ‘compartmentalized’ the issue shutting out the professional echelon, and the discussion those at the helm are conducting with their own experts and executers is disjointed and flawed to the extent that staff work in an orderly fashion is impossible. The layout and scope of the move is not clear to Israel’s security and foreign affairs array (let alone the public, which is focused on surviving economically and health-wise). Moreover, the professional echelons are expected to prepare to meet the ramification of annexation while stumbling around in the dark, under a thick cloud of uncertainty. In the meantime, on the other side, steps are already underway in the Arab states and in the international arena against annexation, taking the form of a concerted coordinated and comprehensive struggle in the diplomatic arena and the battle over public opinion.

It is clear that the government’s choice to focus on annexation comes at the price of its ability – which appears limited in any case – to grapple with the Coronavirus crisis, whose severe ramifications affect every aspect of life in Israel. Thus, the government is dragging the country into a struggle that is a contest of its own making, not the upshot of realities – with grave ramifications and a growing web of threats as the days wear on, consequence that in the future could turn out to be irreversible.

Among the above: Erosion of the foundations of peace with Jordan, and undermining the stability of Israel’s eastern frontier. A marked weakening of the Palestinian Authority and a blow to its ability to rule in a way that would increase the tinderbox in Judea and Samaria, which can be expected to gradually draw the IDF into administration of the daily lives of the Palestinian population. A blow to transfer of monies from the Authority and from Qatar to Gaza that is liable to lead to undermining stability in the Gaza Strip to a point of igniting another ‘round’ of escalation. A severe blow to Israel’s standing as a bipartisan consensus in the United States, where opposition to annexation in Democratic Party circles and the Democratic presidential candidate expands and expands. Erosion in Israel’s international standing that will radiate on its ability to operate effectively against the Iranian threat. Public warnings from the Arab states to cut off progressively warming relations with Israel, and more.

Under such conditions, the State of Israel will be forced to choose its battles, when it is clear that the Coronavirus front is the most urgent, requiring focusing all the nation’s energies on bringing the pandemic in check. Considering the dire warnings Israel is receiving from so many quarters, it is vital that the government come to the conclusion that annexation, certainly if executed unilaterally and in haste, constitutes a strategic threat to Israel’s security and economic wellbeing, to its foreign relations and to Israel’s very character as a Jewish and democratic state, and refrain from such an impulsive and uncoordinated step.