The Annexation Plan:
A Core Challenge to the National Security of Israel

Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS

Executive Director, Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead

May 17, 2020

Seventy-two years of Israeli independence reflects impressive achievements in wide and diverse domains. It is precisely for this reason that the plan to annex territory in Judea and Samaria - first and foremost the Jordan Valley, is very worrisome. This is due to the far-reaching strategic ramifications such an act would have in the future on Israel’s security, economy and very character.

This document focuses on a number of aspects of national security and policy recommendations.

Undermining the Stability of Israel’s Eastern Border

Israel’s eastern border is characterized by great stability, calm and a very low level of terrorism. This is in contrast to the past, when for decades the eastern border was a hostile flash point and staging area for attacks on Israel. Today’s stability rests on three pillars: Israel’s military and intelligence capabilities; the stability of the Hashemite Kingdom; and security collaboration with the Palestinian Authority.

Implementation of the annexation plan is liable to deeply shake Israel’s strategic relationship with Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. Why? In the eyes of the Hashemite regime, annexation is a code word that in the subtext alludes to the concept there is an alternative Palestinian homeland – that is, the destruction of the Hashemite Kingdom, to be replaced by a Palestinian state. In the eyes of Jordan, such a move constitutes a major breach of the peace agreement between the two countries. Under such circumstances, Jordan is liable to emasculate the peace agreement. Parallel to this, annexation risks creating a strategic threat to the internal security of Jordan due to possible unrest among Palestinians, together with underlying economic distress Jordan already faces.

There is no substitute for Jordan as a critical element in Israeli security that otherwise would be ‘paid in blood, sweat and tears’ (resources - economic and military, and many lives). Security cooperation with Jordan preserves the security and calm on Israel’s longest border, and provides strategic depth, including vis-à-vis Iran.

Gradual Disintegration of the Palestinian Authority

In the absence of a diplomatic horizon, the Palestinian Authority will find itself at a dead end, Annexation is liable to seal the fate of the Two-State Solution -- a concept without which the Authority has no raison d'etre. In practice, the Authority refuses to be transformed into a control device in Israeli hands over the Palestinian population, In the absence of a diplomatic horizon, the Authority’s base of legitimacy will narrow; against the backdrop of already loaded relations between the Palestinian public and the government in Ramallah coupled with economic distress and chronic lack of certainty which was worsening dramatically under the shadow of the Coronavirus crisis, the Palestinian Authority will continue to sink. As a result, the effectiveness of cooperation with Israel on security will further deteriorate and weaken.

And who would replace the Authority? The IDF (!) that with its collapse would be forced to invest untold personnel and attention to dealing with riots and other challenges to public order, parallel to maintaining the infrastructure of the Palestinian Authority. If the Palestinian Authority would disappear, the burden of direct military occupation is tremendous in economic and diplomatic term, as well as military ones. On the other hand, the strength and prestige of Hamas, Iran and the likes would grow -- those actors who all the years rejected a diplomatic track and argued that the only alternative in grappling with Israel is via violence and terrorism.

This constitutes a grave multidimensional strategic threat to Israel. Imposition of the above missions on the IDF, by definition, would come at the expense of Israel’s ability to address strategic threats from Iran and its proxies. This will have a negative impact on the IDF’s preparedness for war. One can also expect a significant blow to generous international aid that the Authority receives, which is likely to drop, even evaporate entirely.

One needs to stress: The present times are particularly sensitive in the Palestinian arena, due to the blow in the economic realm in Judea and Samaria in the shadow of the Coronavirus crisis; which has been until now a core factor curbing the outbreak of large-scale violence in the arena. Even if symbolic and partial in scope, promotion of the annexation move could become a ‘trigger’ that would draw the Palestinian public in large numbers into the circle for a violent struggle with Israel, while creating solidarity between the government in Ramallah and Palestinian society that presently doesn’t exist.

Of no less grave significance, changes can be expected in the realm of perceptions whose expression on an operational and concrete level are hard to predict. The breakup of the Authority and expansion of Israeli control can be expected to lead to strengthening the One State Solution that already today has made increasing inroads in the Palestinian arena. Most of the Palestinian public that has sought to avoid a critical blow to their quality of life, will prefer to demand equal civil rights, due to, among other factors, the maturation of demographic processes in coming decades that will narrow the Jewish majority between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean.

The Annexation Plan and the Stability of Peace in the Region

At the foundations of the Annexation Plan is the assessment that one can take peace forward, hand-and-hand with annexation. This is an illusion!

The leaders of the Arab states- primarily Egypt, will not abandon the Palestinians. This is due, first and foremost, in light of the threat to their own internal security, particularly against the backdrop of the Coronavirus crisis, weakening of the status of the United States; and despite the overlapping of interests between them and Israel. Under such conditions, one can expect the return to center stage of the Arab League, which will put a ceiling on expansion of peace with Israel.

Again, it should be stressed: There is danger this will shake Israel’s peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan. This and more: Such a move is liable to put a chill on tightening of relations with the Gulf States, which in the face of the economic crisis sparked by the Coronavirus (primarily due to the sharp drop in crude oil prices), will demonstrate higher sensitivity than in the past to internal unrest and will be wary of moves that could lead to unrest at home - the first among them, opening relations with Israel.

Israel’s International Standing

A move for annexation is liable to cast Israel’s international standing in a shadow. Its status and Israel’s image in the European Union and among leading European countries as the only democracy in the Middle East is liable to be undermined.

In the long run, the demand of the Palestinian public for equal civil rights will likely resonate strongly even in the United States, whose DNA is built on the principle of “one man - one vote”. Under such conditions, and certainly in the event that November 2020 Presidential elections in America may bring a new administration to power, Israel’s standing as a bipartisan consensus would be further jeopardized by annexation.

In the international arena one can expect escalation in the operations of the BDS movement and heightened willingness of the International Criminal Court to address Israel’s actions in the territories. Such a development would expose IDF personnel and Israel’s citizenry to the risk of judicial action abroad.

In any case, Israel must not assume that the Coronavirus crisis has totally occupied the focus of the international community (particularly in the West) with problems on the home front, and no one will have the time or inclination to deal with moves initiated by Israel in the Palestinian arena. Most of the countries in the West are already in the process of executing an exit strategy from the Coronavirus crisis that will be paralleled by growing interest and re-involvement on the Israeli-Palestinian plane, and fear that unilateral steps will radiate on strategic realities in the Middle East.

The Domestic Arena in Israel

Such a move by Israel -partial, and all the more so full annexation—will radiate gravely on the public and political arena in Israel, that is already today in a very sensitive position against the backdrop of extended political tensions, domestic problems further aggravated by the ramifications of the Coronavirus crisis.

Such a move is liable also to radiate on Arab society in Israel, now in a state of plummeting expectations following the establishment of a National Unity Government that dashes hopes many Israeli Arab citizens had nurtured regarding greater influence and integration in Israeli politics and decision-making processes in the country. Against such a backdrop and adding to the growing social and economic tensions generated by the Coronavirus crisis, Israel may face a strong reaction on the part of the Arab public to steps towards annexation, including violent eruptions.

Policy Recommendations

Israel needs to conclude that unilateral annexation is a strategic threat to the future security and character of the country as a Jewish state and as democratic state in the Middle East. As a derivative of this, Israel must adopt an updated policy of refraining from actualization of the annexation plan. This is all the more so in the midst of an unprecedented Coronavirus crisis that threatens Israel’s economy, security and national resilience.

As a foundation for any decision on this issue, it is essential to examine in comprehensive staff work the ramifications of implementing the annexation plan. It is simply out of the question that all relevant positions will not be presented to the government and the Knesset.

Israel must immediately formulate a plan for comprehensive assistance to Jordan—security-wise, economically and diplomatically (while mobilizing external aid) in order to strengthen Israel’s eastern security border. It is essential to clarify to the Jordanian monarch that an alternative homeland solution (Palestinians’ state in Jordan) is not on the agenda.

It is important that Israel strengthen the Palestinian Authority as part of its successful endeavors to defeat terrorism and prevent the rise of radical forces.

Implementation of the above recommendations will be recognized as a core component in grappling with the primary threat—Iran, with Hezbollah on the northern front and with Hamas in Gaza.

This document was written by the team of the Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS)

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