Growing threats -
A combined strategic response is required
Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS
Executive Director
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
August, 2021
Israel faces several threats that are changing and forming which represent potential for escalation in varying ranges in time.
In Gaza, the seeds of a new flareup are being sown due to a combination of what appears to be a lack of deterrence vis-à-vis Hamas following Operation Guardian of the Walls, difficulty returning to the conditions that existed prior to the operation on the civil front (humanitarian infrastructure projects, Qatari funding of Hamas officials' salaries), and an Israeli policy determined to respond disproportionately to acts of terror from the Gaza Strip.
Israel is also on a collision course with Iran due to the ongoing maritime friction between the two countries, Iran's persisting efforts to entrench itself in the region, and the forming of threats inspired and assisted by it in other arenas, namely Iraq and Yemen. In this context, the Shiite militia group 'Hizballah Brigades' in Iraq has recently announced that it was now part of the anti-Israel regional equation.
In the meantime, in the stagnant nuclear negotiations in Vienna, the United States and world powers seem to be repeating past mistakes from the years that preceded the signing of the JPCOA by allowing Iran to keep expanding its nuclear program while the talks are being held, and leverage the technological progress on the ground to obtain greater concession from the world powers as part of the negotiations.
Iran is thus nearing a problematic nuclear threshold – it is in possession of about 110 kg of 20% purity enriched uranium (out of the 230 kg required for a bomb). In this context, Secretary of State Blinken has warned that the time will come when it will be very hard to return to the standards set by the nuclear deal since "ever more sophisticated centrifuges” and stepped-up uranium enrichment are getting Iran "dangerously close to the ability to develop a nuclear bomb".
In Lebanon, the state's crumbling process seems to be gaining momentum, as the negative dry economic figures, corruption, and ongoing unresolvable political crisis are being translated into dysfunction, system-wide collapse, and a severe detriment to citizens' quality of life. An extreme energy crisis leading to huge lines at filling stations and power cuts most hours of the day across the country, a shortage of basic food items and medication, steep rise in poverty threshold and expanding circle of families on the brink of starvation - are but some of the phenomena demonstrating the breakdown of state-governed frameworks.
The collapse in Lebanon has security implications for Israel. Hezbollah is the most organized body in the country, and the only one enjoying the support of a regional power – Iran. Therefore, under these exacerbating circumstances, Hezbollah may get a stronger hold on Lebanon, particularly in the south, in the interim range, and Iran could establish its status there by providing quick humanitarian aid and energy (oil). Iran and Hezoallah may very well exploit the situation to continue with and, more likely, accelerate the organization's military force buildup projects, while focusing on manufacturing precise missiles capable of hitting Israel.
In the shadow of the Lebanese crisis, Hezbollah may indeed be forced to focus on domestic challenges that would restrain its ability to engage in possible conflict with Israel; however, the organization will be extremely sensitive to the possibility that Israel would try to take advantage of the situation to deliver a blow to its military capabilities. Under these circumstances, the escalation potential following Israeli thwarting activities, even if they be of a low signature, will increase.
The grave international concern over Lebanon's catastrophic state of affairs is expected to lead to greater aid to the Lebanese Armed Forces, viewed as the only institution that represents a state-governed structure that is above all factional dispute, and could serve as a future alternative to Hezbollah. In addition, any attack on Lebanese state infrastructure as part of a future war between Israel and Hezbollah is expected to be received with very little international understanding.
In Gaza, the seeds of a new flareup are being sown due to a combination of what appears to be a lack of deterrence vis-à-vis Hamas following Operation Guardian of the Walls, difficulty returning to the conditions that existed prior to the operation on the civil front (humanitarian infrastructure projects, Qatari funding of Hamas officials' salaries), and an Israeli policy determined to respond disproportionately to acts of terror from the Gaza Strip.
Israel is also on a collision course with Iran due to the ongoing maritime friction between the two countries, Iran's persisting efforts to entrench itself in the region, and the forming of threats inspired and assisted by it in other arenas, namely Iraq and Yemen. In this context, the Shiite militia group 'Hizballah Brigades' in Iraq has recently announced that it was now part of the anti-Israel regional equation.
In the meantime, in the stagnant nuclear negotiations in Vienna, the United States and world powers seem to be repeating past mistakes from the years that preceded the signing of the JPCOA by allowing Iran to keep expanding its nuclear program while the talks are being held, and leverage the technological progress on the ground to obtain greater concession from the world powers as part of the negotiations.
Iran is thus nearing a problematic nuclear threshold – it is in possession of about 110 kg of 20% purity enriched uranium (out of the 230 kg required for a bomb). In this context, Secretary of State Blinken has warned that the time will come when it will be very hard to return to the standards set by the nuclear deal since "ever more sophisticated centrifuges” and stepped-up uranium enrichment are getting Iran "dangerously close to the ability to develop a nuclear bomb".
In Lebanon, the state's crumbling process seems to be gaining momentum, as the negative dry economic figures, corruption, and ongoing unresolvable political crisis are being translated into dysfunction, system-wide collapse, and a severe detriment to citizens' quality of life. An extreme energy crisis leading to huge lines at filling stations and power cuts most hours of the day across the country, a shortage of basic food items and medication, steep rise in poverty threshold and expanding circle of families on the brink of starvation - are but some of the phenomena demonstrating the breakdown of state-governed frameworks.
The collapse in Lebanon has security implications for Israel. Hezbollah is the most organized body in the country, and the only one enjoying the support of a regional power – Iran. Therefore, under these exacerbating circumstances, Hezbollah may get a stronger hold on Lebanon, particularly in the south, in the interim range, and Iran could establish its status there by providing quick humanitarian aid and energy (oil). Iran and Hezoallah may very well exploit the situation to continue with and, more likely, accelerate the organization's military force buildup projects, while focusing on manufacturing precise missiles capable of hitting Israel.
In the shadow of the Lebanese crisis, Hezbollah may indeed be forced to focus on domestic challenges that would restrain its ability to engage in possible conflict with Israel; however, the organization will be extremely sensitive to the possibility that Israel would try to take advantage of the situation to deliver a blow to its military capabilities. Under these circumstances, the escalation potential following Israeli thwarting activities, even if they be of a low signature, will increase.
The grave international concern over Lebanon's catastrophic state of affairs is expected to lead to greater aid to the Lebanese Armed Forces, viewed as the only institution that represents a state-governed structure that is above all factional dispute, and could serve as a future alternative to Hezbollah. In addition, any attack on Lebanese state infrastructure as part of a future war between Israel and Hezbollah is expected to be received with very little international understanding.
Recommendations for Israel
At present, Israel should focus on the Iranian nuclear challenge and the threats in the northern arena, and avoid getting dragged into another campaign in Gaza at less-than-optimal timing.
Israel should prepare for the collapse of the Vienna negotiations, even if such a scenario is less likely at this stage, and get ready for a broader diplomatic and other campaign for stopping Iran's technological nuclear progress based on close coordination with the United States and Biden Administration, and using the communication and collaboration channels established with it in political, military, and operational areas.
As part of its said preparation, Israel is advised to demand that the international community condition the Vienna negotiations with Iran upon the cessation of the latter's technological nuclear advancement. Israel should also raise the need for the United States to once again pose a credible military threat to Iran, and reiterate that "all options are on the table" (the last person to use this formula was President Obama).
Israel should prepare for the collapse of the Vienna negotiations, even if such a scenario is less likely at this stage, and get ready for a broader diplomatic and other campaign for stopping Iran's technological nuclear progress based on close coordination with the United States and Biden Administration, and using the communication and collaboration channels established with it in political, military, and operational areas.
As part of its said preparation, Israel is advised to demand that the international community condition the Vienna negotiations with Iran upon the cessation of the latter's technological nuclear advancement. Israel should also raise the need for the United States to once again pose a credible military threat to Iran, and reiterate that "all options are on the table" (the last person to use this formula was President Obama).
On the military-security front, Israel is required to:
a. Build the capability to deliver a surprising multidimensional attack against Hamas' military wing at a time and place of Israel's choosing. The required effect is a harsh blow that would resonate in the region and deter the radical axis, get etched in Arab memory, reinstate Israeli deterrence vis-à-vis Hamas, and thwart the growing threat posed by the movement to the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.
b. Develop tools as well as a smart strategy for the friction expected to grow with Iran so as to limit the conflict as much as possible to arenas in which Israel has an edge.
c. Focus its effort against the changing threat of force buildup posed by Hezbollah, particularly with regard to PGM's.
d. Consider the possibility that the deterrence effect embodied by hitting Lebanese infrastructure in a large scale conflict with Hezbollah is being eroded as Lebanon continues to crumble. The international intolerance expected in such a scenario whereby Lebanese infrastructure is hit requires a reexamination of the idea of destroying Lebanon as part of a future war.
e. Take steps vis-à-vis the international community to ensure that other countries do not supply the Lebanese Armed Forces with advanced offensive weapons that could fall into the wrong hands, and pose a threat to IDF troops in case of an escalation.
Ultimately, Israel should follow carefully planned timetables and priorities to create efficient solutions to the threats forming and changing around it. Israeli conduct must ensure that Israel would be able to concentrate an immediate effort vis-à-vis the international community on the Iranian nuclear challenge, while timing friction on military levels to a time and place of its own choosing.