Israel is in urgent need of a national security policy
Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS
Executive Director
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
May, 2021
An exacerbation in a series of strategic challenges Israel is currently facing has been noted recently while the local leadership is in deep political crisis, stalling to craft a policy vis à vis the emerging reality, and taking decisions without strategizing or going through an organized decision-making process entailing an analysis of alternatives and implications as required in issues affecting national security.
The violent eruption in Jerusalem and Gaza is one striking example, demonstrating the sensitive linkages and high explosiveness in the Palestinian arena, which the postponed elections has only increased.
The damage of the election process in the Palestinian arena has already been caused against the backdrop of the unrest, split and camps in Fatah ranks, divided into four groups, while Hamas is operating as a united, organized system. The entire event has demonstrated the Palestinian leadership's feebleness in Judea and Samaria; the overall weakening of the Palestinian Authority as a governing system, due to worsen once Abu Mazen will no longer be in power; and the evolving internal war of succession in Fatah ranks.
At the same time, the shadow cast by the Iranian challenge is growing longer. While progress in the negotiations over the return to the problematic nuclear deal seems to be made in Vienna, Israel is emerging in Washington as oppositional to Biden Administration policies, and seeking its downfall. On the eve of the U.S. Secretary of Defense's visit to Israel, Prime Minister Netanyahu used a threatening tone when stating that Israel will not be bound by the JCPOA. Earlier, signals were conveyed that Israel is preparing military options; and according to accusations coming from Tehran, and leaks to foreign and Israeli media, Israel was allegedly behind the explosion in Natanz and the hit of IRGC sea vessel in the Red Sea.
Israel may pay a considerable price if the administration will determine that the steps it is taking are designed to sabotage the return to the JCPOA – the latter being a strategic American objective. The United States is striving to return to the nuclear deal in order to "put Iran back in its box" so as to turn to foreign affairs of a far higher priority, first and foremost, the great power competition with China and Russia. The fight over the lead in the race with China is perceived by Washington as a historic struggle for world order and the supremacy of the democratic system; and Israeli moves against the return to the JCPOA may be viewed as placing stumbling blocks before the United States as it pursues a first-rate national security priority.
In the meantime, the conflict between the great powers is constantly "heating", playing an ever-growing part in the global agenda. The tension with Russia due to the developments in the Ukraine, and the sanctions imposed by the United States against Moscow in response to its "hostile actions" (cyber attacks, intervening in the elections) have included the expulsion of Russian diplomats. At the same time, President Biden and the Japanese Prime Minister – the first leader to visit Washington as the new administration's guest – have announced they will face China's threatening policy together, and create joint deterrence in the Eastern China Sea and Taiwan Straits while opposing Chinese oppression tactics in Hong Kong.
In the absence of strategy or chemistry between the Israeli and American leaders, a confrontational policy vis à vis Washington will reflect negatively on the two countries' overall relations, leave Israel isolated, gradually turn the Iranian issue into an "Israeli problem", while weakening Israel's image and power in the eyes of the Arab world as well. Despite advanced security ties, Israel's relations with Egypt are cold, while its relations with Jordan are tense. Little progress is being made in the normalization process, Saudi Arabia is joining the UAE in its adoption of a risk hedging policy vis à vis Tehran due to the progress made in the Vienna negotiations, and the political developments in Israel may have led the Gulf States to speculate about its ostensible collaboration with the Muslim Brotherhood.
Under such circumstances, and in the absence of American support, Israel may find it difficult to broaden the normalization circle, deepen its strategic ties with the Arab states, and harness them to help it address the challenges it is facing in the Palestinian, regional, and Iranian arenas.
The violent eruption in Jerusalem and Gaza is one striking example, demonstrating the sensitive linkages and high explosiveness in the Palestinian arena, which the postponed elections has only increased.
The damage of the election process in the Palestinian arena has already been caused against the backdrop of the unrest, split and camps in Fatah ranks, divided into four groups, while Hamas is operating as a united, organized system. The entire event has demonstrated the Palestinian leadership's feebleness in Judea and Samaria; the overall weakening of the Palestinian Authority as a governing system, due to worsen once Abu Mazen will no longer be in power; and the evolving internal war of succession in Fatah ranks.
At the same time, the shadow cast by the Iranian challenge is growing longer. While progress in the negotiations over the return to the problematic nuclear deal seems to be made in Vienna, Israel is emerging in Washington as oppositional to Biden Administration policies, and seeking its downfall. On the eve of the U.S. Secretary of Defense's visit to Israel, Prime Minister Netanyahu used a threatening tone when stating that Israel will not be bound by the JCPOA. Earlier, signals were conveyed that Israel is preparing military options; and according to accusations coming from Tehran, and leaks to foreign and Israeli media, Israel was allegedly behind the explosion in Natanz and the hit of IRGC sea vessel in the Red Sea.
Israel may pay a considerable price if the administration will determine that the steps it is taking are designed to sabotage the return to the JCPOA – the latter being a strategic American objective. The United States is striving to return to the nuclear deal in order to "put Iran back in its box" so as to turn to foreign affairs of a far higher priority, first and foremost, the great power competition with China and Russia. The fight over the lead in the race with China is perceived by Washington as a historic struggle for world order and the supremacy of the democratic system; and Israeli moves against the return to the JCPOA may be viewed as placing stumbling blocks before the United States as it pursues a first-rate national security priority.
In the meantime, the conflict between the great powers is constantly "heating", playing an ever-growing part in the global agenda. The tension with Russia due to the developments in the Ukraine, and the sanctions imposed by the United States against Moscow in response to its "hostile actions" (cyber attacks, intervening in the elections) have included the expulsion of Russian diplomats. At the same time, President Biden and the Japanese Prime Minister – the first leader to visit Washington as the new administration's guest – have announced they will face China's threatening policy together, and create joint deterrence in the Eastern China Sea and Taiwan Straits while opposing Chinese oppression tactics in Hong Kong.
In the absence of strategy or chemistry between the Israeli and American leaders, a confrontational policy vis à vis Washington will reflect negatively on the two countries' overall relations, leave Israel isolated, gradually turn the Iranian issue into an "Israeli problem", while weakening Israel's image and power in the eyes of the Arab world as well. Despite advanced security ties, Israel's relations with Egypt are cold, while its relations with Jordan are tense. Little progress is being made in the normalization process, Saudi Arabia is joining the UAE in its adoption of a risk hedging policy vis à vis Tehran due to the progress made in the Vienna negotiations, and the political developments in Israel may have led the Gulf States to speculate about its ostensible collaboration with the Muslim Brotherhood.
Under such circumstances, and in the absence of American support, Israel may find it difficult to broaden the normalization circle, deepen its strategic ties with the Arab states, and harness them to help it address the challenges it is facing in the Palestinian, regional, and Iranian arenas.
Which actions should Israel take?
A top priority should be to restore trust and promote strategic coordination with the U.S. administration in an effort to jointly address the Iranian challenge. While continuing to engage in the "campaign between the wars" to inhibit Iran's military entrenchment in the region, Israel would do well to shift from loud, oppositional diplomacy with the U.S. administration - which negatively reflects on its overall relations with the United States - to quiet, intimate dialogue. This bilateral coordination should be based on the robust American commitment to Israel's security, and the two countries' shared view that Iran must not be allowed to have nuclear weapons, while relying on the effective collaboration channels between the two countries in areas such as intelligence, defense, and operations.
In view of the exacerbating great power competition between the United States, China and Russia, Israel must conduct itself cautiously in its relations with U.S. rivals, while also ensuring complete transparency with Washington, particularly with respect to oversight of Chinese investments in sensitive technologies, so that the U.S. administration will be able to determine with certainty that Israel's ties with China and Russia do not jeopardize U.S. interests.
On the regional level, Israel is required to clear the air in its relations with Jordan, and warm up its ties with Egypt on the leadership level as well. The extensive medical aid to the Hashemite Kingdom in its fight against COVID-19 which the Israeli government recently decided upon is a step in the right direction. Close coordination with Amman and Cairo is essential when addressing the challenges of the Palestinian arena as well, if the delicate balances and stability there are upset.
In any event, Israel should bring the two-state solution prospect back to the table in close coordination with the Biden Administration while restoring security and balance in Jerusalem, and restraining Hamas in Gaza. It should simultaneously harness the normalization process with the Gulf States to give attention to the Palestinian Authority, instead of casting it aside. Such steps, alongside the renewal of relations between Washington and the PA could impede the latter's weakening as a governing system.
In view of the exacerbating great power competition between the United States, China and Russia, Israel must conduct itself cautiously in its relations with U.S. rivals, while also ensuring complete transparency with Washington, particularly with respect to oversight of Chinese investments in sensitive technologies, so that the U.S. administration will be able to determine with certainty that Israel's ties with China and Russia do not jeopardize U.S. interests.
On the regional level, Israel is required to clear the air in its relations with Jordan, and warm up its ties with Egypt on the leadership level as well. The extensive medical aid to the Hashemite Kingdom in its fight against COVID-19 which the Israeli government recently decided upon is a step in the right direction. Close coordination with Amman and Cairo is essential when addressing the challenges of the Palestinian arena as well, if the delicate balances and stability there are upset.
In any event, Israel should bring the two-state solution prospect back to the table in close coordination with the Biden Administration while restoring security and balance in Jerusalem, and restraining Hamas in Gaza. It should simultaneously harness the normalization process with the Gulf States to give attention to the Palestinian Authority, instead of casting it aside. Such steps, alongside the renewal of relations between Washington and the PA could impede the latter's weakening as a governing system.
Ultimately, the unprecedented political crisis is reflecting negatively on Israel's ability to form a strategy and effective responses vis à vis the series of threats and challenges that are currently exacerbating. A crisis of this magnitude requires leaders' urgent response en route to the consolidation of a long-term policy that will set strategic objectives, and take combined action toward achieving them.