5 Core Issues as we Welcome
the New Jewish Year
the New Jewish Year
Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS
Executive Director
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
October 11, 2020
Photo: Kobi Gideon - GPO
The new Jewish year finds Israel grappling with several demanding unmet challenges. At the same time, there have also been some positive developments that should be retained and leveraged to create new opportunities.
Among the latter are the favorable Abraham Accords normalizing relations with the UAE and Bahrain. They indicate growing acceptance of Israel in the region, while reflecting the magnitude of the interests it shares with Arab states, the most prominent of which are a strong front against the Iranian threat as well as the challenge posed by Islamic extremism and terrorism. The accords could also potentially lead to collaborations both economic and technological, as well as an exchange in areas such as defense, medicine, and science.
Among the former are all aspects of the Coronavirus crisis, which is exacerbating while being characterized by a loss of control and the absence of leadership; the Israeli-Palestinian relations heading down the slippery crisis slope in Judea and Samaria as well as Gaza; and the threat posed by Iran and its allies in the region, a key strategic challenge that may become more acute.
Among the latter are the favorable Abraham Accords normalizing relations with the UAE and Bahrain. They indicate growing acceptance of Israel in the region, while reflecting the magnitude of the interests it shares with Arab states, the most prominent of which are a strong front against the Iranian threat as well as the challenge posed by Islamic extremism and terrorism. The accords could also potentially lead to collaborations both economic and technological, as well as an exchange in areas such as defense, medicine, and science.
Among the former are all aspects of the Coronavirus crisis, which is exacerbating while being characterized by a loss of control and the absence of leadership; the Israeli-Palestinian relations heading down the slippery crisis slope in Judea and Samaria as well as Gaza; and the threat posed by Iran and its allies in the region, a key strategic challenge that may become more acute.
The Coronavirus crisis and updating priorities
The challenge:
The Israeli government has displayed an absolute lack of governance while cracking under political pressure, effectively losing its control over the spread of the pandemic and its devastating socio-economic implications. So much so that it has been reduced to imposing yet another lockdown at a time when the public's trust is all but lost, chaos reigns high, a leadership vacuum has formed fueled by dysfunctional public diplomacy, and further exacerbation is possibly on the horizon as winter draws nearer.
The response:
A leadership-oriented solution is urgently required. An effective response must begin with a leadership spearheading a multidimensional apolitical battle against COVID-19 and its associated health, financial, and social hazards. Proper leadership would enable the budget to be approved, meet socio-economic needs while improving the health system's inadequate infrastructure, and put in place a multiannual plan for building up the IDF's force (vital for proper military functioning).
The strategic defense arena
The challenge:
To maintain Israel's military supremacy and continue addressing the Iranian threat. It is the IDF's top priority to utilize U.S. foreign aid funds immediately, currently inexplicably stalled by Israel (and amounting to some USD15bn annually). It is essential to utilize these funds to maintain the IDF's quality military edge (QME), which will be jeopardized in future by Washington's decision, probably with Israel's consent, to sell advanced F-35 aircraft to the UAE. There is some concern that this precedent will prompt a force buildup throughout the Arab world (an arms race), potentially violating the principle of maintaining Israel's military advantage.
The response:
Approving a multiannual plan and defense budget for the IDF that will outline force buildup priorities vis à vis a range of threats, including unexpected ones. A strong and persistent stance promoting the immediate receipt of FMF funds, and preventing red lines from being crossed with regard to Arab armament, while maintaining Israel's ability to act vis à vis Iran. At the same time, strategic political relations with Arab states must remain intact, and deterioration in the Palestinian arena due to dangerous steps such as the annexation prevented, as has been done so far.
The Palestinian arena demands input
The challenge:
The Abraham Accords have clearly pushed the Palestinian Authority towards the open arms of the radical camp in the region, and it is currently being supported by Iran, Turkey, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizballah, and others. The PA – which is radicalizing its stances, avoiding from civil and security coordination with Israel, and is losing its right to exist as part of the effort to steer towards a two-state solution – is gradually fading as a governing system. Under such circumstances, the Civil Administration and IDF have already assumed some of its powers, and may be increasingly forced to manage the lives of millions of Palestinians on the ground.
A "crawling" return to direct military control of the Palestinian population in Judea and Samaria, ultimately leading to a de-facto one-state reality, would create an extremely heavy burden on the Israeli economy, while proving detrimental to the IDF's ability to address the threats posed by Iran and the northern front. At the same time, civil conditions are exacerbating in Gaza as Hamas continues to build up its force.
A "crawling" return to direct military control of the Palestinian population in Judea and Samaria, ultimately leading to a de-facto one-state reality, would create an extremely heavy burden on the Israeli economy, while proving detrimental to the IDF's ability to address the threats posed by Iran and the northern front. At the same time, civil conditions are exacerbating in Gaza as Hamas continues to build up its force.
The response:
Despite the normalization, Israel must realize that the Palestinian issue is not disappearing, but exacerbating. Ignoring it to the point of abandoning it while turning its attention to the Arab world could blow up in Israel's face. Israel is required to leverage its normalization accords to infuse the Palestinian issue with input, announce that the dangerous annexation plan is off the table, and bring the two-state solution back into its discourse in an effort to return to full coordination with the PA, strengthening the latter as much as possible as the governing system responsible for managing the lives of the Palestinian population.
the Gaza issue stands no chance of being resolved as long as no alternative has been presented for Hamas rule, which denies Israel's right to exist, and embraces armed resistance. Nevertheless, Israel has a profound interest to ensure that the civil conditions in Gaza do not slip down the slippery slope towards a humanitarian crisis that would inevitably cross over into its territory. The Gaza Strip must therefore be opened to broad and diverse aid, under security restrictions, as well as to export, while avoiding all harm to civil aspects at all times.
the Gaza issue stands no chance of being resolved as long as no alternative has been presented for Hamas rule, which denies Israel's right to exist, and embraces armed resistance. Nevertheless, Israel has a profound interest to ensure that the civil conditions in Gaza do not slip down the slippery slope towards a humanitarian crisis that would inevitably cross over into its territory. The Gaza Strip must therefore be opened to broad and diverse aid, under security restrictions, as well as to export, while avoiding all harm to civil aspects at all times.
The Iranian challenge goes through the U.S.
The challenge:
The most dramatic impact on the evolvement of the Iranian challenge, particularly in its nuclear aspect, is attributed to an event that will take place outside the Middle East – the U.S. elections. The nuclear policy of both presidential candidates may pose a difficult challenge for Israel.
President Trump seems eager to reach an agreement with Iran quickly, even if he must compromise on its terms. Trump may present any agreement as better than that of his predecessor, former president Obama, even if it will not, in effect, address the grievous flaws of the JCPOA: the expiration of restrictions ("sunset"), advanced centrifuge R&D, and authority to oversee the weapons program.
By contrast, the Democrats' candidate, Biden, has announced that as soon as Iran will once again comply with the terms of the agreement, the U.S. will recommit itself to it as well, indicating the lifting of sanctions. According to Biden's plan, only then, when the sanction lever will have effectively been removed and his chances of success substantially diminished, will he enter into negotiations with Iran over fixing the JCPOA flaws.
At the same time, both Trump and Biden may be reluctant to pose a credible military threat to Iran during negotiations. Both seek to extract the U.S. from the "never-ending" wars in the Middle East, and expedite the removal of its forces from the region – two items on the U.S. agenda that enjoy a rare consensus among its divided public.
President Trump seems eager to reach an agreement with Iran quickly, even if he must compromise on its terms. Trump may present any agreement as better than that of his predecessor, former president Obama, even if it will not, in effect, address the grievous flaws of the JCPOA: the expiration of restrictions ("sunset"), advanced centrifuge R&D, and authority to oversee the weapons program.
By contrast, the Democrats' candidate, Biden, has announced that as soon as Iran will once again comply with the terms of the agreement, the U.S. will recommit itself to it as well, indicating the lifting of sanctions. According to Biden's plan, only then, when the sanction lever will have effectively been removed and his chances of success substantially diminished, will he enter into negotiations with Iran over fixing the JCPOA flaws.
At the same time, both Trump and Biden may be reluctant to pose a credible military threat to Iran during negotiations. Both seek to extract the U.S. from the "never-ending" wars in the Middle East, and expedite the removal of its forces from the region – two items on the U.S. agenda that enjoy a rare consensus among its divided public.
The response:
Israel must begin a profound dialog immediately with both the Trump administration and Biden's foreign affairs team to ensure that the U.S. will insist upon rectifying the weaknesses inherent to the JCPOA, and not leave Israel alone with this problem. This will require Israel and the U.S. to jointly contemplate and prepare for the strategic implications and challenges associated with minimizing US military presence in the region.
US-Israel relations – Alarming trends
The challenge:
Israel's status as a bi-partisan consensus is facing dangerous erosion as it is gradually becoming a point of political dispute in light of deepening U.S. polarization, particularly during this election year. The level of solidarity with Israel is also dropping, even among U.S. Jewry, and being increasingly replaced by distancing and alienation trends. These are sensitive issues crucial to Israel's national security.
Another challenge that may cast a shadow over Israel-U.S. relations is China. The U.S. views it as the greatest threat to its national security and to liberal values these days. Despite the close dialog on China between Israel and the U.S., both the administration and non-governmental bodies accessible in Washington continue to convey their deep concern over Israel's conduct, and that of its apparatuses', in Chinese investments, particularly in technology.
Another challenge that may cast a shadow over Israel-U.S. relations is China. The U.S. views it as the greatest threat to its national security and to liberal values these days. Despite the close dialog on China between Israel and the U.S., both the administration and non-governmental bodies accessible in Washington continue to convey their deep concern over Israel's conduct, and that of its apparatuses', in Chinese investments, particularly in technology.
The response:
The Israeli government must urgently address its relations with the U.S., and consolidate an organized political and diplomatic plan containing clear and required objectives and accomplishments pertaining to its conduct vis à vis the next US administration, whether Republican or Democrat. In this context, its top priority should be retaining bi-partisan support of Israel, and the Iranian nuclear challenge.
In addition, the establishment of an inter-ministerial team is recommended for the consolidation of a detailed plan promoting stronger ties between Israel and the U.S. Jewry as well as a shared vision. Israel must fortify its public diplomacy agencies assigned with promoting its image as a democratic state in their campaign against anti-Israeli propaganda in the US. As for China, in order to avoid a crisis in its relations with the U.S., Israel must enhance its oversight mechanisms on Chinese investments in coordination with the U.S. while acting in full transparency to ensure that it meets the American standard so that the U.S. administration could determine that China's activity in Israel does not pose a risk to U.S. interests.
In addition, the establishment of an inter-ministerial team is recommended for the consolidation of a detailed plan promoting stronger ties between Israel and the U.S. Jewry as well as a shared vision. Israel must fortify its public diplomacy agencies assigned with promoting its image as a democratic state in their campaign against anti-Israeli propaganda in the US. As for China, in order to avoid a crisis in its relations with the U.S., Israel must enhance its oversight mechanisms on Chinese investments in coordination with the U.S. while acting in full transparency to ensure that it meets the American standard so that the U.S. administration could determine that China's activity in Israel does not pose a risk to U.S. interests.