Israel is in a labyrinth – what should it do?
Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS
Executive Director
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
February, 2021
Photos: Pete Linforth from Pixabay | Israel Ministry of Health
On the eve of another election campaign, Israel is in a wild "spin" with regard to its abilities to cope with the multidimensional crisis it is in, and the complex challenges it faces. Its inability to make and implement necessary decisions has uncovered dangerous gaps in governance – particularly in ultraorthodox and Arab societies as well as in Judea and Samaria – that emerge as a national threat to the nation's wellbeing as well as to its health, economy, and social fabric. A political leadership crisis negatively impacts citizens' trust in the regime and their elected officials, as well as their compliance with directives, ultimately exacerbating the governance issue.
Following are the key challenges and threats requiring urgent solving, as well as recommendations for addressing them.
Following are the key challenges and threats requiring urgent solving, as well as recommendations for addressing them.
Overcoming COVID-19
The challenge:
The race between the vaccine operation and spread of the disease could end with the virus winning, in a scenario involving the development of violent variants that are more contagious and resilient, the likelihood of which increases under a pandemic "breakout" occurring at the same time as a mass vaccination process. Under such circumstances, Israel, whose government has failed to address COVID-19 on all aspects, may find itself shattered and lacking the tools to counter the threat of the pandemic.
The race between the vaccine operation and spread of the disease could end with the virus winning, in a scenario involving the development of violent variants that are more contagious and resilient, the likelihood of which increases under a pandemic "breakout" occurring at the same time as a mass vaccination process. Under such circumstances, Israel, whose government has failed to address COVID-19 on all aspects, may find itself shattered and lacking the tools to counter the threat of the pandemic.
The response:
Israel must embark upon an immediate, comprehensive, determined, and uncompromising campaign to lower morbidity to zero in order to ensure that the effectiveness of the vaccines is not compromised. The way forward must be based on the recommendations of professional and scientific experts, and be devoid of any ulterior, political or other motives. As part of this campaign, unequivocal and uncompromising enforcement is required in all areas in accordance with morbidity levels; tight control and supervision at all entry points into Israel, alongside high-output testing and breaking the chains of infection.
The pandemic-induced economic crisis
The challenge:
The COVID-19 crisis has led to more than 5,000 deaths, a third lockdown, almost one million unemployed, and an unprecedented budgetary deficit that keeps on growing, yet Israel continues to conduct itself with no long-term plan or priorities. What's worse, it has no budget, and the current "election economics" is expected to further exacerbate the state of the economy in the medium- and long-range, making it harder to come out of the crisis, if and when Israel will overcome the pandemic.
The COVID-19 crisis has led to more than 5,000 deaths, a third lockdown, almost one million unemployed, and an unprecedented budgetary deficit that keeps on growing, yet Israel continues to conduct itself with no long-term plan or priorities. What's worse, it has no budget, and the current "election economics" is expected to further exacerbate the state of the economy in the medium- and long-range, making it harder to come out of the crisis, if and when Israel will overcome the pandemic.
The response:
An inter-ministerial team of professionals and experts must be set up to consolidate a serious national plan for stabilizing the economy (such as the one drafted in the mid-1980s), the aim of which will be to lead Israel back to full employment and renewed growth on "the day after" the pandemic.
At the same time, it is crucial to urgently approve a budget for 2021 that will provide the much-needed direction and anchor of stability during the economy' long process of recovery. A lack of budget creates public uncertainty, and only exacerbates the crisis. Conventional economic steps for addressing recession, let alone "election economics", merely amount to "throwing money away". Under the terms dictated by the pandemic, private and business demand in the economy drops, and consumption cannot be increased by encouraging disposable income.
At the same time, it is crucial to urgently approve a budget for 2021 that will provide the much-needed direction and anchor of stability during the economy' long process of recovery. A lack of budget creates public uncertainty, and only exacerbates the crisis. Conventional economic steps for addressing recession, let alone "election economics", merely amount to "throwing money away". Under the terms dictated by the pandemic, private and business demand in the economy drops, and consumption cannot be increased by encouraging disposable income.
Iran and coordination with the United States
The challenge:
The Iranian issue is emerging as the key factor shaping Israel's relations with the new administration in Washington as the latter persistently advances toward returning to the JCPOA with Iran. In the short range, this may rollback Iran's violations, and extend breakout time before it obtains fissile material for a nuclear weapon. However, in the medium range, seven years from now, the limitations in the agreement will begin to expire, and it will, in effect, pave the way for Iran to become a nuclear threshold state with full international legitimization.
Israel's conduct vis à vis the Biden administration with regard to its policy on Iran is viewed as defiant, certainly in Washington. Even before President Biden had set foot inside the White House, Netanyahu urged him to refrain from returning to the "flawed" nuclear deal. Washington also attributed the assassination of nuclear scientist Fakhrizadeh to Israel, claiming that it was designed to stop the elected administration from returning to the path of diplomacy with Iran. Since the U.S. President's inauguration, Israel has been contacting the new administration "through the media", leaking maximal "demands", such as forbidding any Iranian uranium enrichment, and ending Iranian presence in regional theaters. Israel also seems to be signaling to the Biden administration that its return to the JCPOA may lead the former to reconsider military options.
Biden and the team he appointed took part in drafting the nuclear deal; they believe in it, and regard the return to it as a solution for the foreseeable future that will allow them to address more pressing matters on their list of priorities, namely the domestic issue (health and socio-economics), the great power competition with China and Russia, reinstating U.S. global leadership and credibility, cybersecurity threats, and North Korea.
Biden and his team were deeply agitated by Israel's attempt to thwart the nuclear deal with Iran back when President Obama was in office. Thus, should the administration feel that Israel is once again bringing a conflictual approach to the table, a defiant discourse outside the "closed rooms", and unrealistic views – it may altogether "shut the door" on its attempts to impact its policy. In such a scenario, the tension surrounding the Iranian issue could cloud the overall relations between the two allies, negatively impacting Israel's status and security in the region.
The Iranian issue is emerging as the key factor shaping Israel's relations with the new administration in Washington as the latter persistently advances toward returning to the JCPOA with Iran. In the short range, this may rollback Iran's violations, and extend breakout time before it obtains fissile material for a nuclear weapon. However, in the medium range, seven years from now, the limitations in the agreement will begin to expire, and it will, in effect, pave the way for Iran to become a nuclear threshold state with full international legitimization.
Israel's conduct vis à vis the Biden administration with regard to its policy on Iran is viewed as defiant, certainly in Washington. Even before President Biden had set foot inside the White House, Netanyahu urged him to refrain from returning to the "flawed" nuclear deal. Washington also attributed the assassination of nuclear scientist Fakhrizadeh to Israel, claiming that it was designed to stop the elected administration from returning to the path of diplomacy with Iran. Since the U.S. President's inauguration, Israel has been contacting the new administration "through the media", leaking maximal "demands", such as forbidding any Iranian uranium enrichment, and ending Iranian presence in regional theaters. Israel also seems to be signaling to the Biden administration that its return to the JCPOA may lead the former to reconsider military options.
Biden and the team he appointed took part in drafting the nuclear deal; they believe in it, and regard the return to it as a solution for the foreseeable future that will allow them to address more pressing matters on their list of priorities, namely the domestic issue (health and socio-economics), the great power competition with China and Russia, reinstating U.S. global leadership and credibility, cybersecurity threats, and North Korea.
Biden and his team were deeply agitated by Israel's attempt to thwart the nuclear deal with Iran back when President Obama was in office. Thus, should the administration feel that Israel is once again bringing a conflictual approach to the table, a defiant discourse outside the "closed rooms", and unrealistic views – it may altogether "shut the door" on its attempts to impact its policy. In such a scenario, the tension surrounding the Iranian issue could cloud the overall relations between the two allies, negatively impacting Israel's status and security in the region.
The response:
Israel must lay low, and refrain from public, threatening diplomacy vis à vis the U.S. administration, whereby its views are presented in advance by the media. Instead, it is advised to pursue quiet, intimate dialogue based on the shared view that Iran must not be allowed to have nuclear weapons, while relying on the existing robust channels of cooperation in areas such as intelligence, defense, and operations between the two countries, and strengthening them.
In order to build trust with the incoming administration that will enable it to impact U.S. policy, Israel must display constructive, practical views, and avoid threatening to opt for the military alternative. The chances of implementing an Israeli military option against the U.S.'s better judgement is low in any event, and is virtually illogical at present, since the return to the JCPOA keeps Iran's nuclear program far enough away from breaking out to nuclear arms in upcoming years.
The negotiations between the United States and Iran on the return to the nuclear deal are expected to be complex, may run into difficulties, and are likely to take couple of months at the very least. Thus, a window of opportunity may open for profound dialogue between Jerusalem and Washington on this issue, during which Israel should strive to convince the Biden administration of the advantages of a gradual, cautious approach to Iran, while setting benchmarks and maintaining leverages vis à vis the regime in Tehran. During the dialogue with the U.S. administration it is important to prioritize the nuclear challenge (including nuclear capable missiles) while also discussing, simultaneously but separately, collaborations to inhibit other regional threats to Israel posed by Iran, particularly along the former's northern border.
Israel is also advised to avoid seeking to create a shared regional front with the moderate Arab states against the U.S. administration's policy on Iran (as opposed to an anti-Iranian front). Such a move may be perceived by Washington as defiant, and, in any event, the Arab states are expected to align themselves with the Biden administration in light of their security's profound dependence upon American guarantees.
Finally, to allow U.S.-IS relations to focus on Iran, it is vital that Israel remove any other obstacle and dissipate any further tension with the incoming administration. As part of this effort, and in light of Washington's extreme sensitivity with respect to the great power competition, Israel must conduct itself with full coordination and transparency vis à vis the United States with regard to its relations with Russia and China to ensure that it meets the American standard. This way, the U.S. administration would be able to determine that China's activity in Israel and Israel's relations with Russia do not pose any risk to U.S. interests.
In order to build trust with the incoming administration that will enable it to impact U.S. policy, Israel must display constructive, practical views, and avoid threatening to opt for the military alternative. The chances of implementing an Israeli military option against the U.S.'s better judgement is low in any event, and is virtually illogical at present, since the return to the JCPOA keeps Iran's nuclear program far enough away from breaking out to nuclear arms in upcoming years.
The negotiations between the United States and Iran on the return to the nuclear deal are expected to be complex, may run into difficulties, and are likely to take couple of months at the very least. Thus, a window of opportunity may open for profound dialogue between Jerusalem and Washington on this issue, during which Israel should strive to convince the Biden administration of the advantages of a gradual, cautious approach to Iran, while setting benchmarks and maintaining leverages vis à vis the regime in Tehran. During the dialogue with the U.S. administration it is important to prioritize the nuclear challenge (including nuclear capable missiles) while also discussing, simultaneously but separately, collaborations to inhibit other regional threats to Israel posed by Iran, particularly along the former's northern border.
Israel is also advised to avoid seeking to create a shared regional front with the moderate Arab states against the U.S. administration's policy on Iran (as opposed to an anti-Iranian front). Such a move may be perceived by Washington as defiant, and, in any event, the Arab states are expected to align themselves with the Biden administration in light of their security's profound dependence upon American guarantees.
Finally, to allow U.S.-IS relations to focus on Iran, it is vital that Israel remove any other obstacle and dissipate any further tension with the incoming administration. As part of this effort, and in light of Washington's extreme sensitivity with respect to the great power competition, Israel must conduct itself with full coordination and transparency vis à vis the United States with regard to its relations with Russia and China to ensure that it meets the American standard. This way, the U.S. administration would be able to determine that China's activity in Israel and Israel's relations with Russia do not pose any risk to U.S. interests.
The security challenges and QME
The challenge:
Israel's qualitative military edge is becoming increasingly eroded. Its enemies, namely Hizballah and Hamas, are being armed with advanced, precise capabilities with the help of Iran, who is also establishing a threat to Israel from its own territory as well as from other regional arenas. At the same time, the Sunni Arab states are also rapidly acquiring the most advanced western weapon systems, threatening to create a regional arms race, and compromise the IDF's supremacy.
Israel's qualitative military edge is becoming increasingly eroded. Its enemies, namely Hizballah and Hamas, are being armed with advanced, precise capabilities with the help of Iran, who is also establishing a threat to Israel from its own territory as well as from other regional arenas. At the same time, the Sunni Arab states are also rapidly acquiring the most advanced western weapon systems, threatening to create a regional arms race, and compromise the IDF's supremacy.
The response:
In view of the instability and uncertainty in the region, Israel must maintain its Qualitative Military Edge (QME) vis à vis any possible combination of adversaries and arenas, as well as enhance its own image of deterrence and power in the region. The IDF must urgently approve a buildup and acquisition plan that would provide solutions and set priorities for addressing the various threats and growing need to cut down the enemies' force buildup efforts as part of a wider "campaign between wars" - based on an approved budget as well as critical reliance on future U.S. foreign military financing (FMF) funds. Moreover, Israel should support the Biden administration's decisions, in principle, to revisit the sale of F-35 aircraft to the U.A.E., for its possible implementation will upset the delicate power balance in the region.
The Palestinian arena requires attention
The challenge:
The Palestinian Authority is growing weaker, especially as a governing system. Its leadership and course of action no longer gain the public's trust, it is losing its raison d'être as the leader of the two-state solution, and the normalization accords are forcing it to get closer to Hamas. Under these circumstances, Abu Mazen has announced elections for the Legislative Council and Presidency (in May and July respectively, followed by elections for the PLO's Palestinian National Council).
The election outcomes may have negative strategic implications in the form of accelerated weakening of the Palestinian Authority and its hold on the PLO, as well as a stronger Hamas. At the same time, civil and health conditions are worsening in Gaza due to the spreading Coronavirus crisis, while Hamas continues to build up its military capabilities.
The Palestinian Authority is growing weaker, especially as a governing system. Its leadership and course of action no longer gain the public's trust, it is losing its raison d'être as the leader of the two-state solution, and the normalization accords are forcing it to get closer to Hamas. Under these circumstances, Abu Mazen has announced elections for the Legislative Council and Presidency (in May and July respectively, followed by elections for the PLO's Palestinian National Council).
The election outcomes may have negative strategic implications in the form of accelerated weakening of the Palestinian Authority and its hold on the PLO, as well as a stronger Hamas. At the same time, civil and health conditions are worsening in Gaza due to the spreading Coronavirus crisis, while Hamas continues to build up its military capabilities.
The response:
If Israel chooses to ignore the Palestinian problem to the point of abandoning it, while turning its attention to the Arab world, it could "blow up in its face". Israel should leverage the normalization accords to inject resources into the Palestinian issue, bring the two-state solution back into the discussion in coordination with the Biden administration, and cease the "crawling annexation" of Palestinian territory. These steps will strengthen the Palestinian Authority as much as possible as a governing system, and prevent the IDF and Israeli Civil Administration from being gradually dragged into running the lives of the Palestinian population.
Israel must prepare for the possibility that it will be required to make seminal decisions regarding the Palestinian elections, particularly whether or not it will allow them to be held in East Jerusalem. Such decisions will be made best in coordination and consultation with Egypt and Jordan, the U.S. administration, and Europe, while focusing on the affinity between the election process and the need to recognize Israel and leave terrorism behind.
Israel should also take the emerging opportunity in Gaza to reach a long-term arrangement that aims to ensure that the civil conditions in the Gaza Strip will not deteriorate to a humanitarian crisis that will inevitably spill over into Israeli territory. Inter alia, Israel is expected to find a solution to the Gazans' need for vaccines, as delaying them could lead to security tension.
Israel must prepare for the possibility that it will be required to make seminal decisions regarding the Palestinian elections, particularly whether or not it will allow them to be held in East Jerusalem. Such decisions will be made best in coordination and consultation with Egypt and Jordan, the U.S. administration, and Europe, while focusing on the affinity between the election process and the need to recognize Israel and leave terrorism behind.
Israel should also take the emerging opportunity in Gaza to reach a long-term arrangement that aims to ensure that the civil conditions in the Gaza Strip will not deteriorate to a humanitarian crisis that will inevitably spill over into Israeli territory. Inter alia, Israel is expected to find a solution to the Gazans' need for vaccines, as delaying them could lead to security tension.
Arab Israeli society
The challenge:
Arab Israeli society is suffering from a sharp rise in crime and violence, which have been soaring in recent years. Israeli state governance and law enforcement mechanisms in Arab society are getting eroded, whereas the local and national Arab leadership is struggling to maintain law and order. The clan-based structures are beginning to fill the void, but as they fight among themselves, large amounts of illegal weapons are being accumulated. As frameworks break down, the younger generation is becoming increasingly more despaired and frustrated. Their sense of detachment, alienation, and separatism is growing and some feel disconnected from state mechanisms, despite the basic desire to be part of Israeli society.
Arab Israeli society is suffering from a sharp rise in crime and violence, which have been soaring in recent years. Israeli state governance and law enforcement mechanisms in Arab society are getting eroded, whereas the local and national Arab leadership is struggling to maintain law and order. The clan-based structures are beginning to fill the void, but as they fight among themselves, large amounts of illegal weapons are being accumulated. As frameworks break down, the younger generation is becoming increasingly more despaired and frustrated. Their sense of detachment, alienation, and separatism is growing and some feel disconnected from state mechanisms, despite the basic desire to be part of Israeli society.
The response:
Arab Israeli society's exacerbating issues are a strategic challenge and ticking time bomb. The Israeli government must expand and implement national plans and budgets to address Arab Israeli society. At the heart of its efforts should be: expanding enforcement and fighting crime; encouraging and supporting local leaderships; and expediting integration processes vis à vis Jewish society and state institutions.
Ultimately, Israel is experiencing one of its severest multidimensional crises ever. A crisis of this magnitude requires its leadership to provide an urgent response, and its elected officials to regain composure. The latter must rise above narrow political considerations that cause strategic damage to Israel and its citizens, and take action for the nation's greater good based on an organized long-term policy that will be a guiding star, and create hope and prospects for the Israeli public.
At the same time, as Middle Eastern prospects seem grim, and the need to prepare for the upcoming security-related crises and challenges is imminent, Israel cannot risk jeopardizing its essential dialogue with the Biden administration, or its status as a bipartisan U.S. consensus, which has been eroded in recent years as it is. Israel has no substitute for America's support, and choosing to enter a conflict with the new administration would be a strategic mistake, the implications of which on Israel's security, status, and strength may be detrimental.
At the same time, as Middle Eastern prospects seem grim, and the need to prepare for the upcoming security-related crises and challenges is imminent, Israel cannot risk jeopardizing its essential dialogue with the Biden administration, or its status as a bipartisan U.S. consensus, which has been eroded in recent years as it is. Israel has no substitute for America's support, and choosing to enter a conflict with the new administration would be a strategic mistake, the implications of which on Israel's security, status, and strength may be detrimental.