No Time to Waste - The New Israeli Government Faces Immediate Challenges
Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS
Executive Director
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
December, 2022
Photo: Kobi Gideon-GPO | CC BY-SA 3.0
The new Israeli government forming will need to come up with a quick response for the strategic challenges it faces in both regional and international arenas, while realizing that its true test will, before all else, be its actions on the ground. Its strategy would have to address the explosiveness vis-à-vis the Palestinian Authority as well as the aggravating threat posed by, while preserving Israel’s strategic sources of support, primarily its alliance with the United States, and relations with the peace and normalization countries.
The fading Palestinian Authority – Political and security combustibility
The main security challenge at present is the growing threat in northern Samaria, which could spill over to other areas in the West Bank. It is joined by a sense of frustration and despair among both Palestinian public and leadership, as well as the PA’s governability difficulties, expressed, inter alia, in a growing struggle and disinclination to assume responsibility for emerging hubs of chaos.
As a result, Israel is required to shoulder an increasing burden, and assume greater responsibility in such a way that it forces the IDF to engage in extensive operations with and also without the Palestinian security forces’ cooperation, leading to increased friction with the West Bank population. This state of affairs is enhancing delegitimization trends, and could cloud the attempts to build trust and forge a partnership between the new Israeli government and U.S. administration, while driving a wedge in Israel’s relations with the Sunni countries in the region as well.
In view of these challenges, the incoming government will have to realize that any effort to neutralize immediate security challenges will only provide a temporary and partial solution, and that the potential explosivity is growing, so that, over time, a fundamental change in strategy and relations vis-à-vis the Palestinian Authority will be of the essence. From a practical perspective, this government will have to keep all channels of coordination with the PA open, particularly the security channel. At the same time, and in order to guarantee the civil fabric of life, Israel will have to refrain from economic punitive measures, which could exacerbate the financial distress, further gnaw at the security apparatuses’ willingness to collaborate in counterterrorism, and increase the sense of bitterness among the Palestinian population, particularly the younger generation. Israel will also need to avoid making unilateral steps, including changing the subordination of the Civil Administration, which might indicate the intention to annex the West Bank territories, or changing the status quo in Jerusalem’s holy sites.
As a result, Israel is required to shoulder an increasing burden, and assume greater responsibility in such a way that it forces the IDF to engage in extensive operations with and also without the Palestinian security forces’ cooperation, leading to increased friction with the West Bank population. This state of affairs is enhancing delegitimization trends, and could cloud the attempts to build trust and forge a partnership between the new Israeli government and U.S. administration, while driving a wedge in Israel’s relations with the Sunni countries in the region as well.
In view of these challenges, the incoming government will have to realize that any effort to neutralize immediate security challenges will only provide a temporary and partial solution, and that the potential explosivity is growing, so that, over time, a fundamental change in strategy and relations vis-à-vis the Palestinian Authority will be of the essence. From a practical perspective, this government will have to keep all channels of coordination with the PA open, particularly the security channel. At the same time, and in order to guarantee the civil fabric of life, Israel will have to refrain from economic punitive measures, which could exacerbate the financial distress, further gnaw at the security apparatuses’ willingness to collaborate in counterterrorism, and increase the sense of bitterness among the Palestinian population, particularly the younger generation. Israel will also need to avoid making unilateral steps, including changing the subordination of the Civil Administration, which might indicate the intention to annex the West Bank territories, or changing the status quo in Jerusalem’s holy sites.
Hamas – Curbing force buildup while maintaining calm
Hamas is taking advantage of the relative quiet in the Gaza Strip and extensive civil benefits to establish its ruling and military power, while making preparations to take over the entire Palestinian system on “the morning after Abu Mazen”. It is also promoting terrorism and incitement from within the Gaza Strip, setting up and operating military infrastructures in the West Bank too. Israel should therefore employ a policy that maintains the calm while increasing deterrence against Hamas leadership by presenting clear conditions for economic alleviations granted in exchange for curbing the terror and incitement efforts.
Preserving the ties with the peace and normalization states
Israel’s relations with the Arab world are one of the most crucial components in the former’s political and security power. The new government will have to realize that advancing the relations with these countries is directly linked to the issue of the Palestinians. Thus, if no political progress is made with the Palestinian Authority, or worse, if the situation on the ground should escalate, Israel would come up against a glass ceiling in its ability to deepen partnerships, especially in civilian, overt areas.
Israel’s relations with Jordan are of particular importance, as the Hashemite Kingdom serves as one of Israel’s most important sources of support, and any harm caused to it would lead to destabilization in Israel’s strategic security sphere. Jordan is exhibiting great sensitivity to any development in the West Bank or Israeli steps taken in Jerusalem that could potentially lead to escalation, infringe upon the special status in the sacred sites, or, under an extreme scenario, even pose a threat to the kingdom’s internal stability. Subsequently, the incoming Israeli government should avoid making unilateral steps vis-à-vis the Palestinians that would surprise and challenge the king, especially in Jerusalem, and instead, should actively build trust between the two leaderships in view of past resentment.
The Iranian threat – Formulating a comprehensive strategic response
The Iranian threat posed to Israel is aggravating on all dimensions: the nuclear program is progressing; offensive capabilities including drones and missiles are improving; strategic ties with Russia are deepening; massive assistance is being provided to Hizballah; and boldness to target Israeli civilians and sites worldwide (Turkey, Georgia, the Gulf) is increasing.
The window of opportunity for curbing Iran is closing rapidly. Therefore, the new Israeli government must start out by building military capabilities for addressing this growing threat, while deepening its strategic coordination and security collaboration with the United States, both of which are essential when providing a comprehensive solution to this challenge. At the same time, Israel should continue to deepen its security cooperation with countries in and around the Gulf, while advancing plans to increase the pressure exerted on the Iranian regime domestically as well as internationally.
The window of opportunity for curbing Iran is closing rapidly. Therefore, the new Israeli government must start out by building military capabilities for addressing this growing threat, while deepening its strategic coordination and security collaboration with the United States, both of which are essential when providing a comprehensive solution to this challenge. At the same time, Israel should continue to deepen its security cooperation with countries in and around the Gulf, while advancing plans to increase the pressure exerted on the Iranian regime domestically as well as internationally.
Sensitivity vis-à-vis the U.S. administration
The character and composition of the new Israeli government is raising many concerns in the Democratic U.S. administration with regard to the policies employed on issues pertaining to human rights, minorities, the justice system, and the Palestinians. The Democrats’ triumph in the midterm elections could encourage the U.S. administration to promote its liberal-democratic agenda with renewed vigor, affecting its attitude toward Israel.
There is no substitute for Israel’s strategic relations with the United States, and the former cannot afford to put even the slightest dent in this alliance, which relies, to a great extent, on the values shared by both countries. Thus, the Israeli government will need to exhibit particular sensitivity in the formulation of its policies and conduct, minimize causes for friction, and avoid getting dragged into public disputes with the U.S. administration that could be used by Republicans when locking horns with the Democrats. In this context, the Israeli government is advised to learn its lessons from the past, and actively pursue the forging of ties with representatives across the U.S political spectrum.
The new Israeli government would also do well to avoid making decisions that could be interpreted by wide circles within U.S. Jewry as discriminatory and in violation of their rights, for these could further gnaw at the Democrats’ support of Israel (which is on a gradual decline in recent years as it is, particularly among the younger generation).
There is no substitute for Israel’s strategic relations with the United States, and the former cannot afford to put even the slightest dent in this alliance, which relies, to a great extent, on the values shared by both countries. Thus, the Israeli government will need to exhibit particular sensitivity in the formulation of its policies and conduct, minimize causes for friction, and avoid getting dragged into public disputes with the U.S. administration that could be used by Republicans when locking horns with the Democrats. In this context, the Israeli government is advised to learn its lessons from the past, and actively pursue the forging of ties with representatives across the U.S political spectrum.
The new Israeli government would also do well to avoid making decisions that could be interpreted by wide circles within U.S. Jewry as discriminatory and in violation of their rights, for these could further gnaw at the Democrats’ support of Israel (which is on a gradual decline in recent years as it is, particularly among the younger generation).
Keeping up with the cautious policy vis-à-vis Russia
One of the most charged issues associated with Israel’s present foreign policy is the matter of supporting Ukraine, particularly by providing it with air defense systems. The reason being Israel’s complex relationship with Russia, and particularly the latter’s damaging potential to various Israeli interests in the region, primarily maintaining Israel’s freedom of action in the Syrian arena, and concern for the safety of Russian Jewry. It is particularly against the backdrop of closer security collaborations between Russia and Iran that Israel must exhibit extra caution, and refrain from taking steps that could cause Russia to retaliate, playing into Iran’s hands.
The new government is therefore advised to avoid supplying air defense and/or other weapon systems to Ukraine, while continuing to express public support for Ukraine, condemn the war crimes perpetrated by Russia, and even promote partnerships with Kiev (whether directly or via third parties).
The internal arena – Addressing fundamental issues
The new Israeli government formed will be required to actively bridge the rifts and thoroughly address the challenges of Israeli society and economy, particularly with respect to the cost of living, price of housing, the education and health systems. Unless these problems will be thoroughly resolved, the incoming government will struggle to cope with the strategic challenges it faces successfully.
Special attention should be given to maintaining the justice system’s independence, for it plays a key role in Israel’s ability to defend itself against the delegitimization efforts and growing legal challenges posed by the international arena (primarily the international courts in the Hague and various inquiry commissions).
Conclusion
The new Israeli government is entering office at a time when “everything depends on everything else”. Unlike recent years, Israel’s faltering relations with the Palestinians could project onto its close partnership with the United States, and special collaborations with the Gulf states. Such a development would affect the quality of the response to a wide range of national security issues, led by the ability to address the threat posed by Iran. To brave the fierce strategic storm that lies ahead, the new Israeli government will have to exhibit political-security astuteness, avoid taking unilateral steps (in the West Bank or anywhere else) that would be perceived as destabilizing and infringing upon human rights, and preserve its deep strategic alliance with the United States at all cost, as well as its relations with the Arab world.