Strategic Deterrence Put to the Test
Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS
Executive Director
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
August, 2022
Photo: Lt. Col. E. - IDF Spokesperson's Unit | CC BY-SA 3.0
Operation Breaking Dawn presents a long list of operative achievements, at the top of which is the killing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s leadership backbone, and a display of Israeli military supremacy. Although the latter is translated into the establishment of strategic deterrence that exceeds the tactical equation vis-à-vis the PIJ, it does not necessarily change the overall strategic state of affairs in the Middle East.
Thus, the display of Israeli military supremacy strengthens Israeli deterrence as a whole vis-à-vis Hamas, as well as Hizballah and Iran on the strategic level. Even though the Islamic Jihad’s capabilities are limited in comparison to those of Hamas and Hizballah, the way that Israel has used precise and lethal force to take out the organization’s top echelon while establishing effective defense of the civil home front, alongside a display of its socio-national cohesion and patience, convey a clear message to terror organizations in the region about the expected toll of a comprehensive campaign, as well as the gap in the parties’ power relations.
Yet the Israeli strategy is directed at limiting the fighting to two parties – Israel and the Islamic Jihad – while keeping Hamas out of the military operation. Such strategy chips away at the understandings reached in the arrangement that followed Operation Guardian of the Walls whereby Hamas is supposed to assume responsibility for the entire Gaza Strip, and keep the peace in exchange for rehabilitation steps, economic and civil aid. This development could create flexibility for Hamas, who will attempt to eat the cake and leave it whole: Lead civil rehabilitation and receive the financial help, while allowing “recalcitrant forces” to take adverse action against the IDF from the Gaza Strip without having to pay for it. At the same time, Hamas could also continue its force buildup process in preparation for its next campaign against Israel, while learning operative lessons from the current round of fighting against the Islamic Jihad.
In addition, the operation expresses a component within the strategic conflict between Iran and Israel. Two days before Operation Breaking Dawn began, during which most of the PIJ’s senior military leadership in the Gaza Strip was killed, the organization leader, Zaid Nakhaleh, visited Iran (3 August) and met with the top Iranian leadership (the President, Foreign Minister, Speaker of Parliament, and Commander of the IRGC). The meeting underscores the strategic and operative partnership between Iran and the Palestinian terror organization, while shedding light on Iran’s overall strategy in the region.
Tehran actively supports arming and training militia groups, terror and semi-military organizations to increase the overall pressure on Israel by sharing advanced firing capabilities and deploying military forces that pose a tangible threat in both first and second circles. The Iranian aim is to engage Israel and erode its power in first circle deterrence campaigns while establishing advanced military capabilities along its borders to form deterrence equations that would weaken Israel’s ability to take lasting action in the region. At the same time, Iran is striving to obtain advanced nuclear capabilities (“from one threshold to another”) to establish a regional deterrence equation while continuing to negotiate the renewed nuclear deal with the great powers.
The renewed talks in Vienna (16 months after they began) are an expression of the Iranian strategy that seeks to keep the door with the international arena open, while advancing the nuclear program undisturbed. Will the negotiations lead to a renewed agreement? The ball is in Iran’s court, and to date, no real international pressure has been exerted or military threat posed to make Iran change its negotiating tactics or overall strategy.
In the context of Operation Breaking Dawn – the Islamic Jihad’s operative failure, which demonstrates Israel’s military supremacy and the power relations gap, does not alter the strategic vector of the progress made by Iran in the region and in nuclear, nor mitigate the growing threat and urgent need to address it.
On the regional and international levels, with the exception of general condemnations and the highlighted need to avoid civilian casualties, no harsh or threatening messages were conveyed to Israel. Moreover, Egypt, in its role as mediator, had emphasized its “positive” ability to conduct a dialogue with both parties to bring stability back to the Gaza Strip. In this context, Egypt is positioning its role (similarly to Operation Guardian of the Walls) as the key mediating factor capable of leading both sides to a ceasefire, thereby underscoring its valuableness in both regional and international arenas (particularly in Washington).
The campaign in Gaza received less attention around the world than it, perhaps, would have ordinarily due to the growing tension in China-U.S. relations, massive Chinese military exercise around Taiwan following the U.S. House Speaker’s visit to the latter, developments in the war in Ukraine, and their aggravating global implications from the economic and food aspects. Furthermore, international sensitivity to civilian lives lost, particularly in view of the atrocious images from Ukraine, did not come up on the world media during this operation as the strikes were precise (little collateral damage), and Israeli public diplomacy was highly effective.
Nevertheless, the operation in Gaza could be the beginning of broader escalation, with severe repercussions for regional as well as Israeli security. Thus, one possible arena that could erupt this September is Lebanon following the negotiations over the delineation of the maritime border between Israel and its neighbor. American mediator Amos Hoschstein has completed his recent round of talks in Lebanon, during which he had presented the Israeli compromise offering to share potential gains from the natural gas reserves that will be discovered in the disputed area between Israel and Lebanon.
Israel, the U.S. and EU would like to draft an agreement as soon as possible to avoid an overall military deterioration. Lebanon also seems to be interested in reaching rapid resolution of the conflict in view of the acute economic crisis it is enduring, as well as the substantial energy and economic potential of the Lebanese EEZ. Its Foreign Minister had even expressed some optimism over the prospect of reaching a deal with Israel with the help of U.S. mediation when Hochstein’s visit had ended, and it appears that all parties’ interests are indeed leading them toward a settlement.
However, to a large extent, the ball is in Hizballah’s court, as it leverages the talks to position itself as Lebanon’s “protector”, seeking to establish an image in the Lebanese arena as the organization that protects Lebanon’s rights against Israeli aggression under any scenario. Should an agreement be reached, Nasrallah could argue that his organization’s power of deterrence and its resolve against Israel had protected its country’s rights over its natural resources. If an agreement fails to be reached, Hizballah is in possession of military tools that it believes are capable of deterring Israel from starting to produce gas from the Karish gas field. Nasrallah also reiterated time and again in his public statements in recent weeks that if Israel would produce the gas in the absence of an agreement, it would be grounds for war, and his organization would not hesitate to take action and defend Lebanon’s rights.
At present, it seems that the state interests, American and European involvement, and Israeli willingness to compromise will lead to an agreement over the delineation of the maritime border and distribution of gas profits; however, for the first time since 2006, Israel cannot ignore the growing risk of slipping down the slope of an overall military escalation vis-à-vis Hizballah.
Thus, the display of Israeli military supremacy strengthens Israeli deterrence as a whole vis-à-vis Hamas, as well as Hizballah and Iran on the strategic level. Even though the Islamic Jihad’s capabilities are limited in comparison to those of Hamas and Hizballah, the way that Israel has used precise and lethal force to take out the organization’s top echelon while establishing effective defense of the civil home front, alongside a display of its socio-national cohesion and patience, convey a clear message to terror organizations in the region about the expected toll of a comprehensive campaign, as well as the gap in the parties’ power relations.
Yet the Israeli strategy is directed at limiting the fighting to two parties – Israel and the Islamic Jihad – while keeping Hamas out of the military operation. Such strategy chips away at the understandings reached in the arrangement that followed Operation Guardian of the Walls whereby Hamas is supposed to assume responsibility for the entire Gaza Strip, and keep the peace in exchange for rehabilitation steps, economic and civil aid. This development could create flexibility for Hamas, who will attempt to eat the cake and leave it whole: Lead civil rehabilitation and receive the financial help, while allowing “recalcitrant forces” to take adverse action against the IDF from the Gaza Strip without having to pay for it. At the same time, Hamas could also continue its force buildup process in preparation for its next campaign against Israel, while learning operative lessons from the current round of fighting against the Islamic Jihad.
In addition, the operation expresses a component within the strategic conflict between Iran and Israel. Two days before Operation Breaking Dawn began, during which most of the PIJ’s senior military leadership in the Gaza Strip was killed, the organization leader, Zaid Nakhaleh, visited Iran (3 August) and met with the top Iranian leadership (the President, Foreign Minister, Speaker of Parliament, and Commander of the IRGC). The meeting underscores the strategic and operative partnership between Iran and the Palestinian terror organization, while shedding light on Iran’s overall strategy in the region.
Tehran actively supports arming and training militia groups, terror and semi-military organizations to increase the overall pressure on Israel by sharing advanced firing capabilities and deploying military forces that pose a tangible threat in both first and second circles. The Iranian aim is to engage Israel and erode its power in first circle deterrence campaigns while establishing advanced military capabilities along its borders to form deterrence equations that would weaken Israel’s ability to take lasting action in the region. At the same time, Iran is striving to obtain advanced nuclear capabilities (“from one threshold to another”) to establish a regional deterrence equation while continuing to negotiate the renewed nuclear deal with the great powers.
The renewed talks in Vienna (16 months after they began) are an expression of the Iranian strategy that seeks to keep the door with the international arena open, while advancing the nuclear program undisturbed. Will the negotiations lead to a renewed agreement? The ball is in Iran’s court, and to date, no real international pressure has been exerted or military threat posed to make Iran change its negotiating tactics or overall strategy.
In the context of Operation Breaking Dawn – the Islamic Jihad’s operative failure, which demonstrates Israel’s military supremacy and the power relations gap, does not alter the strategic vector of the progress made by Iran in the region and in nuclear, nor mitigate the growing threat and urgent need to address it.
On the regional and international levels, with the exception of general condemnations and the highlighted need to avoid civilian casualties, no harsh or threatening messages were conveyed to Israel. Moreover, Egypt, in its role as mediator, had emphasized its “positive” ability to conduct a dialogue with both parties to bring stability back to the Gaza Strip. In this context, Egypt is positioning its role (similarly to Operation Guardian of the Walls) as the key mediating factor capable of leading both sides to a ceasefire, thereby underscoring its valuableness in both regional and international arenas (particularly in Washington).
The campaign in Gaza received less attention around the world than it, perhaps, would have ordinarily due to the growing tension in China-U.S. relations, massive Chinese military exercise around Taiwan following the U.S. House Speaker’s visit to the latter, developments in the war in Ukraine, and their aggravating global implications from the economic and food aspects. Furthermore, international sensitivity to civilian lives lost, particularly in view of the atrocious images from Ukraine, did not come up on the world media during this operation as the strikes were precise (little collateral damage), and Israeli public diplomacy was highly effective.
Nevertheless, the operation in Gaza could be the beginning of broader escalation, with severe repercussions for regional as well as Israeli security. Thus, one possible arena that could erupt this September is Lebanon following the negotiations over the delineation of the maritime border between Israel and its neighbor. American mediator Amos Hoschstein has completed his recent round of talks in Lebanon, during which he had presented the Israeli compromise offering to share potential gains from the natural gas reserves that will be discovered in the disputed area between Israel and Lebanon.
Israel, the U.S. and EU would like to draft an agreement as soon as possible to avoid an overall military deterioration. Lebanon also seems to be interested in reaching rapid resolution of the conflict in view of the acute economic crisis it is enduring, as well as the substantial energy and economic potential of the Lebanese EEZ. Its Foreign Minister had even expressed some optimism over the prospect of reaching a deal with Israel with the help of U.S. mediation when Hochstein’s visit had ended, and it appears that all parties’ interests are indeed leading them toward a settlement.
However, to a large extent, the ball is in Hizballah’s court, as it leverages the talks to position itself as Lebanon’s “protector”, seeking to establish an image in the Lebanese arena as the organization that protects Lebanon’s rights against Israeli aggression under any scenario. Should an agreement be reached, Nasrallah could argue that his organization’s power of deterrence and its resolve against Israel had protected its country’s rights over its natural resources. If an agreement fails to be reached, Hizballah is in possession of military tools that it believes are capable of deterring Israel from starting to produce gas from the Karish gas field. Nasrallah also reiterated time and again in his public statements in recent weeks that if Israel would produce the gas in the absence of an agreement, it would be grounds for war, and his organization would not hesitate to take action and defend Lebanon’s rights.
At present, it seems that the state interests, American and European involvement, and Israeli willingness to compromise will lead to an agreement over the delineation of the maritime border and distribution of gas profits; however, for the first time since 2006, Israel cannot ignore the growing risk of slipping down the slope of an overall military escalation vis-à-vis Hizballah.
Conclusion and Implication
- Operation Breaking Dawn has established Israel’s power of deterrence in a way that projects onto other arenas too, but does not alter the overall strategic framework, or the actors’ conduct in the medium-long range in the Gaza Strip (Hamas) or region (Hizballah and Iran). Nevertheless, the operation does strengthen Israel’s status and valuableness to its regional partners’ security and military interests in view of the aggravating threat posed by Iran.
- In preparation for the Jewish High Holidays, and the risk of another violent outbreak, the Israeli government and defense establishment should actively preserve the status quo on Temple Mount, and curb any provocation that would allow Hamas to rally the Palestinian arena around the banner of religion. Israel should also take targeted action against Hamas’ infrastructure in the West Bank, while continuing to promote the flow of financial aid to stabilize the internal Palestinian system.
- Egypt has emphasized its centrality when playing the role of mediator during the negotiations for a ceasefire, demonstrating its valuableness to both regional and international systems. Egypt has “owned” the role of mediator, and effectively created a dialogue between both parties. The Egyptian position is especially important because it is seeking to establish its status in Washington, and in view of growing Western criticism of its human rights policy, as well as close strategic relations with Russia. Israel should show its support and actively bolster Egypt’s status in Washington and Europe due to its increasing importance for Israel’s state and security interests.
- Iran’s overall strategy in the region and with regard to nuclear has not changed or been substantially impacted by the operation’s outcomes. Tehran manages to differentiate between the steps it takes in the region and those that are nuclear-related, and does not feel any threat requiring it to revisit its overall strategy. Thus, Israel should continue to maintain its close strategic coordination with the United States on the political and security-military levels. Under any scenario (the signing of a new nuclear deal / the talks reaching an impasse and leading Iran’s nuclear program to progress), Israel should coordinate its political or operative actions with Washington, and advance force buildup processes rapidly to establish military capabilities that could serve to address the threat of nuclear.
- Israel should pursue the signing of a maritime border agreement with Lebanon, with the help of U.S. mediation, as well as an understanding on how to split gas profits with it in keeping with both countries’ interests. Israel has no desire to engage in a military campaign against Hizballah, as the stakes (particularly for Lebanon) are high. Yet Israel cannot succumb to Hizballah’s dictated terms either if they deviate from the context of the said agreement, for such developments would be interpreted and presented as its surrender, causing damage to Israeli deterrence, and detriment to its security and economic interests.