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Is the Freedom of Action Vis-à-vis Iran at Risk?

Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS
Executive Director
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
January, 2023
26-3-20main-...
Photos: Avi Ohayon - GPO | Tasnim News Agency | CC BY 4.0
 

The new Israeli government was required, from its first day in office, to address a series of challenges projecting onto Israel’s national security and resilience. It has not even been given 100 hours of grace; instead, within 24 hours of being sworn in, the UN General Assembly had resolved to request the International Court of Justice to examine the “ongoing Israeli occupation”. Meanwhile, President Biden has conveyed implicit warnings when reiterating that he expects the incoming government to maintain the two-state principle, and protect the values Israel shares with the United States. The immediate harsh responses, in both the West and Muslim Arab world, to Minister Ben Gvir’s visit to Temple Mount, which emerged as a provocative step, is writing on the wall indicating what the future would hold should Israel alter the status quo in this sensitive and explosive compound. Furthermore, the growing national resilience challenges may also affect the government's ability to deal with the security threats.
 
Iran – The aggravating threat and required response
The aggravating threat posed by Iran is based on extreme ideology calling for Israel’s annihilation while developing the capabilities to put this vision to practice. The Iranian policy is designed to develop the potential that would enable it, subject to its leader’s decision, to break out and attain weapons-grade nuclear capabilities. We estimate that, under a stringent scenario, the Iranians would be able to carry out a nuclear experiment within a relatively short timeframe, if and when the decision to do so will be taken.

Thus, the Israeli government should form an overall strategy, based on accelerating force buildup processes and collaborating with the international community, primarily the United States. Preserving the strategic alliance and special relations with the United States is a pre-condition for any plan designed to curb Iran. Therefore, the government is advised to engage in building trust with the U.S. administration, while carefully avoiding steps that could lead to a clash of ideologies and values with it, particularly with regard to combustible issues, primarily Temple Mount and the Palestinian arena.

At the same time, Israel should take advantage of the Iranian threat to promote security collaborations with the Gulf states, both bilaterally and on the multilateral level along with CENTCOM (the U.S. central command). It should also attempt to convince the international community to impose painful sanctions on Iran, similar to those imposed on Russia, in order to isolate it, and possibly lead to increased internal protests against the regime. Although this method of operation has low chances of succeeding, it would enable an international front against Iran to be maintained.

 
The Palestinian arena – Political and security explosiveness

Israel’s ability to focus most of its resources and inputs on the Iranian challenge greatly depends upon the possibility of avoiding escalation in other arenas. First among them is the Palestinian one. It currently serves as the most explosive challenge due to the combination of increasing security threat in Northern Samaria, which is threatening to spill over to other areas in the West Bank, and prospective government actions in this region, especially on Temple Mount. Such actions could be interpreted as altering the status quo, annexing and applying Israeli law to the settlements, even in the absence of an official declaration, and therefore as cause for violent outbreaks across the board.

Moreover, the government should take into consideration the coordination issues that could develop between the various security agencies, as well as in interactions with the Palestinian apparatuses, following the decision to subordinate the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and Civil Administration to the additional minister in the Ministry of Defense, instead of the minister of defense himself.

Furthermore, Abu Mazen is identifying the current atmosphere in the international arena as a window of opportunity, perhaps one that will never return, for a campaign that would impose strategic constraints on Israel. To this end, he is promoting steps in international institutions, namely the UN and international courts in the Hague, that are perceived as legitimate and carry weight in the shaping of international norms. In fact, Abu Mazen is striving to define Israel as an apartheid state that perpetrates war crimes, purporting that Israel’s presence in the West Bank runs contrary to international law.

The most significant threat in the accelerated de-legitimization processes lies, first and foremost, in the concretization of narratives in western public opinion, and not necessarily among extreme marginal groups, whereby Israel systematically violates Palestinian rights. These narratives could project onto Israel’s status and image, its military freedom of activity when confronting Hamas or Hizballah, its ability to promote security and economic collaborations, as well as garnering its allies’ support for its policies.

To address these challenges, the incoming government would do well to recognize the fragility of the current state of affairs. Accordingly, it should form an overall strategy for its conduct vis-à-vis the Palestinian arena that would take into account all constraints, while avoiding actions that could be interpreted as preparations to annex, as well as punitive measures. These could harm the population’s fabric of life, as well as the Palestinian Authority’s standing (which is on a downward slope as it is), and jeopardize Israel’s security collaboration with it, which is crucial to thwarting terror attacks.

 
The explosiveness of Jerusalem’s holy sites

The Palestinian Authority, Arab world and Israeli Arab society are very concerned about the expected Israeli policy on Temple Mount, as expressed by Minister Ben Gvir’s visit in the compound. King Abdullah has already warned that the holy sites are a “red line”, and that he would not tolerate any Israeli step that would jeopardize Jordanian custodianship.

Thus, Israel would have to be extra careful with respect to its conduct on Temple Mount. Actions perceived as altering the status quo in the compound would have far-reaching implications on its strategic relations with the Arab and Muslim world, particularly with Jordan, even projecting onto developments in other arenas, and igniting a violent conflict that would emerge as a religious war.

Against the backdrop of reports on Prime Minister Netanyahu’s aspirations to promote normalization with Saudi Arabia, it is recommended that Israel exhibit great caution to refrain from paying the Saudi monarchy with the Jerusalem currency as part of the negotiations. Such a scenario could lead to a genuine rift in relations with the Jordanian monarchy, that would also project onto security collaborations between the two countries that are crucial to securing Israel’s eastern borders.

 
Israeli Arab society – Despair and explosiveness

Israeli Arab society is feeling a sense of multidimensional crisis based on several trends. First and foremost, a crisis of expectations among many due to being excluded from the regime’s decision-making process compared to their involvement in the former government’s. Second, concern over the nature of the incoming government, particularly with regard to its attitude toward Arabs, and the question of whether it will continue to advance steps in the contexts of crime and violence, as well as the development of Arab economy and society. Third, despair of the current leaderships who are exacerbating the blame game between them, and accusing one another of the current state of affairs. In the meantime, manifestations of crime, violence, and lack of governance continue in the background. Under these charged circumstances, any “spark” – such as friction between Israel Police and Arab citizens over issues of law enforcement or crime, not to mention Temple Mount – could ignite broad tension between Israeli Arab society and the establishment, leading to violent clashes between Arab and Jewish communities.

The new government is therefore required to be extra sensitive. It should realize that the situation is charged, and recognize the potential explosiveness, as well as the need to formulate a policy that would defuse it. Thus, the Israeli government, and particularly the Minister of National Security, is strongly advised to identify ways of developing a dialogue with the heads of Arab society, placing an emphasis on mayors, as well as political leaders. At the same time, it should also promote dialogue with the public, using the digital sphere and social media (primarily in Arabic) to develop trust and relieve the grave concerns that are currently prominent in Israeli Arab society.

 
The Russia-China axis

The conversation held between Presidents Putin and Xi, and the possibility that the latter would visit Moscow in several months, are yet another manifestation of the new world order and conflict between the liberal bloc headed by the United States and authoritative bloc led by China. This development could have implications on the great powers’ conduct in the Middle East, which could turn into another area of conflict in the era of the Cold War 2.0, as manifest in President Xi’s recent visit to Saudi Arabia, as well as the military partnership between Russia and Iran. Furthermore, it seems that the armies of Russia and Ukraine are preparing for an escalation in fighting towards the spring.

The forming world order creates both risks and opportunities for the new Israeli government, requiring it to form an overall strategy for its conduct vis-à-vis the great powers. On the one hand, Israel could demonstrate its valuableness to Washington, inter alia by promoting partnerships with the Sunni countries by way of addressing the threat posed by Iran. On the other hand, the aggravating inter-bloc rivalry would force Israel to employ greater caution than ever before, and define clear boundaries in its relations with China. Vis-à-vis Russia, and the extent of the potential damage it could cause Israel, the incoming government would do well to avoid supplying Ukraine with air-defense systems, while continuing to express public support of Ukraine and providing it with humanitarian and other aid wherever possible.

 
National resilience challenges – A long-term strategy is required

Alongside the threats on both state and security levels, the new Israeli government also faces the complex challenge of restoring and strengthening national resilience. This challenge derives from numerous dimensions associated with social, economic, and civil aspects, and due to the government intentions to promote radical changes in the legal system.

Therefore, the government’s success to improve Israel’s national resilience would be measured by its ability to avoid actions that will lead to the worsening of the rift between the different sections of the public on the one hand, and to demonstrate its ability to promote actions on a variety of issues for the benefit of the general population, on the other. Concurrently, the government should do its best to improve the citizens’ sense of personal safety, developing and improving the standard of living, as well as job security. Next, it must improve healthcare services, build an egalitarian education system, develop and adapt high-level civil and transportation infrastructure, develop community and welfare services that are widely available and highly diverse, provide opportunity and availability for affordable housing, and give the citizens a sense of impact and involvement in the management of state affairs. In all of the above, the government is required to make extensive improvements, and show proven successes by building long-term action strategies in all ministries.