Maintaining the "special relations" with the U.S. in the shadow of a domestic crisis in Israel
Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS
Executive Director
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
January, 2021
Photo: Gage Skidmore | CC BY SA 2.0
Israel beginning its fourth election campaign in two years reflects ongoing deterioration and erosion in its national resilience. It is knee-deep in a health crisis that has severe socio-economic implications while suffering from continuous political paralysis in the absence of a future-oriented budget, organized workplan, strategy, or set of priorities.
These processes reflect negatively on Israel's image of strength, as well as on its regional and international status. They also cause damage in political and security-related areas, which, particularly at this time, when there is a shift in U.S. administration, may prove to be substantial. Just when the Biden administration will be forming its policies, including its Middle Eastern one, Israel will be spending crucial months in a domestic whirlwind; too busy looking inwardly, and trying to solve its own issues, to impact any processes taking place in Washington, or receiving the attention it needs from the incoming administration.
Several core issues are on the agenda of the U.S. Middle Eastern policy and its relations with Israel, which could potentially cause tension between the two allies.
These processes reflect negatively on Israel's image of strength, as well as on its regional and international status. They also cause damage in political and security-related areas, which, particularly at this time, when there is a shift in U.S. administration, may prove to be substantial. Just when the Biden administration will be forming its policies, including its Middle Eastern one, Israel will be spending crucial months in a domestic whirlwind; too busy looking inwardly, and trying to solve its own issues, to impact any processes taking place in Washington, or receiving the attention it needs from the incoming administration.
Several core issues are on the agenda of the U.S. Middle Eastern policy and its relations with Israel, which could potentially cause tension between the two allies.
The Iranian nuclear challenge
It seems that Biden's Middle Eastern policy will be affected by his attitude toward Iran more than anything else. His approach to Tehran seems to be the Archimedean point that will define the depth of Washington's involvement, and inform its relations with regional allies.
An analysis of the statements made by the president-elect and his national security team supports the notion that the incoming administration is interested in returning to the JCPOA while lifting the sanctions, without insisting on negotiations with Tehran to rectify its grievous flaws: the expiration of limitations (starting seven years from now), which could pave the way for Iran to become an internationally legitimized nuclear threshold state; advanced centrifuge R&D that significantly reduces the breakout time Iran requires to produce weapon-grade fissile material; and the lack of authority for the IAEA to monitor the nuclear weapons program.
It seems that the return to the JCPOA is the administration's way of "setting aside" the Iranian issue in order to focus on more urgent matters, such as: addressing domestic socio-economic problems; great power competition, particularly with China; and reinstating America's status globally. Tehran, for its part, is eager to remove the sanctions yoke from around its neck, as they are detrimental to its economy, and has made it clear that it is willing to fully comply with the agreement once more, with no need even for negotiations with the U.S.
Despite what may seem as a zone of possible agreement between Iran and the United States – supported by Europe, Russia, and China – the return to the JCPOA may run into a series of obstacles, and get derailed. Among such hurdles are: an unplanned escalation – for instance, in Iraq; possible disputes over the sequence of steps constituting the return to the JCPOA – will compliance come before or after the lifting of sanctions? – as well as the baseline to which Iran must return in complex issues, such as the know-how accumulated through R&D; internal conflict between the conservatives and Rouhani's government expected to exacerbate as the June elections draw nearer, which could potentially lead to Iran's terms becoming more stringent; the effect of this step on the relations between the Biden administration and Israel or the Arab states, and more.
In light of their complexity, the probes and talks between the U.S., Europe, and Iran could take some time, thereby allowing Israel enough time to make an impact on the Biden administration's stance and planned actions in this matter.
An analysis of the statements made by the president-elect and his national security team supports the notion that the incoming administration is interested in returning to the JCPOA while lifting the sanctions, without insisting on negotiations with Tehran to rectify its grievous flaws: the expiration of limitations (starting seven years from now), which could pave the way for Iran to become an internationally legitimized nuclear threshold state; advanced centrifuge R&D that significantly reduces the breakout time Iran requires to produce weapon-grade fissile material; and the lack of authority for the IAEA to monitor the nuclear weapons program.
It seems that the return to the JCPOA is the administration's way of "setting aside" the Iranian issue in order to focus on more urgent matters, such as: addressing domestic socio-economic problems; great power competition, particularly with China; and reinstating America's status globally. Tehran, for its part, is eager to remove the sanctions yoke from around its neck, as they are detrimental to its economy, and has made it clear that it is willing to fully comply with the agreement once more, with no need even for negotiations with the U.S.
Despite what may seem as a zone of possible agreement between Iran and the United States – supported by Europe, Russia, and China – the return to the JCPOA may run into a series of obstacles, and get derailed. Among such hurdles are: an unplanned escalation – for instance, in Iraq; possible disputes over the sequence of steps constituting the return to the JCPOA – will compliance come before or after the lifting of sanctions? – as well as the baseline to which Iran must return in complex issues, such as the know-how accumulated through R&D; internal conflict between the conservatives and Rouhani's government expected to exacerbate as the June elections draw nearer, which could potentially lead to Iran's terms becoming more stringent; the effect of this step on the relations between the Biden administration and Israel or the Arab states, and more.
In light of their complexity, the probes and talks between the U.S., Europe, and Iran could take some time, thereby allowing Israel enough time to make an impact on the Biden administration's stance and planned actions in this matter.
Maintaining Israel's qualitative military edge (QME)
and the IDF's buildup
In the absence of a budget, set of priorities, and long-term planning by the government, the IDF is left incapable of executing its multiannual plan, and setting the wheels of essential force buildup processes in coming years in motion. These processes are crucial, inter alia, in order to tackle Iran's efforts to establish itself militarily on Israel's borders, and arm Hizballah with precise missiles, as well as scenarios involving missile launching at Israel from remote arenas, such as Yemen and Iraq, as the IDF spokesperson has recently warned. The plausibility of such scenarios may increase in light of Iran's threats to avenge the assassination of nuclear scientist Fakhrizadeh, which it attributes to Israel, and the events marking one year to the assassination of Quds Force commander Soleimani (January 3).
A major aspect of the IDF's force buildup plan is based on future U.S. aid, and if Israel continues to stall, and avoid acquiring advanced American capabilities and platforms, Washington may start to wonder. Particularly since the U.S. recently signed huge deals with Arab states, reflecting negative precedents in the supply of advanced weaponry systems to the region, such as F-35 aircraft and armed UAVs, which gnaw at Israel's QME.
A major aspect of the IDF's force buildup plan is based on future U.S. aid, and if Israel continues to stall, and avoid acquiring advanced American capabilities and platforms, Washington may start to wonder. Particularly since the U.S. recently signed huge deals with Arab states, reflecting negative precedents in the supply of advanced weaponry systems to the region, such as F-35 aircraft and armed UAVs, which gnaw at Israel's QME.
The Great Power Competition (China and Russia)
The unprecedented cyberattack against the U.S. recently revealed could heighten the tension and further dampen the relations between the U.S. and Russia, which the administration and cyber experts are blaming. Under these circumstances, the Biden administration's sensitivity toward Israel-Russia relations may increase, as some in Washington continue to claim that the close ties between Moscow and Jerusalem come at the expense of American interests.
The cyberattack is expected to hone U.S. concerns over a possible negative effect on its technological supremacy, particularly vis à vis China. The administration has reiterated to Israel, publicly too, that it is concerned about its level of oversight of Chinese investments in technological sectors. Assistant Secretary of State, David Schenker, has recently warned once again of America's concern that China is penetrating into Israel's high-tech industries, and purchasing dual-use technologies that could "jeopardize the United States".
The cyberattack is expected to hone U.S. concerns over a possible negative effect on its technological supremacy, particularly vis à vis China. The administration has reiterated to Israel, publicly too, that it is concerned about its level of oversight of Chinese investments in technological sectors. Assistant Secretary of State, David Schenker, has recently warned once again of America's concern that China is penetrating into Israel's high-tech industries, and purchasing dual-use technologies that could "jeopardize the United States".
American presence in the Middle East
and Israel's relations with Arab countries
While the Biden administration seeks to reduce U.S. presence and involvement in "unwinnable conflicts", Israel has a strong interest in preserving broad American presence in the Middle East, as well as its top ally's unwavering support of the states that serve as an anchor for both regional stability and Israel's safety, such as Jordan and Egypt. Israel is also looking to the United States for maintenance of the Palestinian arena, the stability of which seems to be increasingly more challenged in both Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip.
At the same time, the normalization process, which reflects considerable accomplishments for Israel, as well as its acceptance in the region, could begin to slow down if the Biden administration will delay or revoke the implementation of commitments given during it by President Trump.
At the same time, the normalization process, which reflects considerable accomplishments for Israel, as well as its acceptance in the region, could begin to slow down if the Biden administration will delay or revoke the implementation of commitments given during it by President Trump.
How should Israel conduct itself vis à vis the incoming administration? Dos and Don’ts
These and other strategic issues, some of which reveal gaps between Israel and the Biden administration, require Israel to build a strong foundation for deep and intimate dialog with the newcomers to the White House with the aim of becoming part of Washington's policymaking process, and impacting it.
This key objective that Israel must set for itself at this time could play a significant role in its national security, but the setting for its obtainment is not optimal: a time of multidimensional domestic crisis and political whirlwind; the loss of communication channels, experience, and contacts in Washington due to a change of ambassadors, and tension in Israel's relations with Biden, a true friend of Israel, before entering office.
Sources affiliated with the incoming president have argued in the media that the assassination of nuclear scientist Fakhrizadeh, which they attributed to Israel, was designed to stop Biden from pursuing the diplomatic avenue with Iran. An interview given by Prime Minister Netanyahu to a conservative institute in Washington in which he warned against returning to the "flawed" nuclear deal, last minute construction permits in Judea and Samaria, and the delayed recognition in Biden's victory in the elections– have all outraged the Biden camp. The anger toward Israel was mirrored in a particularly blatant op-ed published in the Washington Post by long-time columnist Jackson Diehl.
Under these circumstances, Biden – who has already been "stung" as vice-president by Netanyahu's unusual speech in Congress back in 2015 in an effort to thwart Obama's nuclear deal – may "shut the door" on Israel's attempts to impact U.S. policy on Iran in particular, and in the Middle East in general.
This key objective that Israel must set for itself at this time could play a significant role in its national security, but the setting for its obtainment is not optimal: a time of multidimensional domestic crisis and political whirlwind; the loss of communication channels, experience, and contacts in Washington due to a change of ambassadors, and tension in Israel's relations with Biden, a true friend of Israel, before entering office.
Sources affiliated with the incoming president have argued in the media that the assassination of nuclear scientist Fakhrizadeh, which they attributed to Israel, was designed to stop Biden from pursuing the diplomatic avenue with Iran. An interview given by Prime Minister Netanyahu to a conservative institute in Washington in which he warned against returning to the "flawed" nuclear deal, last minute construction permits in Judea and Samaria, and the delayed recognition in Biden's victory in the elections– have all outraged the Biden camp. The anger toward Israel was mirrored in a particularly blatant op-ed published in the Washington Post by long-time columnist Jackson Diehl.
Under these circumstances, Biden – who has already been "stung" as vice-president by Netanyahu's unusual speech in Congress back in 2015 in an effort to thwart Obama's nuclear deal – may "shut the door" on Israel's attempts to impact U.S. policy on Iran in particular, and in the Middle East in general.
The Israeli establishment must regain its composure, lay the foundation for a quiet, constructive dialog with the Biden administration, and gain its trust. Israel, led by its prime minister, must avoid throwing its relations and gaps with Biden into the election campaign mix; and refrain from any unilateral steps in the final week of President Trump's term in office, which the incoming president may perceive as an attempt to restrain him in advance.
Israel must continue to improve its oversight mechanisms of sensitive Chinese investments, and conduct itself vis à vis the United States with full coordination and transparency with regard to its ties with Russia and China. Israel must ensure that it meets the American standard, so that the incoming administration will be able to determine that Chinese activity in Israel and Israel's relations with Russia do not jeopardize U.S. interests.
In view of the bleak outlook in the Middle East, and the need to prepare for the upcoming crises and challenges together, the crucial dialog with the Biden administration, and Israel's status as a bi-partisan U.S. consensus, must not be jeopardized. Israel has no substitute for the support and strategic back provided by the U.S., and entering a high-profile conflict with the incoming administration (among other reasons, for internal political purposes) would be a strategic error, the implications of which on Israel's security, status, and power could be severe.
Israel must continue to improve its oversight mechanisms of sensitive Chinese investments, and conduct itself vis à vis the United States with full coordination and transparency with regard to its ties with Russia and China. Israel must ensure that it meets the American standard, so that the incoming administration will be able to determine that Chinese activity in Israel and Israel's relations with Russia do not jeopardize U.S. interests.
In view of the bleak outlook in the Middle East, and the need to prepare for the upcoming crises and challenges together, the crucial dialog with the Biden administration, and Israel's status as a bi-partisan U.S. consensus, must not be jeopardized. Israel has no substitute for the support and strategic back provided by the U.S., and entering a high-profile conflict with the incoming administration (among other reasons, for internal political purposes) would be a strategic error, the implications of which on Israel's security, status, and power could be severe.