Between Washington and the Middle East: 
Is the U.S. Being Perceived as "Packing It In" and Providing Tailwind for Extremists?

Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS
Executive Director
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
November 30, 2020
26-3-20main-...
Photo: piqsels.com
The unstable and volatile Middle East continues to provide fast-paced dramatic headlines. The assassination of Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh – a "knowledge hub" and leader of the Iranian nuclear weapon project – has the media's complete attention these days. The operation pushed aside important events and profound trends that demonstrate how the extreme and radical forces in the region – both on the Shiite and Sunni axes – continue to fight for their control and status and have yet to be eradicated.

In the broader Middle East – The U.S. announcement of its withdrawal of forces has brought the ever-strengthening Taliban in Afghanistan back to the headlines. It is expanding the areas under its control, and threatening to occupy key cities in the both northern and southern parts of the country (Kandahar). The American statement also highlighted the increasing attacks in Somalia carried out by Al Qaeda-affiliated Al Shabab. In Iraq too, the reduction of American forces served as a reminder for the declared Iranian goal to push the U.S. out of the country. The Shiite militias affiliated with Iran "showed their support for the message conveyed" by launching rockets toward the "green zone" in Baghdad immediately after the U.S. had made its announcement.

In the northern arena – It turns out that the statements made by some Israeli officials in May 2020 about Iran reducing its presence in Syria were premature. In practice, not only did the IRGC's Quds Force not retreat from our borders, it has set up terror infrastructures near them, in the Syrian Golan by establishing itself within Syrian Army frameworks, and instructing local Syrian organizations. The latter have recently placed explosive charges on the Israeli side of the border, in the southern part of the Golan Heights, which, upon being discovered, led to a series of IDF attacks against Iranian targets in Syria.

In the Palestinian arena – Although the renewed coordination between the Palestinian Authority and Israel is an important and positive development, it has also underscored the weakening of the PA and its decline as a governmental system. By contrast, the rockets launched from Gaza to adjacent Israeli cities, as well as to Central Israel, reiterate that the Gaza Strip is armed and controlled by Hamas – a Muslim Brotherhood affiliate receiving particular support from Qatar and Turkey. The latter is spearheading an extreme and confrontational line, while projecting power across the Middle East.

The American troops' expedited withdrawal from the region is likely to be interpreted and marketed by radical forces as indicative of the U.S. "packing it in" and leaving the Middle East in general in a way that could provide them with tailwind. Against this very backdrop, the Secretary General of NATO warned that "the price for leaving too soon or in an uncoordinated way could be very high". This is a problematic "inheritance" that Trump is leaving president-elect Biden, whose ability and desire to send American forces back to regional conflict zones are doubtful, particularly in light of his explicit support in bringing most of them home. His views were outlined, inter alia, in his programmatic piece in Foreign Affairs magazine, in which he argued that "staying entrenched in unwinnable conflicts" prevents the United States from leading and building its instruments of power.

Reduced U.S. presence in the Middle East, and the region's low ranking on the incoming administration's list of priorities, could be detrimental to Washington's image of strength, as well as project negatively on its ability to address other challenges, the first of which is the Iranian nuclear problem. Meanwhile, recent IAEA reports prove that Iran continues to expand its nuclear program – beyond its ongoing accumulation of enriched uranium, it is also progressing in its advanced centrifuges R&D, while shielding them in underground spaces at the Natanz facility.

These capabilities significantly reduce the "breakout" time Iran requires to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. The assassination of Fakhrizadeh, the dominant figure central to Iran's nuclear weapons efforts, has delivered a blow to the project, but does not render the regime incapable of completing it. As the Iranian nuclear archive exposed by Israel demonstrates, Iran has been in possession of the necessary knowledge for many years, and is keeping it organized and accessible. Its scientists can continue advancing the project – even if they are forced to work in fear and a sense of penetrability – should such a decision be reached. It is only Iran's concern about the world's (economic and kinetic) reaction, and particularly that of the United States, that is impeding such decision-making; Fakhrizadeh's death is no "bottleneck" in this regard.

The doubts about America's determination to preserve its presence and influence in the Middle East will certainly be used to the advantage of other "external players" seeking to enhance their presence in the region at America's expense, like Russia. Moscow continues to display equity and impact regional processes. After imposing an agreement on Armenia at Nagorno-Karabakh, thereby strengthening its ties with Baku, Moscow's plan of many years to build a Russian seaport in Sudan is now underway following the agreement it signed with Khartoum. The naval base at Port Sudan will be the first military Russian base in Africa, and an important point on a strategic maritime route in the Red Sea.

The combination between the potential momentum of radical forces in the region, Iran's expanding nuclear program, and challenging players leaking into every "crack" the U.S. leaves behind demonstrates the instability, uncertainty, and explosiveness of the Middle East.

Under such complex circumstances, Israel must maintain its Qualitative Military Edge (QME) more than ever before to address any possible combination of adversaries and arenas, as well as to enhance its own image of deterrence and power in the region.

But instead, as the Director General of the Ministry of Defense has warned, in the absence of a budget, set of priorities and long-term planning, the IDF is left incapable of executing its multi-annual plan, and set the wheels of essential buildup processes in coming years in motion, while relying on future U.S. foreign military financing. This risk taken by the Israeli government goes against all logic.

Another risk in this context is being posed by any unilateral steps that Israel may take during President Trump's final weeks in office. These might be perceived by president-elect Joe Biden as an attempt to restrain him even before he has entered office. Such moves may harm the quality of Israel's dialog with the incoming administration and their shared trust. Due to the bleak outlook in the Middle East, and the need to prepare for the implications and challenges associated with reduced American military presence in the region together, this crucial dialog must not be jeopardized. Israel has no substitute for the support and strategic back provided by the U.S.