Multiple Challenges: A Call for Leadership
Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS
Executive Director
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
March, 2021
A bleak strategic picture is being painted in recent weeks due to some developments that could pose a challenge to Israel's national security. These processes require guidance and collaboration across the board to deliver an urgent, coordinated response that is aligned with Israel's interests. However, since it is in the midst of a multidimensional domestic crisis, and focused on another elections campaign, Israel seems to be taken aback and unable to keep up, lacking a coherent policy, and reluctant to set the wheels of the decision-making processes required for the consolidation of such policy in motion. As a result, Israel is not impacting events but being led by them, reactive. Moreover, with regard to some of the issues, its leaders' conduct as they address challenges seems to be affected by ulterior political motives.
The imminent strategic challenges we face are taking place in four arenas.
The imminent strategic challenges we face are taking place in four arenas.
Iran
Rapid developments between the United States and Iran that, despite growing regional tension and bargaining over complex nuclear issues, may lead both parties to a gradual and coordinated return to the nuclear deal, even though it is significantly limited in its impediment of Iranian progress toward the nuclear threshold. It is against this backdrop that relations between Jerusalem – who is publicly critical of the steps taken by the new administration – and Washington are tense. It may even cast a shadow on overall relations between the two allies, negatively reflecting on the collaboration with the United States on various challenges in other arenas that has always been a vital strategic need of Israel's.
The Palestinians
Fatah and Hamas are progressing rapidly toward elections in late May. Clearly this process is moving forward (voter registration, release of detainees), and as time goes by the parties will find it harder to rescind on it. Moreover, Egypt is advocating it, and the international community is supportive in principle. The elections in the Palestinian arena may turn into a multidimensional strategic event and spin out of control. Warning signs are already mounting, looking similar to the circumstances that led to Hamas' victory in the last elections held in January 2006. The most worrying trend is Fatah splitting into camps (Barghouti, Dahlan, al-Qidwa, Abu Mazen) alongside the movement's complacence and exaggerated self-confidence.
Should Fatah lose the elections, Hamas may bolster its hold on the West Bank. This event could become a milestone in the organization's process of gaining control and imposing its armed conflict agenda on the entire Palestinian system, including the PLO. Alongside the process of Abu Mazen leaving, this may signal an internal war of succession in Fatah that would further weaken the Palestinian Authority as a governing system.
Should Fatah lose the elections, Hamas may bolster its hold on the West Bank. This event could become a milestone in the organization's process of gaining control and imposing its armed conflict agenda on the entire Palestinian system, including the PLO. Alongside the process of Abu Mazen leaving, this may signal an internal war of succession in Fatah that would further weaken the Palestinian Authority as a governing system.
Legal
The decision reached by the International Criminal Court Prosecutor in the Hague to launch an investigation into "the situation in Palestine" surprised Israel, demonstrating that the ICC proceedings may move forward faster than anticipated.
The Gulf
U.S.-Saudi relations seem to have hit a "bump" with the issuing of the U.S. intelligence report on the killing of Khashoggi, U.S. sanctions against senior Saudi officials, the suspension of sales of offensive weapons due to the war in Yemen, and President Biden's avoidance of contact with Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman. The new administration's growing focus on human rights on the one hand, and its pursuit of accelerated negotiations with Tehran on the other, are causing concern among Arab leaders viewed as U.S. allies. In Saudi Arabia, the tension with the United States could impede its willingness to take risks and proceed toward normalization with Israel, as well as push it, as it did in the past, to promote independent regional arrangements and understandings with Iran.
How should Israel respond?
Israel and its leadership must regain their composure, expedite their preparation for the challenges that lie ahead, and establish responses as well as policies based on close coordination with the U.S. administration in order to impact events before it is too late, and avoid paying heavy prices.
A positive development in U.S.-Israeli relations was recently reported when Jerusalem accepted the Biden administration's suggestion that strategic dialogue between the two on the issue of Iran be renewed.
A renewed dialogue with the administration provides Israel with the opportunity to shift from loud confrontational diplomacy that negatively projects on Israel's overall relations with the United States to a quiet effective strategy of addressing the challenges posed by Iran. We believe that, in the absence of close and constructive coordination with the United States, Israel will not be able to fully realize its range of pressure and prevention steps vis à vis Iran, nor translate them into tangible long-term accomplishments. In its dialogue with the U.S. administration, Israel must prioritize the nuclear threat. It is the gravest threat Iran currently poses to Israel, and may become existential if the former's progress is not impeded. It is in Israel's best interest that Iran be countered by the international community, instead of becoming an "Israeli problem".
At the same time, in its dialogue with the U.S. administration, Israel should underline the need to work together in a coordinated manner, operationally, to address the growing regional threats posed by Iran, not only against Israel itself, but the Gulf states too. When doing so, it is vital that Israel agree with the administration that ignoring Iranian aggression in the region will be perceived by Tehran as a display of weakness that may only embolden it in the region and in its nuclear-related conduct. These arguments are probably in line with the Biden administration's thinking too, for it has recently taken deterrent action against Iran to maintain its credibility in the region by carrying out its first attack against pro-Iranian militia groups in Syria, near the Iraqi border, for which it has also assumed responsibility.
It is equally vital that the United States project robust commitment to protecting the current regimes in the Gulf states. The misalignment between the United States and the Arab world, particularly Saudi Arabia, are probably a cause for satisfaction in Iran, and could prompt the Gulf states to engage in appeasement and "risk hedging" with Tehran.
Domestically, Israel should embrace an organized, coherent, interagency policy contending with the Iranian issue. The political echelon is responsible for aligning the entire establishment, and ensuring that its actions are fully synchronized, and transparent.
In the Palestinian arena, Israel is required to better prioritize the challenges that the Palestinian elections may raise, and cease "burying its head in the sand". Even if it is best at this stage to refrain from publicly intervening in this process, the full realization of which remains doubtful, Israel should strive for an urgent dialog with the United States and Europe in an attempt to reach understandings on postponing the elections if need be, or at least conditioning them upon Hamas' compliance with the Quartet Conditions.
At the same time, Israel should reintroduce the two-state solution into its agenda in coordination with the Biden administration; and harness the normalization process with the Gulf states to give the Palestinian Authority some attention instead of casting it aside. Such steps, alongside the renewed ties between Washington and the PA as well as American foreign aid funding to the Palestinians, may mitigate the Palestinian Authority's weakening trend, and counter its growing intimacy with Hamas.
Profound political coordination with the U.S. administration and European countries on the Palestinian issue, while pulling the peace process out of its deep freeze, is expected to help Israel garner international support as it addresses the examination announced by the International Criminal Court in the Hague.
A positive development in U.S.-Israeli relations was recently reported when Jerusalem accepted the Biden administration's suggestion that strategic dialogue between the two on the issue of Iran be renewed.
A renewed dialogue with the administration provides Israel with the opportunity to shift from loud confrontational diplomacy that negatively projects on Israel's overall relations with the United States to a quiet effective strategy of addressing the challenges posed by Iran. We believe that, in the absence of close and constructive coordination with the United States, Israel will not be able to fully realize its range of pressure and prevention steps vis à vis Iran, nor translate them into tangible long-term accomplishments. In its dialogue with the U.S. administration, Israel must prioritize the nuclear threat. It is the gravest threat Iran currently poses to Israel, and may become existential if the former's progress is not impeded. It is in Israel's best interest that Iran be countered by the international community, instead of becoming an "Israeli problem".
At the same time, in its dialogue with the U.S. administration, Israel should underline the need to work together in a coordinated manner, operationally, to address the growing regional threats posed by Iran, not only against Israel itself, but the Gulf states too. When doing so, it is vital that Israel agree with the administration that ignoring Iranian aggression in the region will be perceived by Tehran as a display of weakness that may only embolden it in the region and in its nuclear-related conduct. These arguments are probably in line with the Biden administration's thinking too, for it has recently taken deterrent action against Iran to maintain its credibility in the region by carrying out its first attack against pro-Iranian militia groups in Syria, near the Iraqi border, for which it has also assumed responsibility.
It is equally vital that the United States project robust commitment to protecting the current regimes in the Gulf states. The misalignment between the United States and the Arab world, particularly Saudi Arabia, are probably a cause for satisfaction in Iran, and could prompt the Gulf states to engage in appeasement and "risk hedging" with Tehran.
Domestically, Israel should embrace an organized, coherent, interagency policy contending with the Iranian issue. The political echelon is responsible for aligning the entire establishment, and ensuring that its actions are fully synchronized, and transparent.
In the Palestinian arena, Israel is required to better prioritize the challenges that the Palestinian elections may raise, and cease "burying its head in the sand". Even if it is best at this stage to refrain from publicly intervening in this process, the full realization of which remains doubtful, Israel should strive for an urgent dialog with the United States and Europe in an attempt to reach understandings on postponing the elections if need be, or at least conditioning them upon Hamas' compliance with the Quartet Conditions.
At the same time, Israel should reintroduce the two-state solution into its agenda in coordination with the Biden administration; and harness the normalization process with the Gulf states to give the Palestinian Authority some attention instead of casting it aside. Such steps, alongside the renewed ties between Washington and the PA as well as American foreign aid funding to the Palestinians, may mitigate the Palestinian Authority's weakening trend, and counter its growing intimacy with Hamas.
Profound political coordination with the U.S. administration and European countries on the Palestinian issue, while pulling the peace process out of its deep freeze, is expected to help Israel garner international support as it addresses the examination announced by the International Criminal Court in the Hague.
Ultimately, Israel cannot afford to dwell on its domestic issues, such as the upcoming elections, without also engaging in nationwide, interorganizational, serious and comprehensive preparations that will result in the establishment of coherent policies underlying an ongoing dialogue with the Biden administration and vis à vis the Iranian, Palestinian, and regional arenas. Processes in these arenas are evolving rapidly; they do not wait for Israel, and may force it to pay heavy prices if it is caught unprepared.