A New Administration in Washington:
Opportunities & Challenges for Israel
Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS
Executive Director
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
November 13, 2020
Photo: Gage Skidmore | CC BY SA 2.0
On January 20, Democrat president elect, Joe Biden, will enter the oval office. The change in leadership will undoubtedly lead to significant shifts in U.S. foreign policy in both style and essence. At the same time, there may also be a certain degree of continuity on some issues with regard to the outgoing administration's policy.
For Israel, the new administration represents a series of significant opportunities as well as challenges with respect to the various items on the agenda, even if the Middle East will not rank high on its list of priorities for the first year in office. During it, the Biden administration is expected to focus, first and foremost, on closing the gaps schisms in American society, fighting the COVID-19 pandemic and its associated economic challenges, and improving the global posture of the U.S. – particularly its transatlantic relations and the great power competition with China and Russia.
For Israel, the new administration represents a series of significant opportunities as well as challenges with respect to the various items on the agenda, even if the Middle East will not rank high on its list of priorities for the first year in office. During it, the Biden administration is expected to focus, first and foremost, on closing the gaps schisms in American society, fighting the COVID-19 pandemic and its associated economic challenges, and improving the global posture of the U.S. – particularly its transatlantic relations and the great power competition with China and Russia.
Israel's Status and Image in the U.S. Are Put to the Test
The special relations and value-based political-security alliance between Israel and the U.S. will continue under the Biden-Harris administration, as they are true friends of Israel. Nevertheless, Biden was left with a bitter aftertaste from his term as President Obama's vice president in the Palestinian context (building in the settlements) and the Iranian one (Prime Minister Netanyahu's speech in Congress). Moreover, in recent years Israel's status as a bipartisan consensus in the U.S. has dangerously eroded. Israel is perceived as identifying primarily with the Republican party and administration, and as such, has gradually become a political bone of contention, particularly in this era of deepening polarization in the U.S.
The Biden-Harris administration, as well as the cabinet the two will appoint, is expected to act in accordance with liberal values of liberty, civil and gender equality, as well as human rights. These are marked, inter alia, by their support base at the dynamic and increasingly younger Democratic Party. The latter does not always sympathize with Israel as it once did, and some of its members even view it as a reactionary player. Under these circumstances, Israel's status as the only democracy in the Middle East – a huge asset in its relations with U.S. administrations and the public for generations – may be put to the test.
The incoming administration is expected to continue, and possibly exacerbate, its predecessor's policy with regard to the collaboration between Israel and China, and the former's relations with Russia, which Biden has defined as a potentially greater threat than China.
Under such circumstances, the Israeli government must urgently address its relations with the Biden administration, and consolidate an organized political and diplomatic plan for its conduct with Washington, the aims of which will be:
The Biden-Harris administration, as well as the cabinet the two will appoint, is expected to act in accordance with liberal values of liberty, civil and gender equality, as well as human rights. These are marked, inter alia, by their support base at the dynamic and increasingly younger Democratic Party. The latter does not always sympathize with Israel as it once did, and some of its members even view it as a reactionary player. Under these circumstances, Israel's status as the only democracy in the Middle East – a huge asset in its relations with U.S. administrations and the public for generations – may be put to the test.
The incoming administration is expected to continue, and possibly exacerbate, its predecessor's policy with regard to the collaboration between Israel and China, and the former's relations with Russia, which Biden has defined as a potentially greater threat than China.
Under such circumstances, the Israeli government must urgently address its relations with the Biden administration, and consolidate an organized political and diplomatic plan for its conduct with Washington, the aims of which will be:
a. Opening doors and establishing a consistent and quiet dialog with the new incoming position-holders and impact hubs within the administration in order to coordinate, find a common language, and conduct intimate consultations on issues that are of concern to Israel.
b. Emphasizing the values shared by the two countries by strengthening Israel's image as a democratic country that sanctifies equal opportunity, initiative and innovation; as well as reinstating its status as a bipartisan U.S. consensus.
c. Dissociating China from Russia in the dialog conducted with the administration. Washington views the two as a similar threat tied to the superpower rivalry, whereas Israel regards them as separate issues. China represents a threat in the area of investments and technology, and does not strive to shape the region, certainly as long as its interests, particularly in energy, are protected. By contrast, Russia's military presence in the region impacts essential Israeli interests.
d. Preventing a crisis in U.S.-Israel relations because of China by enhancing the oversight mechanisms over Chinese investments in coordination with Washington and with full transparency to ensure that it meets the American standard so that the US administration could determine that China's activity in Israel does not pose a risk to US interests.
e. Making the Biden administration understand that Israel's relations with Russia on the tactical-military and leadership levels are essential to maintaining freedom of action in Syria, which allows Israel to thwart Iran's attempts to establish itself militarily, and duplicate the severe conventional threat it has built against Israel in Lebanon on Syria n soil. The Biden administration must understand that this is a top strategic Israeli interest.
The Nuclear and Regional Iranian Threat
During the elections campaign, Biden presented his strategy vis à vis Iran, whereby if Iran returns to strict compliance with the JCPOA, the US would rejoin it, implicitly indicating that sanctions would be lifted. Only then would his administration negotiate with Iran over "strengthening and extending the nuclear deal's provisions". At the same time, Biden claims the U.S. will continue to push back against Iran's malign activities in the area of human rights violations, its support for terrorism, and ballistic missile development.
Biden's strategy could therefore lead the US administration back to the original nuclear deal, with its provisions nearing their expiration dates, and "lock" it there - having at least partly conceded the sanction lever – unable to rectify its grievous flaws.
However, while Trump's administration struggled to translate the pressure levers it had on Iran to its return to the negotiating table or to strategic accomplishments, Biden's entry into the oval office improves the chances of coordination between Washington and Europe, and renewed negotiations with Tehran, which may slow down the latter's violations of the nuclear deal.
As a lesson learned from the problematic interaction during Obama's term in office, Israel should refrain from publicly criticizing Biden's policy, and strive to coordinate its moves with Washington as much as possible in order to impact the latter's process of crafting its policy vis à vis the Iranian challenge.
The desired objective in Israel's dialog with the U.S. administration are:
Biden's strategy could therefore lead the US administration back to the original nuclear deal, with its provisions nearing their expiration dates, and "lock" it there - having at least partly conceded the sanction lever – unable to rectify its grievous flaws.
However, while Trump's administration struggled to translate the pressure levers it had on Iran to its return to the negotiating table or to strategic accomplishments, Biden's entry into the oval office improves the chances of coordination between Washington and Europe, and renewed negotiations with Tehran, which may slow down the latter's violations of the nuclear deal.
As a lesson learned from the problematic interaction during Obama's term in office, Israel should refrain from publicly criticizing Biden's policy, and strive to coordinate its moves with Washington as much as possible in order to impact the latter's process of crafting its policy vis à vis the Iranian challenge.
The desired objective in Israel's dialog with the U.S. administration are:
a. Reaching the understanding that Iran must be denied not only nuclear weapons but the status of a nuclear threshold state as well, which would allow it to project power in the Middle East.
b. Reaching an understanding over the ToR of its negotiations with Tehran to ensure that the U.S. will insist on rectifying the weaknesses inherent to the JCPOA: the expiration of restrictions ("sunset"), advanced centrifuge R&D, and authority to monitor authorities on the weapon program.
c. Maintaining the sanction lever until the grievous flaws of the original deal are addressed. If a decision on sanctions relief is made, an indirect step - such as a European credit line (as previously suggested by the President of France, Macron) - is preferable.
d. Prioritizing the nuclear challenge and focusing on it, while promoting a joint effort to curb Iran in the region and in the area of missile development.
e. Urging the U.S. administration to recognize that the most effective way of motivating the Iranian regime to compromise is to combine military presence and deployment in the region that poses a credible military threat, with sanctions, punitive measures, and heavy economic pressure.
The Palestinian Arena as an Opportunity
In the immediate term, the change in U.S. leadership presents a clear opportunity for Israel in the Palestinian arena. Biden's rise to power is expected to take the annexation plan, which posed a genuine threat to Israel's national security as well as its Jewish and democratic character, off the table for good. Under these circumstances, the chances of curbing the Palestinian Authority's accelerated weakening, and its fading as a governing system, are increasing. Its drift toward Hamas and the radical camp due to the normalization accords could also be mitigated.
The possible renewal of U.S. aid to the Palestinians, the reopening of the Palestinian representation in Washington as well as the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem, and, more importantly, the renewed hope of a two-state solution could lead the Palestinian Authority to stop objecting to receiving Israeli collected funds, and gradually renew civic and security coordination with Israel, while curbing Hamas in Judea and Samaria.
If the PA grows stronger, and the hope of a return to peace negotiations reappears on the horizon, the IDF and Civil Administration would be able to resist getting sucked into the vacuum left behind by the PA in managing the lives of the Palestinian population, and Israel's relations with both Jordan and Egypt would improve.
The possible renewal of U.S. aid to the Palestinians, the reopening of the Palestinian representation in Washington as well as the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem, and, more importantly, the renewed hope of a two-state solution could lead the Palestinian Authority to stop objecting to receiving Israeli collected funds, and gradually renew civic and security coordination with Israel, while curbing Hamas in Judea and Samaria.
If the PA grows stronger, and the hope of a return to peace negotiations reappears on the horizon, the IDF and Civil Administration would be able to resist getting sucked into the vacuum left behind by the PA in managing the lives of the Palestinian population, and Israel's relations with both Jordan and Egypt would improve.
Israel and the U.S. in the Middle East
Biden's approach, as reflected in his programmatic article in Foreign Affairs attributes significant weight to issues of democracy, human rights, and freedom of expression. This attitude raises genuine concern among Middle Eastern rulers, in the Gulf states and Egypt, to name a few, who are grappling with domestic opposition, and fear a rerun of the "Obama script" that, in their view, had paved the way for the "Arab spring".
Moreover, as president, Biden, like Obama and Trump before him, is expected to divert attention to Asia in light of the growing challenges posed by China and North Korea, at the expense of the Middle East, inter alia, where Israel has profound interest in ongoing American presence and dominance, particularly at these times of uncertainty and instability.
Against this backdrop, Biden is also striving to reduce the scope of American forces in the Middle East, and redeploy them so as to cut the cost (in money and lives) that the U.S. invests in the region down to what it perceives as a tolerable level. The need to recover from the blow sustained by the U.S. economy during the COVID-19 crisis will limit American capabilities under Biden with regard to overseas presence and alternatives, including in our region.
Israel must enter into a deep dialog about the Middle East with the Biden administration to achieve the following goals:
Moreover, as president, Biden, like Obama and Trump before him, is expected to divert attention to Asia in light of the growing challenges posed by China and North Korea, at the expense of the Middle East, inter alia, where Israel has profound interest in ongoing American presence and dominance, particularly at these times of uncertainty and instability.
Against this backdrop, Biden is also striving to reduce the scope of American forces in the Middle East, and redeploy them so as to cut the cost (in money and lives) that the U.S. invests in the region down to what it perceives as a tolerable level. The need to recover from the blow sustained by the U.S. economy during the COVID-19 crisis will limit American capabilities under Biden with regard to overseas presence and alternatives, including in our region.
Israel must enter into a deep dialog about the Middle East with the Biden administration to achieve the following goals:
a. Honing the administration's awareness and sensitivity to the profound tension between issues of democracy and stability in the Middle East, and the need to balance them to avoid dangerous shocks in an already unstable region (as the events in Egypt less than a decade ago clearly demonstrated).
b. Analyzing the significance and jointly preparing for the implications and challenges associated with reducing U.S. military presence in the region.
c. Ensuring that the U.S. continues to play the part and honor its commitment to deepen relations between Israel and the Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, and broaden the normalization sphere.
d. Making sure that the Biden administration will ensure and place a special emphasis on maintaining Israel's qualitative military edge (QME) in view of the giant advanced arms and weapons deals with the Gulf states. The incoming administration must be informed that at present, with the Middle East and international arena facing such uncertainty and volatility, Israel must hedge its risks, and preserve its military supremacy, as well as its image of deterrence and power in this region more than ever before. Israel must therefore prepare to submit to the Biden Administration, which is expected to review U.S. foreign aid early on, a comprehensive request for acquisition that would equip the IDF and build-up its force in upcoming years while fully exhausting U.S. foreign military financing (FMF) funds.
e. Leveraging the shift in policy expected at the White House with regard to Turkey to curb its problematic maneuvers in the region, and particularly in the Eastern Basin of the Mediterranean.
To conclude, Israel is facing a host of domestic and external challenges in which there is no substitute for the strategic support and tailwind provided by the U.S. The Israeli government should therefore strive, as a top priority, to build trust and effective frameworks of dialog with the senior officials and various impact hubs of the incoming administration. In this context, Israel should be particularly cautious in its relations with the Trump administration in its final months so as not to be perceived by the Biden administration as opportunistic, and leave a bad aftertaste before the president elect even sets foot in the White House.