The Strategic Minefield
Mapping and Policy Recommendations
Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS
Executive Director
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
September, 2022
Photos: Khamenei.ir; Kremlin.ru | CC BY 4.0
The next few weeks leading up to the elections, at the heart of which are the Jewish High Holidays, harbor potential for explosivity due to the convergence of several processes and events: The continuing security escalation in the West Bank, particularly in northern Samaria, which is aggravating; the expected start of gas production in Karish rig against the backdrop of Nasrallah’s threats; the security deterioration that could develop around Temple Mount during the Jewish High Holidays, which may project onto other focal points in the Palestinian arenas, as well as on the internal Israeli one. At the same time, in the absence of an agreement, Iran’s nuclear programs continue to progress, and the ball for renewed negotiations is in its court. From a broader perspective, President Putin announced a partial military mobilization and intends to escalate the activities in Ukraine.
A leap in tension in the West Bank
The series of terrorist attacks and incidents in recent weeks, particularly in northern Samaria – Jenin and Nablus – are a manifestation of the leap taken since mid-2022 in the West Bank (3 times as many terrorist attacks as were perpetrated during the corresponding period of time last year). This escalation has its roots in a combination of three factors: The weakness shown by the Palestinian administration, which struggles to or fails to appear motivated to enforce its laws and rule in some areas of the West Bank; the younger Palestinian generation’s boldness (most of the terrorists who perpetrated these attacks were not affiliated with any terrorist organization); and growing Israeli security efforts leading to greater friction on the ground, and exemplifying the Palestinian security apparatuses’ helplessness. It is noteworthy that the weakness displayed by the Palestinian administration does not only result from the actions taken by Israel, but from the characteristics of the ruling government in Ramallah (corruption, deep alienation among the public, and ongoing political dystrophy).
In the background, the Palestinian Authority is angry, not only with Israel but with the Biden Administration as well for failing to convince Israel to change its behavior (and, in general, for paying limited attention to the Palestinian arena). The PA’s criticism primarily centers on the scope of IDF activity and offset of funds transferred (which impacts its ability to pay the security apparatus employees their salaries), but also on the pressure exerted by the U.S. administration on the Palestinian Authority to cease all actions it is taking in the UN in order to be accepted as a member state, and the overall disappointment that President Biden’s visit to the region did not bear any fruit for the Palestinians. Expressions of this resentment can be found in the reportedly tense meetings recently held by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf in Ramallah, and the fact that Abu Mazen has refused to meet with her.
The tension surrounding the Karish rig
A key arena that could erupt in upcoming weeks is associated with the negotiations over Israel and Lebanon’s maritime borders, following Nasrallah’s outstandingly aggressive warnings that Hizballah will not hesitate to take action in order to protect Lebanon’s rights in the event that Israel should decide to unilaterally begin to produce the gas without having reached an agreement with Lebanon first.
U.S. mediator Amos Hochstein has completed yet another shuttle in Lebanon and Israel that failed to end with an announcement on a breakthrough made in negotiations, despite media reports of significant progress having been made. Just before Hochstein’s visit to the region, Al-Arabiya published a possible outline for compromise, whereby Israel would concede sovereignty over the Qana gas field in exchange for royalties from Energean, the company that is due to drill in the region. Energean itself has announced that gas production will begin in the next few weeks.
Despite the interest of all parties involved, including the Lebanese government, to reach an agreement over the division of profits, the ball seems to be in Hizballah’s hands to a large extent. The Lebanese organization is using the dispute to leverage its image as “the protector of Lebanon’s natural resources”, and strives to gain from any scenario. Whether an agreement will be reached whereby Israel will give up the Qana gas field or Israel will once again be forced to postpone gas production, Nasrallah will present it as Israel cowering under the Lebanese organization’s power of deterrence.
It is also possible that Nasrallah believes Israel will refrain, at this time (the Jewish High Holidays and pre-elections, as well as in view of the soaring tension in the West Bank) from taking unilateral steps that could lead to destabilization, and therefore feels confident to place a higher bet. This possibility harbors a growing risk of miscalculation on Nasrallah’s part with respect to the magnitude of Israel’s response.
In any event, the United States’ increased involvement in this crisis, alongside regional actors’ weighty state interests, are likely to ultimately lead to an agreement. However, the signing of such an agreement, and, subsequently, gas production from Karish, may be postponed due to the difficulty to form an agreement at this time (mere weeks before elections will be held in both Israel and Lebanon).
The stagnant nuclear talks
The nuclear agreement between Iran and the great powers, which seemed to have been nearing finalization, has once again reached an impasse following Iran’s response to the most recent proposal, which basically demands that the IAEA’s open inquiries against it into the traces of uranium found on three sites be closed. American and European parties are therefore pessimistic about the possibility that an agreement will be reached in the near future, as the great powers are finding it extremely difficult to grant Iran’s wish, for that would mean the NPT principles would collapse at a time when both Russia and North Korea are challenging its robustness.
The Iranian response further hones the dilemma – is this yet another step in Iran’s negotiations tactic, designed to coax more accomplishments from the West, or is Iran ultimately disinterested in an agreement in view of the lack of trust and concern that the possible power transition in the United States in two years’ time would lead to a change in American policy and another withdrawal from the agreement? Moreover, the Iranian position repeatedly demonstrates that the ball pertaining to progress in negotiations is in its court and, to date, it has not been required to make a choice, as the great powers have refrained from exerting any real pressure or posing any tangible threat to it that would force it to rethink its policy and change its conduct in general, and with regard to the negotiations in particular.
In fact, the West’s stance is playing into Iran’s hands, enabling it to continue with its manipulations. For while it avoids storming out of the negotiations, it also continues to actively promote its nuclear program, pursuing the attainment of advanced capabilities under no significant restrictions. According to the IAEA’s new quarterly report, Iran is currently in possession of 55.6kg of 60% enriched uranium – a substantial increase compared to three months ago, and an enriched amount sufficient for a single bomb. The report actually demonstrates the risk of the negotiations continuing to stall, for in the absence of a new agreement and renewed oversight, and as long as Iran faces no tangible threat, it will continue, practically unabated, to progress toward attaining nuclear threshold capabilities.
The Ukrainian counterattack
The Ukrainian army has, in recent days, successfully regained control over key areas in northeastern Ukraine near Kharkiv following the surprising counterattack it had launched in the region. This is the Ukraine’s most significant operative success since the Russian attack against Kiev was curbed soon after the war had begun. Despite the Ukrainians’ success, the road to an arrangement and the end of the war remains long. Ukraine and the West are likely to be encouraged by this feat, which rekindles the hope that other accomplishments may be made vis-à-vis the Russian army as this war continues, despite the exacerbating energy distress and economic difficulties felt across Europe. However, the more concerned Moscow will become with the prospects of a turning point in the campaign, the more likely President Putin would be to use more extreme measures as means of curbing the deterioration and loss of additional land. A manifestation of this trend was seen in his announcement of partial military mobilization and the intention to hold referendums in the territories Russia has occupied in Ukraine.
Arab Israeli society
Arab Israeli society also continues to display a charged atmosphere, both due to the unrelenting violence and crime in its midst, and the feeling of weakening governance in various focal points in Israel that are threatening to outweigh the sense of accomplishment boasted by the United Arab List (Raam) these last 12 months. Coupled with the deepening despair in Arab society from the political system as a whole, the upcoming elections are expected to end in a low voter turnout. Until then, this very explosivity may increase due to possible tension involving Temple Mount (similarly to the May 2021 events model), and following the elections, should the Israeli Arabs be underrepresented in the Knesset, the tension between the Arab population, state institutions and Jewish society could deepen.
Conclusion and Implication
- In preparation for the Jewish High Holidays and the risk of a violent outbreak in view of the leap in the scope of terror incidents and attempted attacks, an educated policy is required, at the heart of which are steps designed to preserve the current fragile calm on Temple Mount.
- At the same time, focused actions must continue to be taken against Hamas infrastructure in the West Bank in an attempt to stop the violent incidents from spilling over throughout the West Bank. The Israeli government must actively seek to stabilize the Palestinian economic system, preserve security and civil coordination with the Palestinian Authority (inter alia with regard to workers employed in Israel), and convey warnings to Hamas to refrain from taking any steps (in the West Bank or, indeed, among Israeli Arabs) that could set this region ablaze at this sensitive time.
- As for Iran, Israel should continue to preserve its close strategic coordination with the United States on both political and security-military levels while ensuring that the dialogue be discrete, and avoiding public disputes with the U.S. administration. At the same time, Israel must promote force buildup processes by which to establish military capabilities for addressing the Iranian nuclear threat, with the signing of the deal to purchase four refueling tankers serving as an important and crucial step. Israel would also do well to continue to take action inhibiting Iran’s entrenchment in the region while following the security coordination protocol established with Russia in the northern arena.
- Israel should strive to finalize the agreement with Lebanon on its maritime borders with the help of U.S. mediation, and divide the gas profits between them. As part of this move, Israel should express its determination to begin producing the gas while showing its willingness to delay production by several weeks in order to proceed with the negotiations until the deal has been signed. No matter what, Israel must not be seen as deterred by Hizballah’s threats, for although seeming deterred may prevent an escalation in the short range, it would damage Israel’s deterrence in the long one, and encourage the Lebanese organization to challenge the Jewish State regularly with respect to other issues as well.