Is U.S. Deterrence In Jeopardy?
Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS
Executive Director
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
March, 2022
Photos: U.S. Embassy Kyiv Ukraine
The war in Ukraine continues, and there is still no sign of a military or political breakthrough that would change the course of this campaign. Russia is exerting greater pressure on the civilian population, making it pay dearly, but, at this stage, has yet to achieve its goals – defeating and dismantling the Ukrainian Army, and replacing the current regime with a Russian puppet government.
The West, led by the United States, is helping Zelensky's government by providing weapons and humanitarian aid, exerting political as well as financial-economic pressure, demonizing and delegitimizing Russia in every international forum or event. Yet the West is disinclined to provide any direct military assistance or declare Ukraine a no-fly zone for fear of getting dragged into a world war. Russia, for its part, is not deterred by the pressure exerted on it thus far, and continues to strike both military and civilian targets.
At present, both sides are escalating their responses, and neither is trying to take steps or spearhead compromises that would put an end to the campaign. Under the current circumstances, dynamics are exacerbating, and the point of no return in Russia's relations with the West is fast approaching. As part of this escalated dynamics, the Russian military force actively seeks to achieve its strategic-operative goals in Ukraine, whereas the United States' and Europe's economic-political force is also aggravating its measures as it aims to crush the Russian economy, and turn it into a leper state within the international community. The test of resolve between these two forces will determine the campaign's long-term effect on the shaping of world order and global balance of power.
At the same time, the war in Ukraine has direct implications on the nuclear deal being drafted in Vienna. The nuclear talks have been suspended, even though the parties have reached a final draft that has already been placed on the negotiating table. Russia has conditioned the signing of the nuclear deal upon obtaining guarantees from Washington that the sanctions imposed on it due to the war with Ukraine would not jeopardize the expected collaboration with Iran following the signing of the agreement. If Russia should continue to curb the progress toward signing the agreement, the great powers and Iran would be forced to promote creative steps as means of setting the negotiations wheels in motion by passing the roles currently played by Moscow. The United States is determined to clear its desk, and take the Iranian item off the agenda, whereas Tehran recognizes the economic potential embedded for it within the nuclear deal. In the current state of affairs, the signing of the agreement is still highly likely.
The return to the JCPOA will allow Iran to be a significant player in the global energy market, lead to an influx of resources into the local economy that will enable the development of state infrastructure and mitigate domestic pressure, prompt investment in military force buildup, and enhance Tehran's ability to put an effort into expanding its regional impact, inter alia by bolstering its proxies in the region using advanced firing capabilities. Thus, the nuclear deal does not stop Iran from continuing to develop advanced firing capabilities (suicide drones, precise ballistic missiles), holding on to the nuclear knowledge it has accumulated, destabilizing Sunni regimes, as well as investing in entrenching itself and expanding its influence in the region.
Iran is already not afraid to use force, whether via its proxies or directly against the Gulf states, or even the United States forces in Syria and Iraq. Thus, Iran has launched 12 ballistic missiles at several targets in Erbil (12 March). The IRGC have assumed responsibility for the attack, which, they claim targeted a secret Israeli base from which six Israeli UAVs had carried out a strike against a military base in the Iranian Kermanshah District. The United States confirmed Iran's claim of an Israeli connection to the building targeted by the IRGC, thereby, in effect, justifying their lack of response to date. If this report is indeed true, this could be seen as a leap in the campaign between Iran and Israel. In response to the kinetic attack in Erbil, Iran launched a cyberattack against Israeli governmental websites, showcasing another of the harmful capabilities at its disposal in the event that the campaign between the two countries should escalate.
The Iranian attack was designed to convey a deterring message to Israel, while underscoring that the account for the killing of the two IRGC officers during the war between wars attack in Syria has yet to be settled. This strike also served additional purposes: Conveying a message to the Iraqi leadership whereby it must take Tehran's interests into account when forming its new government, and fortifying Iranian deterrence vis-à-vis the Gulf states.
The attack further undermines the American image of power in the region, although it probably was not directed at the nearby U.S. consulate. The lack of American response to Iran's acts of force in the region against U.S. allies is perceived as a weakness, and joins a series of events and steps that have chipped away at the strategic relations between the Gulf states and the Biden Administration. Thus, the United States' pursuit of a new nuclear deal with Iran, its refusal to recognize the Houthis as a terror organization, the upgrading of strategic relations with Qatar, which Washington has deemed a strategic partner, in addition to the cold shoulder the administration has been giving Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman because he is being perceived as the person responsible for the assassination of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, have increased the tension in the relations between the USA to UAE and Saudi Arabia.
In this context, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh have chosen to maintain their strategic ties with Moscow, and avoid producing more oil by way of stopping the soar in prices, that, at some point, had reached the record price of $139 per barrel, despite Washington's request that production quotas be increased. This souring of relations has taken a concrete toll on Washington by way of its regional allies in the overall endeavor to isolate Moscow. The United States would have to invest in the restoration of its relations with the Gulf states in view of the growing importance of the Middle East in the global competition against Russia and China; however, at present, the trust crisis with the local leaderships is projecting onto its ability to lead strategic moves in the region.
From the Israeli perspective, overall explosivity is growing on the northern front and vis-à-vis Hamas. The tension between Israel and Iran has gone up a notch following the killing of the two IRGC officers in the war between wars attack in Syria. The preparations for an anticipated Iranian response from Syria, alongside the growing tension vis-à-vis Hizballah, as expressed in the recent attempts to have drones cross over into Israeli airspace, are raising the tension threshold in the region.
Furthermore, the Palestinian issue has been taken off of the international and regional agendas, and it is no longer urgent to promote relevant steps in view of the overall stagnation, split in the Palestinian arena, lack of regional energy or international/American attention to engage in this matter. Ramadhan is drawing near, and serves as an opportunity for Hamas to leverage the basic explosivity in Palestinian society and cause friction with Israel while establishing itself as a legitimate political force on the morning after Abu Mazen.
Implications for Israel
Israel is successfully establishing itself as a mediator between the parties to the escalating war in Europe without having to pay any price for it at this stage. However, the Israeli refugee policy is causing strategic damage, compromising Jerusalem's image in the international arena. Israel must modify its Ukrainian refugee policy, both for humanitarian-value based considerations, and due to its strategic long-range costs in the international arena.
Jerusalem should exhaust its role as mediator, and avoid walking away from Russia for fear that such a step would jeopardize its freedom of action in the war between wars in Syria, unless this role should contradict a direct U.S. strategy and interests. The United States is Israel's key historical ally, and Jerusalem must form its policy based on the need to preserve its special relations with it, even if, by doing so, it would lead to friction with Russia in the region.
The nuclear deal expected to be signed by and between the great powers and Iran demands that Israel prepare with a suitable force buildup that would enable Jerusalem to take independent action in the third circle, while tightening its strategic relations with countries in the region as means of projecting strength, establishing deterrence, and curbing Iran's acts of power.
In this context too Israel's strategic alliance with the United States is of utmost importance in view of the need to maintain the IDF's qualitative military edge (QME), and upgrade the security-military partnership as means of boosting Israeli superiority. The return of the Cold War and enhanced strategic competition against Russia and China will restore the Middle East's importance to U.S. strategy, and its national security perception's set of priorities in view of the geostrategic, security and energetic interests. This state of affairs presents an opportunity for Jerusalem to establish its valuableness and status in Washington's overall view of the region.
Moreover, Israel is required to form a regional security strategy together with the United States and Sunni Camp (the Gulf states, Egypt and Jordan), while anchoring Washington's commitment by tightening operational and intelligence-based collaboration, as well as strengthening regional defense arrays.
The increasing explosivity vis-à-vis Iran and in the Palestinian arena require Israel to prepare accordingly, as well as to understand that the world's attention has turned to the crisis in Ukraine. The United States will ask Israel to avoid taking escalating action in the region, and Jerusalem should see how it can "turn down the heat" while maintaining its ability to take action under the threshold of escalation to counter Iran's actions in Syria and Lebanon, and Hamas' actions in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.
Jerusalem should exhaust its role as mediator, and avoid walking away from Russia for fear that such a step would jeopardize its freedom of action in the war between wars in Syria, unless this role should contradict a direct U.S. strategy and interests. The United States is Israel's key historical ally, and Jerusalem must form its policy based on the need to preserve its special relations with it, even if, by doing so, it would lead to friction with Russia in the region.
The nuclear deal expected to be signed by and between the great powers and Iran demands that Israel prepare with a suitable force buildup that would enable Jerusalem to take independent action in the third circle, while tightening its strategic relations with countries in the region as means of projecting strength, establishing deterrence, and curbing Iran's acts of power.
In this context too Israel's strategic alliance with the United States is of utmost importance in view of the need to maintain the IDF's qualitative military edge (QME), and upgrade the security-military partnership as means of boosting Israeli superiority. The return of the Cold War and enhanced strategic competition against Russia and China will restore the Middle East's importance to U.S. strategy, and its national security perception's set of priorities in view of the geostrategic, security and energetic interests. This state of affairs presents an opportunity for Jerusalem to establish its valuableness and status in Washington's overall view of the region.
Moreover, Israel is required to form a regional security strategy together with the United States and Sunni Camp (the Gulf states, Egypt and Jordan), while anchoring Washington's commitment by tightening operational and intelligence-based collaboration, as well as strengthening regional defense arrays.
The increasing explosivity vis-à-vis Iran and in the Palestinian arena require Israel to prepare accordingly, as well as to understand that the world's attention has turned to the crisis in Ukraine. The United States will ask Israel to avoid taking escalating action in the region, and Jerusalem should see how it can "turn down the heat" while maintaining its ability to take action under the threshold of escalation to counter Iran's actions in Syria and Lebanon, and Hamas' actions in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.