Recommendations for the new Israeli government
Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS
Executive Director
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
June, 2021
Photo: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs | CC BY-NC 2.0
The new Israeli government has inherited a country that is "spinning" with respect to its abilities to cope with the multidimensional crisis it is currently in. the absence of an organized policy and inability to make and implement much-needed decisions have unveiled dangerous gaps vis à vis the strategic security threats that Israel currently faces.
These are the five key challenges and threats requiring an immediate response alongside recommendations for overcoming them.
These are the five key challenges and threats requiring an immediate response alongside recommendations for overcoming them.
1. Israel-U.S. relations
The challenge:
Operation Guardian of the Walls has demonstrated Israel's critical need of American support politically (freedom of action) and militarily (stockpiles resupply) and utmost coordination with the U.S. administration in much wider contexts than the fighting in Gaza. The escalation has revealed the increasing weight of the critical attitude toward Israel among the younger ranks of the Democratic Party and its constituency, as well as American Jewry, and even in its most prominent stronghold of support – U.S. Congress. This is a harsh and ongoing blow to Israel's status as a bipartisan consensus - one of its most significant assets in the United States, our greatest ally.
The outgoing prime minister was in conflict with the administration over the latter's intention to return to the nuclear deal with Iran. This battle is futile because it conflicts with Washington's global strategic agenda, which seeks to secure its flanks, and turn its attention to the struggle over supremacy against China.
The Iranian challenge and return to the JCPOA have become an Archimedean point between Israel and the United States that could reflect negatively on the overall relations between the two allies, while impeding Israel's ability to receive U.S. support and guarantees it requires both with respect to Iran and in a wide range of other arenas.
Another challenge that could "poison" U.S.-Israel relations is related to the great power competition (GPC) between the United States and China. The U.S. administration views victory over China as a historical, almost "religious" task it is determined to complete, inter alia as part of the struggle for liberty, the supremacy of the liberal-democratic system, and world order.
Israel's policy vis à vis China could exclude it from the international front the United States is pursuing. Washington has been clear in its messages to Israel, some of which were made publicly, voicing its concern about the level of Israel's oversight on Chinese investments, particularly in the technological sector, which place essential American interests at risk.
The outgoing prime minister was in conflict with the administration over the latter's intention to return to the nuclear deal with Iran. This battle is futile because it conflicts with Washington's global strategic agenda, which seeks to secure its flanks, and turn its attention to the struggle over supremacy against China.
The Iranian challenge and return to the JCPOA have become an Archimedean point between Israel and the United States that could reflect negatively on the overall relations between the two allies, while impeding Israel's ability to receive U.S. support and guarantees it requires both with respect to Iran and in a wide range of other arenas.
Another challenge that could "poison" U.S.-Israel relations is related to the great power competition (GPC) between the United States and China. The U.S. administration views victory over China as a historical, almost "religious" task it is determined to complete, inter alia as part of the struggle for liberty, the supremacy of the liberal-democratic system, and world order.
Israel's policy vis à vis China could exclude it from the international front the United States is pursuing. Washington has been clear in its messages to Israel, some of which were made publicly, voicing its concern about the level of Israel's oversight on Chinese investments, particularly in the technological sector, which place essential American interests at risk.
The response:
On the most urgent level, the Israeli government should defuse tension with Washington regarding Iran. It must restore trust with the Biden Administration by shifting from a loud confrontational diplomacy to a quiet intimate dialogue based on a shared view that Iran must not be allowed to have nuclear weapon, while relying on the effective collaboration channels between the two countries in areas such as intelligence, defense, and operations.
The Israeli government should remove all indications of its intention to take military action against Iran's nuclear program from its agenda, for such a step makes no sense at present, when a potential return to the nuclear deal is expected to roll Iran's nuclear capabilities back in the upcoming years. Instead, Israel should enter a shared strategic coordination as well as a quid pro quo dialogue of guarantees with the Biden Administration in case the latter will not be able to achieve its declared goal of reaching a future stronger and longer agreement with Iran.
In the Chinese context – Israel has profound interest in the U.S. winning the race with China, and must be incorporated into the democratic states front being established by the United States, including its technology aspects (where Israel brings real assets to the table). Israel is also required to make a strategic decision that fully supports American interests vis à vis China, while conducting itself in full coordination, cooperation and transparency with the U.S. administration on all aspects associated with Israel's relations with China.
Finally, Israel must form a comprehensive national plan for the restoration of its bipartisan status in the United States as well as its relations with both the American Jewry and Democratic Party.
The Israeli government should remove all indications of its intention to take military action against Iran's nuclear program from its agenda, for such a step makes no sense at present, when a potential return to the nuclear deal is expected to roll Iran's nuclear capabilities back in the upcoming years. Instead, Israel should enter a shared strategic coordination as well as a quid pro quo dialogue of guarantees with the Biden Administration in case the latter will not be able to achieve its declared goal of reaching a future stronger and longer agreement with Iran.
In the Chinese context – Israel has profound interest in the U.S. winning the race with China, and must be incorporated into the democratic states front being established by the United States, including its technology aspects (where Israel brings real assets to the table). Israel is also required to make a strategic decision that fully supports American interests vis à vis China, while conducting itself in full coordination, cooperation and transparency with the U.S. administration on all aspects associated with Israel's relations with China.
Finally, Israel must form a comprehensive national plan for the restoration of its bipartisan status in the United States as well as its relations with both the American Jewry and Democratic Party.
2. The budget and multi-annual plan
The challenge:
Two of the top strategic processes in Israel, outlining its long-term path, priorities, and updated policies in the face of a changing reality have been shut down in recent years: the state budget and IDF multi-annual plan.
In the absence of a forward-facing budget, Israel was left with no organized response and priorities for the unprecedented socio-economic crisis, a growing deficit, and no ability to bridge the severe gaps in the home front's preparedness for emergencies in both health and security contexts.
With no budget, IDF capability to implement its multi-annual plan was damaged, compromising its ability to develop responses and capabilities required to address evolving security challenges - processes that take several years.
In the absence of a forward-facing budget, Israel was left with no organized response and priorities for the unprecedented socio-economic crisis, a growing deficit, and no ability to bridge the severe gaps in the home front's preparedness for emergencies in both health and security contexts.
With no budget, IDF capability to implement its multi-annual plan was damaged, compromising its ability to develop responses and capabilities required to address evolving security challenges - processes that take several years.
The response:
The Israeli government should form a budget immediately to address the changing reality and challenges. Both the cabinet and IDF must "recalibrate" and adjust the IDF's multi-annual plan, Tnufa (Momentum), and close severe gaps in the home front's preparedness for war. While doing so, priorities must be redefined and objectives adapted to the new circumstances created by COVID-19 and the recent campaign in Gaza. They should also decide exactly how to rely on future U.S. FMF funding when equipping the IDF with advanced weaponry systems and force multipliers.
3. Arab-Jewish relations in Israel
The challenge:
The violence that erupted in the Arab population against the backdrop of the escalation in Gaza marks a profound crack in Arab-Jewish relations, as well as a ticking timebomb that threatens the State of Israel as a civilized state under the rule of law. It was an expression of Israel's longstanding failure in integration, governance, and law enforcement when crime and violence soared. A clear governance issue is also apparent in Judea and Samaria, vis à vis Jewish extremists and vigilantes.
The response:
The Israeli government should implement uncompromising enforcement to restore order (intelligence, arrests, legal action, deterring punishments), for it is instrumental in getting life back on track, and bridging the rift between communities in mixed Jewish-Arab cities. At the same time, national plans and budgets should be implemented and expanded immediately in order to address Arab society problems. At the heart of this effort, crime must be eradicated, local leaderships encouraged and supported, and integration processes with Jewish society and state institutions accelerated.
4. The Palestinian arena
The challenge:
The Israeli strategy has failed. The perception whereby recognizing Hamas' rule while improving the civil conditions in the Gaza Strip on the one hand, and weakening the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank on the other, will prevent a two-state solution while maintaining a security equilibrium - has collapsed. The escalation in Gaza has demonstrated that, when tested, Hamas' ideological-religious agenda supersedes all other considerations it may have.
By contrast, due to Israel's policy, the Palestinian Authority is getting weaker; so much so that it may gradually force Israel to begin managing the life of the Palestinian population, keeping IDF forces rooted to this arena at the expense of the Israeli military's ability to focus on the strategic threats posed by Iran and the northern arena.
By contrast, due to Israel's policy, the Palestinian Authority is getting weaker; so much so that it may gradually force Israel to begin managing the life of the Palestinian population, keeping IDF forces rooted to this arena at the expense of the Israeli military's ability to focus on the strategic threats posed by Iran and the northern arena.
The response:
Israel must reverse its priorities vis à vis the Palestinian system. It should contain and weaken Hamas without compromising on improving the humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip, as they are in Israel's best interest. At the same time, it must fundamentally change its attitude toward the Palestinian Authority, which represents the political alternative to the resolution of the conflict, and should be strengthened in every way as a governing system.
Moreover, Israel should strive to build the PA as an alternative to Hamas' rule in Gaza in the longer term, otherwise, the only other alternative in the Gaza Strip would always be Israel itself.
Moreover, Israel should strive to build the PA as an alternative to Hamas' rule in Gaza in the longer term, otherwise, the only other alternative in the Gaza Strip would always be Israel itself.
5. Jordan
The challenge:
In the shadow of the pandemic and recent escalation in Gaza, the Hashemite Kingdom's stability and its collaboration with Israel have been put to the test. The steps Israel has taken in recent years, such as the annexation plan, water quotas dispute, conflicts over Jerusalem and Jordan's (founded) concern about an erosion in its status in the sacred sites in favor of Saudi Arabia have had a detrimental effect on Israel's relations with the kingdom, undermining the peace accord with it.
Jordan is irreplaceable as a factor in Israel's security. The security-based cooperation with the Hashemite Kingdom is keeping Israel's longest border safe and sound, and providing it with strategic depth, inter alia vis à vis Iran.
Jordan is irreplaceable as a factor in Israel's security. The security-based cooperation with the Hashemite Kingdom is keeping Israel's longest border safe and sound, and providing it with strategic depth, inter alia vis à vis Iran.
The response:
The Israeli government must restore its relations with Jordan and take actions in both regional and international arenas to garner assistance for strengthening the Kingdom's internal stability. It is crucial to strengthen Jordan's role in preserving and deepening the status quo in the holy sites in Jerusalem, and, as a rule, to avoid demeaning steps that could prove to be destructive to the King of Jordan's status and his kingdom's stability, which is already challenged.
Ultimately, the new Israeli government should vigorously address the urgent national security challenges. The suggested responses to pressing issues combined constitute the required strategic policy that aligns with the recommendations of top professional echelons in Israel. As such, it is not expected to cause any profound disputes between the various political parties forming the new government, and can be executed immediately.
Ultimately, the new Israeli government should vigorously address the urgent national security challenges. The suggested responses to pressing issues combined constitute the required strategic policy that aligns with the recommendations of top professional echelons in Israel. As such, it is not expected to cause any profound disputes between the various political parties forming the new government, and can be executed immediately.