RU-IPS-E4_2

Petty Politics or a Broad Strategy

Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS
Executive Director
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
October, 2022
26-3-20main-...
Photos:  Remix - Image By www.ccpixs.com | CC BY 3.0 | Image by Сергей from Pixabay |

The focus on politics and the internal schism have grown over the last three years, fueling the domestic rifts and leading to a "fire extinguishing" policy that centers solely on urgent matters, while avoiding thorough exploration of issues and the formulation of an overall strategy designed to address the fundamental challenges and problems faced by Israel and Israeli society.
 
Worse still is the fact that the new Jewish year has begun with exacerbating strategic turbulences internally, regionally and globally that could destabilize national security if they are not properly prepared for and addressed. First and foremost, there is the threat posed by Iran, who is continuing to race toward obtaining nuclear threshold capabilities, coupled with the concern over the collapse of the Palestinian Authority and accelerating “one state for two nations” trend.
 
In the immediate range, the most urgent and high-risk challenge is the exacerbating security situation in the northern West Bank, as it could deteriorate into the broad escalation for which Hamas is aiming, impacting the ability to promote partnerships with the peace- and normalization-seeking states, and projecting onto Israeli Arab society as well. The feelings of despair among Israeli Arabs, soaring crime, and prospective underrepresentation in the Knesset following the upcoming elections are causes of internal explosivity that could further deepen the rift between the Arab public, Israeli establishment and Jewish public.
 
In the global arena, the war in Ukraine is on the cusp of severe escalation due to the successful Ukrainian counterattack, announced annexation of regions to Russia, and growing tension between the West and Russia. The discourse on the latter’s possible use of nuclear weapons demonstrates the severity of the situation and strategic explosivity.
 
As it faces these challenges, Israel’s strategic status in the Middle East and international arena remains strong; however, resilience can be fleeting. The peace treaties signed with Egypt and Jordan, Abraham Accords and its growing importance to regional security are manifestations of the way Israel is perceived as a valuable asset with the economic and security capabilities of a great power. Its strategic alliance with the United States and ability to maintain strategic partnerships with other global powers (Russia, China, India) provide Israel with the flexibility it needs when using force and continuing its investment in force buildup so as to preserve its qualitative edge over its regional enemies and adversaries.
 
The government’s cautious and wise conduct in its management of the Karish rig crisis is noteworthy, and paves the way for an arrangement led by the United States that enable the production of gas from both Israel and Lebanon’s EEZ, thereby deactivating the ticking timebomb that is Hizballah.
 
At the same time, the outstanding collaboration between the security forces is preventing murderous terror attacks in Israel every single day that could have deteriorated into a full-fledged confrontation with the terror organizations in the West Bank and Gaza.


 
The explosivity of the Palestinian Arena

The Palestinian Authority is crumbling in recent years due to a combination of processes that project on its internal stability and inability to function in either security or civil areas. The first is Abu Mazen’s ever weakening rule, which is rendering him virtually irrelevant. His weakness leads to inaction on the internal security front and disinclination to set the wheels of any negotiation process with Israel in motion, as well as Abu Mazen’s personal inability and unwillingness at his age to advance a genuine process vis-à-vis Israel. Furthermore, there has not been a strategic plan in place for many years that aims to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, whether by Israeli or international initiative. Abu Mazen’s statement in the UN Assembly whereby Israel was setting up the two-state vision to fail, and is not regarded as a partner for peace negotiations, coupled with the fact that the Israeli leadership has ceased to engage in ongoing dialogue with him in recent years (with the exception of the defense minister) shows the magnitude of the crisis and schisms between the two parties.
 
The Second process is the loss of the Palestinian public’s trust in the Palestinian Authority, impacted, inter alia, by corruption and ungovernability processes. Internal polls conducted by Palestinian research institutions indicate that most Palestinians do not believe that the Palestinian Authority has a right to exist in its current format, or that an arrangement with Israel has any chances of being reached. The Third process is the increasing activity of members of both Fatah and Hamas leadership set out to assume power when Abu Mazen will no longer be in office, to a large extent due to the absence of an agreed successor. These parties are becoming more powerful, causing separation and polarization within Palestinian society and its security forces. These battles over Palestinian leadership could even result in the Palestinian Authority splitting de facto between various centers of power.
 
Under such circumstances, and in view of the Palestinian security forces’ inability and unwillingness to take action, Israel has been required to undertake targeted thwarting over the last 6 months or so, particularly in northern Samaria (Operation Breakwater). Although this activity is extremely successful, it is causing increasing friction on the ground and a considerable rise in attempted attacks, primarily by young unaffiliated terrorists, fueling the Palestinian public’s frustration and resentment of both the PA and Israel. Moreover, the IDF is paying hefty prices for its extensive investment in ensuring safety across the West Bank, which also impacts its preparedness for other security challenges (lack of training, budgets, and so on).

 
The Hijab Protests in Iran – A challenge, not a threat

The nuclear talks between Iran and the great powers have ground to a halt two months ago due to Iran’s demand to shut IAEA’s open investigations against it pertaining to traces of uranium found on three sites that may indicate its engagement in a military-grade program. The various parties are currently busy with more pressing issues, and no further breakthrough is expected in negotiations before the U.S. midterm elections. This is a dangerous scenario for Israel, as it allows virtually uninterrupted progress to be made by Iran’s nuclear program, and for new materials to be accumulated (particularly 60% enriched uranium), in addition to the looming prospect of progress made toward the obtainment of fissile material.
 
The Iranian regime is currently focused on the Masha Amini (or Hijab) Protests that began several weeks ago and are spread across dozens of local hubs, including Teheran. These riots differ from past demonstrations as they focus on civil freedoms and women’s rights, voicing direct criticism against the regime and its use of force, and are led primarily by young, educated, middleclass men and women. The current protests do not pose a viable threat to the regime’s stability at present, or else it would not have refrained from employing all means available to it (overall, the IRGC have not been involved); however, they do attest to the frustration and extremism fermenting beneath the surface. If a genuine attempt to address these sentiments will not be made by the regime, at least partially, it is highly likely that they will surge once more in due course with even greater intensity. 

 
Escalation in the war in Ukraine

Russia’s annexation of the four regions, the damage it has caused to the gas pipelines, its mobilization of reserve troops and threat to use nuclear weapons are all manifestations of the most significant step up in the war since it has begun, and are designed to convey a message whereby Russia is willing to employ all means available to it to force the West (and Ukraine) to agree to an arrangement it will find convenient.
 
In effect, the annexation of the regions aimed to establish a new status, whereby they would form an integral part of Russia de jure, so that any future arrangement would have to include recognition that these regions belong to it – a situation that Zelensky refuses to accept under any circumstance. The immediate implication being increased Ukrainian efforts to continue with the counterattack, with western support, to try and regain control of the territories occupied by Russia before winter arrives, while Russia steps up its own retaliatory actions both on the battlefield and in its energy campaign against Europe. For the time being, the use of nuclear weapons still seems to be an extreme scenario; however, it is more likely now that it has been since the war began. The likelihood will increase as Putin will feel more cornered, and fear of losing the war.

 
Recommendations
  • In the immediate range, Israel is advised to maintain the current quiet on and around Temple Mount, and reduce friction with the Palestinian population, while attempting to motivate the PA security apparatuses to take action themselves against the terror hubs in northern Samaria. It is recommended that Israel avoid making belligerent statements that could embarrass Abu Mazen, and further disincentivize the Palestinian security apparatuses.
     
  • In the medium to long range, any government formed in Israel will be required to formulate a strategic plan and actively restore relations with the Palestinian Authority by presenting political prospects, stabilizing the economic system, and maintaining security coordination. At the same time, Israel should begin to prepare for the “morning after”, including with regard to Abu Mazen’s successor and the ability to collaborate with them.
     
  • Jordan is one of Israel’s most important sources of support, and any harm caused to it would destabilize Israel’s strategic security sphere. Israel is therefore advised to avoid any unilateral steps that could challenge King Abdullah, particularly with regard to its conduct vis-à-vis the Palestinian Authority and Temple Mount, in view of the high strategic and security prices it will pay in general, and in its relations with the Hashemite Kingdom in particular. At the same time, Israel would do well to examine ways of helping Jordan receive security and financial aid from the United States and Gulf states. In this context, it is of tremendous importance to keep actively deepening the collaborations with the Gulf states in a wide range of areas (not only security), inter alia as means of addressing their growing intimacy with Iran. All in addition to keeping up the essential security collaboration with Egypt, while carefully avoiding any statements or actions that would embarrass the Egyptian political and military leaderships.
     
  • Israel should continue to maintain its strategic and security coordination with the United States, while refraining from public disagreements, particularly in the upcoming weeks leading up to the midterm elections so as not to be used as a bargaining chip in the hands of U.S. politicians. At the same time, Israel should utilize the stalling talks between Iran and the great powers to continue with its discreet efforts to impact various aspects of the deal. All the while, it is advised to keep accelerating its force buildup in view of the possibility that, ultimately, a new agreement will not be signed. The protests in Iran and its regime’s brutality should lead Israel to emphasize to the West that, paradoxically, a new nuclear deal worth billions to an oppressive, totalitarian regime could end up inhibiting the catalysts of social change gaining momentum in Iran.
     
  • From a global perspective, Israel should keep actively protecting its strategic national security objectives and interests, both with respect to its strategic alliance with the United States and its freedom of action in the northern front. Concretely, Israel should continue to voice its objection to Russia’s annexation steps while avoiding taking any publicly visible measures in the security sphere that would be viewed by Russia as active assistance rendered to the Ukrainian army. Israel would also do well to try and integrate into any international effort to prevent the use of nuclear weapons during the war so that it would not “normalize” the use of such means, and drive other countries to acquire nuclear capabilities.
     
  • Finally, domestically, the new government formed will be required to actively reconcile the rifts in society, and address the challenges posed by Israeli society and economy, particularly with regard to the education and health systems, as well as housing prices. If these are not fundamentally treated, it would prove very difficult indeed to successfully grapple with the strategic challenges Israel is facing in the regional and global arenas.