A New Government - Immediate Strategic Challenges
Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS
Executive Director
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
November, 2022
Photo: Kobi Gideon-GPO | CC BY-SA 3.0
The new government that will soon be formed will grapple with a complex strategic reality, as well as a series of political and security challenges on the internal, regional, and international fronts. In view of the combustibility and urgency of these challenges, the government is required to formulate a comprehensive strategy and systemic solution as soon as possible, This by adopting a cautious approach that will prevent manifestations of violence and the undermining of strategic assets and partnerships, primarily the one with the United States, and Israel’s ties with the Sunni countries.
The Palestinian arena requires the formulation of a response as soon as possible
The ongoing tension in the Palestinian system, particularly in the West Bank, will require the future government to form an organized strategy and practical response fairly quickly. The Palestinian issue is expected to be at the top of the new government’s agenda, as it is a “ticking timebomb”. The main challenge is the growing security threat in northern Samaria, which threatens to spread to other areas in the West Bank, while the Palestinian Authority exhibits profound weakness, as well as a difficulty or disinclination to assume responsibility for the emerging hubs of chaos in the region, led by the city of Nablus.
The fact that Abu Mazen has given up, de facto, on his ability to bring any achievement to his people is fueling the unrest on the Palestinian street, and the activity of various elements of power battling for future positions of leadership. In the absence of a natural successor, the struggle over his leadership is expected to gain momentum among those who view themselves as potential future leaders of the Palestinian people. Not only Fatah senior officials will participate in this battle of leadership, but Hamas senior officials too, who will attempt to take advantage of the situation, and take over positions of power in the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank as well. This fact, alongside the assumption that any leader at the helm would initially employ a strict, nationalist approach in order to fortify his status, contributes to the understanding that, unless Israeli conduct undergoes fundamental change, we will face a significant escalation in the political and security relationship with the Palestinian Authority.
Beyond the diffusion of impending security threats (namely terror units such as The Lions’ Den in Nablus or infrastructures that Hamas and Islamic Jihad are trying to put together and operate), the new government will have to take several more steps in order to calm the streets down. Thus, it is highly recommended to continue preserving all channels of coordination with the PA, particularly that of security; to continue sustaining the civilian fabric of life that, to date, has put some distance between most of the Palestinian public and their integration into the struggle; and, at least in the foreseeable future, clearly state that Israel is not interested in any drastic change of the current state of affairs, particularly not casting sovereignty over parts of the West Bank and/or dramatically cutting down the economic support provided by Israel to the Palestinian Authority. In contrast, unilateral Israeli steps, such as the annexation of Area C territories, could prove detrimental to the relations and collaboration with the U.S. administration, EU, and Sunni countries, projecting onto the security reality on the ground.
Furthermore, Israel should show great sensitivity with regard to the issue of Jerusalem and the holy sites, and avoid taking steps that could be perceived as violating the fragile balance on the ground, leading to a violent outbreak that would be viewed by the Muslim and Arab world as a religious war. In this context, Israel should actively tighten its coordination with the Palestinian Authority and Jordan, who has already expressed its concern over Israel’s possible steps in Jerusalem. Preserving the partnership with the Hashemite Kingdom is essential for protecting Israel’s top national security interests.
Examining the policy vis-à-vis Hamas
A cautious examination of the policy employed in recent years vis-à-vis Gaza is recommended, as it is focused on maintaining security calm, while enabling Hamas to establish its rule and military power, and improving its preparations for taking over the entire Palestinian system (one of the movement’s declared goals). At the same time, it is also promoting terror and incitement from the Gaza Strip, and diligently setting up and operating military infrastructures that increase the security challenges posed by the West Bank.
Israel is required to begin raising clear conditions to Hamas, whereby economic alleviations would only be provided in exchange for the curbing of terror and incitement efforts. It should use the external pressure levers on Hamas optimally, without taking drastic steps that could lead to rapid escalation in the Gaza Strip.
These moves in both arenas should lead to quiet while diffusing security threats. They will allow Israel to move on to the next essential level – Adopting a new strategy vis-à-vis the Palestinian system (which has not existed for many years, in effect), accompanied by the understanding that the current reality cannot be further maintained using the existing tools (particularly the economic ones). The new government should realize that if new initiatives will not be taken in one direction or another, Israel may have to face shocks (some of which will evolve from within the Palestinian system itself), which would force it to promote a strategic solution in response.
The internal arena: Potential for rising tension between Jews and Arabs
Another explosive arena is the domestic one, at the center of which are the charged relations between Jews and Arabs. Following the elections, the atmosphere among Arab Israeli citizens is a combination of frustration and anxiety. The hope for increased influence has been crushed, alongside the fundamental issues, primarily crime and violence, the young generation’s distress, and sense of deep discrimination.
The future government should understand this reality, and make it clear that it intends to continue addressing the distresses among the Arab public, and even expand its efforts, primarily countering crime and violence, cultivating the younger generation, and developing the economy and civil infrastructures in Arab towns and villages. At the same time, it should also engage in ongoing, broad, and direct dialogue with the Arab leaderships in parliament, as well as the Arab public itself. Ignoring this charged reality, and certainly announcing the intention to promote new steps that would limit the Arab public, or reduce the government support provided to it, could be interpreted as “shutting” the governmental and public “door”, generating a severe cascade of expectations that would project negatively on Israel’s internal reality and national resilience.
The Iranian threat – A comprehensive strategic solution must be formulated
In recent months, the Iranian threat posed to Israel is stepping up as a result of a combination of several processes – the ongoing dragging of heels in the nuclear talks and absence of practical oversight over its activities in this area, alongside its military collaboration with Russia, which enables it to improve its offensive capabilities in the area of drones, and perhaps that of missiles too. Moreover, on the regional level too, Iran has successfully improved its status following the appointment of pro-Iranian Mohammed al-Sudani as Iraqi prime minister.
To address these processes, the new government should prioritize the need to formulate a comprehensive strategic plan for curbing the Iranian threat as soon as possible, since the time left for stopping the nuclear program is running out. To do so, a profound collaboration with the United States and the Gulf states is required. Thus, the new government should actively build trust and avoid steps that could taint relations with these countries, and impede their willingness to agree to meet Israel’s requests. In addition, Israel should utilize the growing apprehension in the West from military assistance to Russia and violent oppression of local protests to promote a broad cognitive and economic campaign that will increase the pressure exerted on the regime externally as well as internally.
In view of the concern over an Iranian nuclear breakout scenario, the IDF should expedite its growth and force buildup processes, which, to a large extent, rely on the financial support from the United States and Israel’s close partnership with it, this underscoring the new government’s need to build trust with the administration.
To address these processes, the new government should prioritize the need to formulate a comprehensive strategic plan for curbing the Iranian threat as soon as possible, since the time left for stopping the nuclear program is running out. To do so, a profound collaboration with the United States and the Gulf states is required. Thus, the new government should actively build trust and avoid steps that could taint relations with these countries, and impede their willingness to agree to meet Israel’s requests. In addition, Israel should utilize the growing apprehension in the West from military assistance to Russia and violent oppression of local protests to promote a broad cognitive and economic campaign that will increase the pressure exerted on the regime externally as well as internally.
In view of the concern over an Iranian nuclear breakout scenario, the IDF should expedite its growth and force buildup processes, which, to a large extent, rely on the financial support from the United States and Israel’s close partnership with it, this underscoring the new government’s need to build trust with the administration.
Preserving the cautious policy vis-à-vis Russia
The complexity of the Israeli position against the backdrop of the war that has been waging in Ukraine for the past 9 months springs from the special strategic and security situation of Israel. On the one hand there are strategic and value-based considerations (the alliance with the United States and war crimes perpetrated by Russia), and on the other hand are security and national considerations (maintaining the freedom of action in Syria and the situation of the Jews in Russia). Thus, the new government would do well to embrace a policy, at the heart of which is the expression of public support in Ukraine, and the promotion of clandestine collaboration with it, alongside a cautious approach toward supplying air-defense systems.
Israel could derive many advantages from a partnership with Ukraine (as well as other countries), learning the drones’ technological capabilities and their method of operation to help improve ways of defending itself against them. At the same time, the government should beware of getting dragged into a military conflict, and avoid supplying air-defense systems to Ukraine due to the concern over the scope of damage Russia could cause, and any retaliatory steps it might take, as conveyed by the warnings issued by Russian senior officials. It is noteworthy that, to date, and despite its relations with Iran becoming closer, Russia has not impeded Israel’s freedom of action in Syria.
Israel could derive many advantages from a partnership with Ukraine (as well as other countries), learning the drones’ technological capabilities and their method of operation to help improve ways of defending itself against them. At the same time, the government should beware of getting dragged into a military conflict, and avoid supplying air-defense systems to Ukraine due to the concern over the scope of damage Russia could cause, and any retaliatory steps it might take, as conveyed by the warnings issued by Russian senior officials. It is noteworthy that, to date, and despite its relations with Iran becoming closer, Russia has not impeded Israel’s freedom of action in Syria.
Sensitivity vis-à-vis the U.S. administration
The new government’s character and composition is raising many concerns among the Democratic administration in the United States and U.S. Jewry. The special strategic relations with the United States are irreplaceable, and Israel cannot afford even the slightest harm to be caused to these relations, which rely, to a large extent, on the democratic and liberal values shared by both countries.
The new government would have to exhibit sensitivity and caution when forming its policies so as not to provide ammunition to its critics that would impact the collaboration between the two countries. In view of the fact that the next two years are expected to deepen the rifts in American society leading up to the presidential elections, and in view of past lessons learned, the next government should beware not to get dragged into public conflicts with the U.S. administration that may be used by Republicans to taunt Democrats, and be perceived as part of the elections campaign.