Israel Lacks Clear Strategy
Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS
Executive Director
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
April, 2021
Photo: Kobi Gideon - GPO
In the shadow of an unprecedented political crisis, Israel lacks clear strategy with respect to a series of imminent security-related and political challenges it is currently facing. Subsequently, Israel is delaying its policy-crafting, and instead, reaches decisions without holding relevant discussions or sufficiently involving professional level, providing specific, reactive responses in lieu of coherent logic or an organized, consistent policy. This problematic dynamic, alongside irresponsible leaks driven by irrelevant considerations, have been prominent in recent weeks against the backdrop of challenging developments in four areas.
The Iranian challenge
The Biden Administration is persistent in its pursuit of a return to the JCPOA regardless of any guarantee that it would be improved in the future, softening its original demands in response to Tehran's uncompromising attitude, and is disinclined to enter a conflict with Iran and its proxies, who are aggravating their attacks in the region against the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel.
Under these circumstances, Israel is conducting a poor policy with respect to the United States. Israel should have embarked on a continuous, profound, and intimate dialogue with the U.S. administration long ago, in an attempt to reach broad understandings on how to maintain its interests in a changing reality; obtain guarantees for its national security, to which the U.S. administration has expressed its commitment; implement the declared consensus between the two countries with regard to the need to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons by all means necessary; and restore the rocky relations and distrust with the Democratic government.
In the absence of strategy as well as chemistry between Israeli and U.S. leaderships, Israel does not seem to be learning its lessons from past crises. Instead, it is once again being cornered into a confrontational policy vis à vis Washington, which may turn out to be costly, leave it isolated, turning the Iranian issue into an increasingly more "Israeli problem", as well as weakening Israel's image and strength in the eyes of the Arab world. In the meantime, friction between Israel and Iran is expanding, reaching, according to foreign sources, into the naval realm as well, where Israel – the economy of which depends upon commercial sea routes – is at a disadvantage. The actions attributed to it, inter alia due to leaks that endanger the safety of our military forces, are perceived by Washington as a provocation intended to sabotage the negotiations between the international community and Iran.
One should be aware that, ultimately, Israel cannot take preventive actions, especially military ones, against the Iranian nuclear challenge unless it has closely and constructively coordinated them with the United States. It will not be able to translate them into tangible, long-term achievements, and may risk being seen as making empty threats.
Under these circumstances, Israel is conducting a poor policy with respect to the United States. Israel should have embarked on a continuous, profound, and intimate dialogue with the U.S. administration long ago, in an attempt to reach broad understandings on how to maintain its interests in a changing reality; obtain guarantees for its national security, to which the U.S. administration has expressed its commitment; implement the declared consensus between the two countries with regard to the need to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons by all means necessary; and restore the rocky relations and distrust with the Democratic government.
In the absence of strategy as well as chemistry between Israeli and U.S. leaderships, Israel does not seem to be learning its lessons from past crises. Instead, it is once again being cornered into a confrontational policy vis à vis Washington, which may turn out to be costly, leave it isolated, turning the Iranian issue into an increasingly more "Israeli problem", as well as weakening Israel's image and strength in the eyes of the Arab world. In the meantime, friction between Israel and Iran is expanding, reaching, according to foreign sources, into the naval realm as well, where Israel – the economy of which depends upon commercial sea routes – is at a disadvantage. The actions attributed to it, inter alia due to leaks that endanger the safety of our military forces, are perceived by Washington as a provocation intended to sabotage the negotiations between the international community and Iran.
One should be aware that, ultimately, Israel cannot take preventive actions, especially military ones, against the Iranian nuclear challenge unless it has closely and constructively coordinated them with the United States. It will not be able to translate them into tangible, long-term achievements, and may risk being seen as making empty threats.
The Palestinian system
The Israeli leadership does not seem to be addressing as urgently as required or preparing for the problematic trends that are emerging in the Palestinian arena. The progress made toward Palestinian elections could create a multidimensional strategic event and spin out of control, particularly if Fatah is defeated. However, even if the elections will be postponed, the damage may already have been done due to the unrest and divisiveness in Fatah ranks, as the organization has split into three camps, whereas Hamas continues to function as a united, organized system.
Israel must form long-term strategy from which to derive its immediate conduct vis à vis the Palestinians, inter alia in response to the weakening of the Palestinian Authority as a governing system, expected to worsen when Abu Mazen will no longer be in power and an internal war of succession will ensue among Fatah ranks, while Hamas and the armed struggle approach it advocates grow stronger.
Israel must form long-term strategy from which to derive its immediate conduct vis à vis the Palestinians, inter alia in response to the weakening of the Palestinian Authority as a governing system, expected to worsen when Abu Mazen will no longer be in power and an internal war of succession will ensue among Fatah ranks, while Hamas and the armed struggle approach it advocates grow stronger.
The relations with Jordan
The internal developments in Jordan serve as a "wakeup call" from two aspects. The first pertains to the challenges that King Abdallah and the Hashemite regime are facing, and the second to the knowledge and information gaps on the goings-on in the kingdom, the stability of which is vital to Israel's national security.
The series of steps recently taken by Israel – impeding the Crown Prince's visit to Temple Mount, closing its airspace to flights from Jordan, and delaying the transfer of water quotas in violation of the peace accord – reflect actions that contradict the basic interest to strengthen the kingdom that provides security along Israel's longest border, as well as depth vis à vis Iran. These steps – led by Israel's prime minister without coordinating them with the relevant professionals and, in some cases, contrary to their recommendations – are destabilizing the king's status, and show that Israel is not following an organized strategy.
The series of steps recently taken by Israel – impeding the Crown Prince's visit to Temple Mount, closing its airspace to flights from Jordan, and delaying the transfer of water quotas in violation of the peace accord – reflect actions that contradict the basic interest to strengthen the kingdom that provides security along Israel's longest border, as well as depth vis à vis Iran. These steps – led by Israel's prime minister without coordinating them with the relevant professionals and, in some cases, contrary to their recommendations – are destabilizing the king's status, and show that Israel is not following an organized strategy.
The threat posed by The Hague
The decision reached by the International Criminal Court Prosecutor in the Hague to launch an investigation into "the situation in the State of Palestine" surprised Israel, demonstrating that the ICC proceedings may move forward faster than anticipated, turning into a "sword of Damocles" hanging above its head.
Despite the imminent threat, Israel does not seem to internalize the severity of this development, for it has failed to consolidate an agreed policy or updated legal approach on this matter. It has even left to the very last minute the formulation of a response to the ICC prosecutor's question whether it intends to investigate the war crimes the court is attributing to it on its own, or refuse to recognize the court's jurisdiction; and the political echelon has not bothered to hold proper discussions on the matter.
Despite the imminent threat, Israel does not seem to internalize the severity of this development, for it has failed to consolidate an agreed policy or updated legal approach on this matter. It has even left to the very last minute the formulation of a response to the ICC prosecutor's question whether it intends to investigate the war crimes the court is attributing to it on its own, or refuse to recognize the court's jurisdiction; and the political echelon has not bothered to hold proper discussions on the matter.
What's next?
The State of Israel is experiencing a severe multidimensional crises, and acute gaps in governing system functioning are apparent. It is conducting itself with no budget, has not formed a national plan for exiting the economic crisis, the education and health systems lack long-term planning and budgeting, the defense establishment is following no approved multiannual plan, and the home front is not ready for war or disaster.
The rift in governance is also reflected in the absence of strategy vis à vis pressing political and military challenges; decisions that have strategic implications – such as the annexation and consent to the sale of F-35 aircraft to the United Arab Emirates – are being taken with no thorough staff work, consultation, or control. What is worse, in the absence of a functioning government, the processes required for the crafting of a systemwide national policy in crucial areas cannot even be set in motion.
A crisis of this magnitude demands urgent response by leaders. Elected public officials must regain their composure, rise above narrow political considerations that cause strategic damage to Israel and its citizens, and take steps to form strategic long-term policies and objectives and join forces in an effort to implement them.
The rift in governance is also reflected in the absence of strategy vis à vis pressing political and military challenges; decisions that have strategic implications – such as the annexation and consent to the sale of F-35 aircraft to the United Arab Emirates – are being taken with no thorough staff work, consultation, or control. What is worse, in the absence of a functioning government, the processes required for the crafting of a systemwide national policy in crucial areas cannot even be set in motion.
A crisis of this magnitude demands urgent response by leaders. Elected public officials must regain their composure, rise above narrow political considerations that cause strategic damage to Israel and its citizens, and take steps to form strategic long-term policies and objectives and join forces in an effort to implement them.