Are We Heading for a New Strategic Era in the Middle East?
Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS
Executive Director
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
June, 2023
- Iran as a nuclear threshold state?
- Saudi Arabia – a member of the nuclear club under U.S. auspices?
- Can the Palestinian issue be ignored while normalization with Saudi Arabia is being pursued?
New nuclear understandings
Iran and the United States are nearing understandings whereby Iran would discontinue its enrichment of uranium to 60 percent purity, and avoid progressing with its weapons-grade nuclear program. In exchange, the United States will commit to partial sanction relief, including the unfreezing of some USD20 billion held worldwide. These developments do not amount to a new deal in lieu of the original JCPOA, and therefore, the U.S. administration is not required to have these understandings approved by U.S. Congress.
Israel has already stated that it is not committed to a new deal or return to the JCPOA, and, in fact, opposes it, but has been vague with regard to the possibility of reaching understandings. Thus, Prime Minister Netanyahu has stated during a briefing given at the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that Israel objects to a return to the original agreement, and that “differences of opinion remain with regard to minor agreements”. His statement implies that the prime minister himself realizes that Israel’s ability to curb the understandings being reached is highly limited.
The key outcome of the emerging understandings would be that Iran will forego immediate breakout to nuclear weapons, but it will also be making some accomplishments on several levels. In nuclear, it will remain a nuclear threshold state, while retaining its overall abilities in this area, including that of breaking out within a two-week period to the weapons-grade level required of enriching uranium to 90% purity. On the political level, it is improving its relations with the United States and Europe, while steering clear of the threat of a military operation against it.
Moreover, since the emerging understandings focus primarily on military nuclear, Iran maintains enough leeway to continue growing in areas such as ballistic missiles and armed UAVs, while taking advantage of the fund unfreezing to address domestic economic plight, and increase its support to its proxies. At the same time, Iran is also continuing to broaden its strategic axis with Russia, as well as the two countries’ military-technological collaborations, while developing its strategic ties with China, as it promotes reconciliation processes with the Arab world, and successfully contains internal rioting. These developments could bolster Iran’s confidence to challenge Israel directly and/or via its regional proxies.
The United States, on its part, is successfully harnessing these understandings to curb the Iranian nuclear program, probably until the next U.S. president is inaugurated (January 2025) at least. This aligns with President Biden’s policy to prefer a diplomatic solution to the use of all other means as per his declared commitment to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. It seems that, in the U.S. administration’s view, this development is allowing it to focus most of its resources on the two most pressing and urgent challenges that the United States currently faces – the evolving conflict with China and the war in Ukraine.
From the Israeli perspective, if the new understandings will indeed be realized as an alternative to an agreement, Israel could emerge as having lost strategic assets, while being stranded in its campaign against Iranian nuclear. Practically-speaking, Israel will not be able to expect international support for a military campaign against Iran, thereby significantly reducing its strategic freedom of action to take steps against the Iranian weapons-grade nuclear program. On the bright side, however, curbing the progress being made by Iran with its nuclear program will allow the IDF to continue its force buildup processes in the long range in an effort to best prepare for a scenario whereby the military option will be the last one left to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.
The challenge posed by Iran and its local proxies is aggravating in view of Hizballah’s growing level of boldness over the last two months, as manifest in the terror attack in Megiddo Junction, and the blind eye turned toward the rockets fired at Israel from Lebanon. In this regard, Head of Military Intelligence, Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliwa warned during the Herzliya Conference that Nasrallah was beginning to think he could “push the equations vis-à-vis Israel”, and that he was close to making a mistake in Lebanon and Syria that could push the entire region to a war.
Israel has already stated that it is not committed to a new deal or return to the JCPOA, and, in fact, opposes it, but has been vague with regard to the possibility of reaching understandings. Thus, Prime Minister Netanyahu has stated during a briefing given at the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that Israel objects to a return to the original agreement, and that “differences of opinion remain with regard to minor agreements”. His statement implies that the prime minister himself realizes that Israel’s ability to curb the understandings being reached is highly limited.
The key outcome of the emerging understandings would be that Iran will forego immediate breakout to nuclear weapons, but it will also be making some accomplishments on several levels. In nuclear, it will remain a nuclear threshold state, while retaining its overall abilities in this area, including that of breaking out within a two-week period to the weapons-grade level required of enriching uranium to 90% purity. On the political level, it is improving its relations with the United States and Europe, while steering clear of the threat of a military operation against it.
Moreover, since the emerging understandings focus primarily on military nuclear, Iran maintains enough leeway to continue growing in areas such as ballistic missiles and armed UAVs, while taking advantage of the fund unfreezing to address domestic economic plight, and increase its support to its proxies. At the same time, Iran is also continuing to broaden its strategic axis with Russia, as well as the two countries’ military-technological collaborations, while developing its strategic ties with China, as it promotes reconciliation processes with the Arab world, and successfully contains internal rioting. These developments could bolster Iran’s confidence to challenge Israel directly and/or via its regional proxies.
The United States, on its part, is successfully harnessing these understandings to curb the Iranian nuclear program, probably until the next U.S. president is inaugurated (January 2025) at least. This aligns with President Biden’s policy to prefer a diplomatic solution to the use of all other means as per his declared commitment to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. It seems that, in the U.S. administration’s view, this development is allowing it to focus most of its resources on the two most pressing and urgent challenges that the United States currently faces – the evolving conflict with China and the war in Ukraine.
From the Israeli perspective, if the new understandings will indeed be realized as an alternative to an agreement, Israel could emerge as having lost strategic assets, while being stranded in its campaign against Iranian nuclear. Practically-speaking, Israel will not be able to expect international support for a military campaign against Iran, thereby significantly reducing its strategic freedom of action to take steps against the Iranian weapons-grade nuclear program. On the bright side, however, curbing the progress being made by Iran with its nuclear program will allow the IDF to continue its force buildup processes in the long range in an effort to best prepare for a scenario whereby the military option will be the last one left to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.
The challenge posed by Iran and its local proxies is aggravating in view of Hizballah’s growing level of boldness over the last two months, as manifest in the terror attack in Megiddo Junction, and the blind eye turned toward the rockets fired at Israel from Lebanon. In this regard, Head of Military Intelligence, Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliwa warned during the Herzliya Conference that Nasrallah was beginning to think he could “push the equations vis-à-vis Israel”, and that he was close to making a mistake in Lebanon and Syria that could push the entire region to a war.
Normalization with Saudi Arabia
Alongside its talks with Iran, the United States is also actively pursuing normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia as part of its overall effort to better its relations with this kingdom. Saudi Arabia has reportedly established prerequisites, primarily U.S. consent to the development of a civilian nuclear program, including uranium enrichment, willingness to provide advanced weapons systems (such as F35 fighter jets), and the provision of U.S. security guarantees.
In the meantime, the question of the effects of the Palestinian issue and the government's attempts to promote a coup d'état on the chances of accomplishing normalization remains unanswered. It is our understanding that, even if it seems like the considerations in the Palestinian issue will be mostly symbolic, a response dissimilar in spirit to the Arab Initiative, outlining a clear horizon for genuine negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, could render any arrangement reached unstable. This is due to its potential implications on the Palestinian Authority’s already-undermined status, in such a way as to play into the hands of Hamas, possibly leading to a boost to its reputation on the Palestinian street. Abu Mazen is also likely to exert pressure on both the United States and Europe, as well as the Arab and Muslim world, in an effort to ensure that the Palestinian issue is adequately addressed. It is therefore our assessment that, as long as King Salman is ruling Saudi Arabia, it would be extremely difficult to draft an agreement that would circumvent the Palestinian issue.
The government intent to promote radical reforms in the judicial system also emerges as an obstacle to the pursuit of normalization, and its retraction serves as a prerequisite for direct talks between President Biden and Prime Minister Netanyahu, and certainly for a trilateral summit with the Saudi Crown Prince. The reason being that the U.S. administration views the possible harm to the Israeli judiciary as undermining the shared values that form the basis for the strategic alliance between the two countries. Despite the deep security ties, the absence of a direct and intimate dialogue on the leadership level is detrimental to the ability to coordinate and forge strategic collaborations.
In the meantime, the question of the effects of the Palestinian issue and the government's attempts to promote a coup d'état on the chances of accomplishing normalization remains unanswered. It is our understanding that, even if it seems like the considerations in the Palestinian issue will be mostly symbolic, a response dissimilar in spirit to the Arab Initiative, outlining a clear horizon for genuine negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, could render any arrangement reached unstable. This is due to its potential implications on the Palestinian Authority’s already-undermined status, in such a way as to play into the hands of Hamas, possibly leading to a boost to its reputation on the Palestinian street. Abu Mazen is also likely to exert pressure on both the United States and Europe, as well as the Arab and Muslim world, in an effort to ensure that the Palestinian issue is adequately addressed. It is therefore our assessment that, as long as King Salman is ruling Saudi Arabia, it would be extremely difficult to draft an agreement that would circumvent the Palestinian issue.
The government intent to promote radical reforms in the judicial system also emerges as an obstacle to the pursuit of normalization, and its retraction serves as a prerequisite for direct talks between President Biden and Prime Minister Netanyahu, and certainly for a trilateral summit with the Saudi Crown Prince. The reason being that the U.S. administration views the possible harm to the Israeli judiciary as undermining the shared values that form the basis for the strategic alliance between the two countries. Despite the deep security ties, the absence of a direct and intimate dialogue on the leadership level is detrimental to the ability to coordinate and forge strategic collaborations.
Recommendations
The Israeli government must end the coup d'état immediately, as it is emerging as an increasingly larger obstacle on the path to promoting Israel’s security and economic interests, primarily its strategic relations with the U.S. administration, freedom of actions vis-à-vis Iran, and ties with the Arab world.
With regard to the Palestinians, Israel must conduct itself responsibly and sensitively, while avoiding unilateral steps such as expanding settlements and altering the status quo in Jerusalem’s holy sites, which could evoke acute international dissatisfaction, and cause tension in both Palestinian and regional systems. For instance, the decision to promote construction plans for 5000 residential units in settlements has already been harshly criticized by U.S. administration officials.
In the long range, neglecting the political avenues vis-à-vis the Palestinians, despite the defense establishment’s operational successes thwarting terror attacks, could lead Israel to a binational state reality, dragging the IDF into greater involvement on the ground in a way that would be detrimental to its ability to prepare for other reference scenarios.
In accordance with the warnings issued by the heads of the defense establishment, Israel should prepare on both political and military levels for an overall conflict on multiple fronts in view of what emerges as overlapping interests among our enemies, who believe that Israel’s image of power is on the decline.
In the Saudi context, Israel should formulate a cautious policy that would take into account all the implications of Saudi Arabia joining the civilian nuclear club as a strategic formative factor with far-reaching long-range implications in view of the reasonable concern that nuclearization processes across the Middle East be accelerated, posing a potential threat to Israel’s national security which relies, alongside military might, on its image as a local superpower.
With regard to the Palestinians, Israel must conduct itself responsibly and sensitively, while avoiding unilateral steps such as expanding settlements and altering the status quo in Jerusalem’s holy sites, which could evoke acute international dissatisfaction, and cause tension in both Palestinian and regional systems. For instance, the decision to promote construction plans for 5000 residential units in settlements has already been harshly criticized by U.S. administration officials.
In the long range, neglecting the political avenues vis-à-vis the Palestinians, despite the defense establishment’s operational successes thwarting terror attacks, could lead Israel to a binational state reality, dragging the IDF into greater involvement on the ground in a way that would be detrimental to its ability to prepare for other reference scenarios.
In accordance with the warnings issued by the heads of the defense establishment, Israel should prepare on both political and military levels for an overall conflict on multiple fronts in view of what emerges as overlapping interests among our enemies, who believe that Israel’s image of power is on the decline.
In the Saudi context, Israel should formulate a cautious policy that would take into account all the implications of Saudi Arabia joining the civilian nuclear club as a strategic formative factor with far-reaching long-range implications in view of the reasonable concern that nuclearization processes across the Middle East be accelerated, posing a potential threat to Israel’s national security which relies, alongside military might, on its image as a local superpower.
The 2023 Herzliya Conference:
The Aggravating Threat Posed by Iran
The Aggravating Threat Posed by Iran
Since the United States withdrew from the nuclear deal in 2018, Iran has accelerated the advancement of its weapons-grade nuclear program. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) report published in May, Iran has already enriched 114kg of uranium to 60% purity. Such an amount is sufficient for several bombs and, in fact, according to senior officials at the U.S. Department of Defense, Iran is two weeks away, subject to its leader’s decision, from starting to enrich to the weapons-grade 90% purity.
The Head of Israel’s Military Intelligence, Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliwa, warned during the Herzliya Conference that Iran was increasingly advancing in both military enrichment and nuclear weapons, and is preparing for the possibility that its leader would make the decision to break out to nuclear weapons. Perhaps due to these and other trends, IDF Chief of General Staff, Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi warned in his Herzliya Conference address that there were “negative developments on the horizon that could lead to action” in Iran. In a possible context, former commander of the Israeli Air Force, Maj. Gen. Amikam Norkin noted that, as time goes by, Israel’s preparedness for the Iranian nuclear challenge is improving.
Meanwhile, Iran is enjoying what seems to be the West’s strategic choice to try and stop the nuclear program, if only temporarily, by diplomatic means. Thus, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has announced the closing of two investigations against Iran. This leaves two more open IAEA investigations that, in the past, at least, Iran demanded be closed as a precondition for reaching a new deal. In the meantime, in the background is the partial relief of sanctions imposed on Iran (among them sanctions in the field of missiles) toward the end of the year, when UN Security Council Resolution 2231 will expire.
Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Defense, Maj. Gen. (res.) Eyal Zamir stated that addressing the threat posed by Iran is “an ongoing interdisciplinary campaign on multiple fronts”. Indeed, at the same time as it advances its military nuclear program, Iran is continuing to develop its conventional capabilities. In the field of missiles, for example, it has showcased what it refers to as the first hypersonic missile it has developed, which could reach a range of up to 1400km.
Furthermore, Iran is taking advantage of the war in Ukraine to deepen its strategic axis with Russia, particularly with regard to military collaborations. In this context, Iran is helping Russia build a drone-producing facility, which U.S. officials maintain should be completed in early 2024. In exchange for its assistance, Iran is receiving military technological help from Russia, and, in the foreseeable future, may also receive advanced weapons systems from it, including SU-35 fighter jets, assault helicopters, and air defense systems.
Moreover, Israeli Minister of Defense, Yoav Gallant revealed that Iran was setting up floating terror bases by converting commercial sea vessels into military ones, armed with a range of weapons to serve as floating terror bases capable of operating in remote locations following Iran’s sea terror activity in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, with plans to extend it to the Indian Ocean and, in future, to the Red Sea and Mediterranean too.
The Head of Israel’s Military Intelligence, Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliwa, warned during the Herzliya Conference that Iran was increasingly advancing in both military enrichment and nuclear weapons, and is preparing for the possibility that its leader would make the decision to break out to nuclear weapons. Perhaps due to these and other trends, IDF Chief of General Staff, Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi warned in his Herzliya Conference address that there were “negative developments on the horizon that could lead to action” in Iran. In a possible context, former commander of the Israeli Air Force, Maj. Gen. Amikam Norkin noted that, as time goes by, Israel’s preparedness for the Iranian nuclear challenge is improving.
Meanwhile, Iran is enjoying what seems to be the West’s strategic choice to try and stop the nuclear program, if only temporarily, by diplomatic means. Thus, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has announced the closing of two investigations against Iran. This leaves two more open IAEA investigations that, in the past, at least, Iran demanded be closed as a precondition for reaching a new deal. In the meantime, in the background is the partial relief of sanctions imposed on Iran (among them sanctions in the field of missiles) toward the end of the year, when UN Security Council Resolution 2231 will expire.
Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Defense, Maj. Gen. (res.) Eyal Zamir stated that addressing the threat posed by Iran is “an ongoing interdisciplinary campaign on multiple fronts”. Indeed, at the same time as it advances its military nuclear program, Iran is continuing to develop its conventional capabilities. In the field of missiles, for example, it has showcased what it refers to as the first hypersonic missile it has developed, which could reach a range of up to 1400km.
Furthermore, Iran is taking advantage of the war in Ukraine to deepen its strategic axis with Russia, particularly with regard to military collaborations. In this context, Iran is helping Russia build a drone-producing facility, which U.S. officials maintain should be completed in early 2024. In exchange for its assistance, Iran is receiving military technological help from Russia, and, in the foreseeable future, may also receive advanced weapons systems from it, including SU-35 fighter jets, assault helicopters, and air defense systems.
Moreover, Israeli Minister of Defense, Yoav Gallant revealed that Iran was setting up floating terror bases by converting commercial sea vessels into military ones, armed with a range of weapons to serve as floating terror bases capable of operating in remote locations following Iran’s sea terror activity in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, with plans to extend it to the Indian Ocean and, in future, to the Red Sea and Mediterranean too.