The Middle East’s “Strategic Explosives” Challenge
Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS
Executive Director
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
July, 2022
Photos: The White House | Khamenei.ir - CC BY 4.0
The Tehran and Jeddah summits are an expression of the great powers’ range of strategies for coping with the world security and economic crisis, projecting clout, and promoting interests that exceed the specific Middle Eastern context. Nevertheless, this region is becoming increasingly more instrumental to the great powers’ national security interests as the conflict between the West and Russia exacerbates. Israel’s strategic balance sheet in view of developments in the international arena and their impact on Middle Eastern dynamics is a mixed one, and calls for a consistent policy that takes all risks and opportunities into consideration.
The Jeddah Summit – attended by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Egypt, Jordan and Iraq – aimed to restore the tense relations between Washington and the Gulf states, establish U.S. leadership, and anchor the United States’ commitment to its regional allies’ security, but above all, to increase the Gulf’s oil production in an effort to diminish the rise in prices across the global energy market.
President Biden’s shuttle, which began in Israel, has demonstrated the historical strategic alliance between the two countries, as well as the U.S. commitment to Israel’s security as manifest in the signing of the Jerusalem Declaration.
However, one cannot ignore the half empty glass of the visit. President Biden had stated that he wishes to exhaust diplomacy, return to the JCPOA outline, and avoid a military option against Iran as much as possible. The U.S. President’s commitment to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons did not address the leap made in recent months with respect to the enrichment capabilities and technological knowhow that Iran has accumulated, taking it ever closer to breakout (90% enrichment), and has particularly disregarded the change in negotiation dynamics whereby the decision to either reach an agreement or break out to attaining a nuclear device has been left in the hands of the Iranian leadership. The absence of a concrete military threat that would deter the Iranian leadership from advancing nuclear steps enables it to keep violating the nuclear deal systematically and undisturbed, progress in its enrichment capability development as well as nuclear research and development, while at the same time negotiating with the great powers.
The Iranian strategy is attempting to eat the cake and leave it whole: To strive to establish “near-breakout” capabilities while actively enhancing regional clout and entrenchment as it deters the Gulf states from forming a military defense alliance with Israel and the United States. Iran aims to increase its pressure on Israel and lead to its regional isolation, push the U.S. out of the region, weaken the pro-American bloc, move military threats away from its borders, and undermine the Abraham Accords until they altogether collapse.
The American attempted countermeasure to forge a military anti-Iranian defense partnership has failed as countries in the region are deterred by Tehran’s damaging power. Moreover, the Gulf states, Egypt and Jordan have stated that they have no intention of forming a military defense alliance against Iran alongside the United States and Israel. Nevertheless, the Jeddah Summit has successfully promoted regional security collaborations under American auspices – the setting up of joint naval task forces to defend international waterways, willingness to sell advanced air defense capabilities, and plan to accelerate the security-technological cooperation with Saudi Arabia and its regional allies.
Furthermore, the anticipated leap in relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel prior to the summit due to pave the way to future normalization between the two countries did not occur. Instead, the Saudi Foreign Minister had explicitly stated that the decision to open Saudi airspace to civilian flights to and from Israel was merely part of an overall Saudi policy, had “nothing to do with diplomatic ties with Israel… [and was] not in any way a precursor to any further steps”.
The Gulf states and Egypt have embraced a support diversification policy on both the great power and regional levels. Getting closer to Israel while retaining the U.S. source of support does not contradict the forging of strategic relations with Russia and China, nor the stabilizing and evolving of diplomatic as well as economic ties with Iran. On the great power level – Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE are disinclined to jeopardize their strategic relations with Russia and China despite Washington’s pressure. The civil nuclear program in Egypt established with Russian financing and guidance is one such example. Another manifestation is the call between Mohammed bin Salman and President Putin (22 July), during which the two leaders had agreed to remain coordinated on matters relating to the energy market. This telephone conversation casts a shadow on one of the Jeddah Summit’s greatest achievements as declared by the United States – the understanding reached with Saudi Arabia whereby it would increase its oil production.
In another, no less explosive context where Israel is concerned, Biden’s shuttle did not lead to any breakthrough with regard to Israel’s gas production dispute with Lebanon. In fact, no progress has been made with the Lebanese government on the "Karish" gas rig at all. Nasrallah has aggravated his threats against Israel recently, declaring that he would consider going to war should the talks fail. Nasrallah’s threat creates a new equation whereby any gas obtained from "Karish" before an agreement is reached with Lebanon on the maritime border constitutes as grounds for waging war.
16 years after the Second Lebanon War, Nasrallah seems to be setting the scene for another possible conflict with Israel entitled “Rights or War”, and the severe economic and political crisis in Lebanon may even legitimize and provide tailwind for a military campaign against Israel on the grounds of an energy dispute.
The Tehran Summit ended with a mixed balance sheet for its participants. On the one hand, President Putin can chalk down a significant feat by convening with Turkish President Erdogan, Iranian leader Khamenei and Iranian President Raisi. Moreover, progress had been made during the meeting with Erdogan on regulating the renewed export of Ukrainian crops out of Black Sea ports, leading to the official agreement signed in Istanbul between Russia and Ukraine (the very next day, Russia had already violated the agreement signed by bombing the Port of Odessa). Russia was fully and publicly sanctioned by the Iranian leadership and, according to the U.S. National Security Advisor’s reports, Tehran will also be supplying Russia with offensive drones.
On the other hand, the profound disagreements, historical rivalry and competition between these actors over resources and clout cast a shadow on the summit’s positive ending. Iran and Russia compete with one another in the global energy market, vying for the same resources in Syria. The two countries are historically and profoundly suspicious of one another. The summit is an accomplishment for President Putin and the Iranian leadership, but does not signal the establishment of a new anti-American coalition in the region.
The Jeddah Summit – attended by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Egypt, Jordan and Iraq – aimed to restore the tense relations between Washington and the Gulf states, establish U.S. leadership, and anchor the United States’ commitment to its regional allies’ security, but above all, to increase the Gulf’s oil production in an effort to diminish the rise in prices across the global energy market.
President Biden’s shuttle, which began in Israel, has demonstrated the historical strategic alliance between the two countries, as well as the U.S. commitment to Israel’s security as manifest in the signing of the Jerusalem Declaration.
However, one cannot ignore the half empty glass of the visit. President Biden had stated that he wishes to exhaust diplomacy, return to the JCPOA outline, and avoid a military option against Iran as much as possible. The U.S. President’s commitment to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons did not address the leap made in recent months with respect to the enrichment capabilities and technological knowhow that Iran has accumulated, taking it ever closer to breakout (90% enrichment), and has particularly disregarded the change in negotiation dynamics whereby the decision to either reach an agreement or break out to attaining a nuclear device has been left in the hands of the Iranian leadership. The absence of a concrete military threat that would deter the Iranian leadership from advancing nuclear steps enables it to keep violating the nuclear deal systematically and undisturbed, progress in its enrichment capability development as well as nuclear research and development, while at the same time negotiating with the great powers.
The Iranian strategy is attempting to eat the cake and leave it whole: To strive to establish “near-breakout” capabilities while actively enhancing regional clout and entrenchment as it deters the Gulf states from forming a military defense alliance with Israel and the United States. Iran aims to increase its pressure on Israel and lead to its regional isolation, push the U.S. out of the region, weaken the pro-American bloc, move military threats away from its borders, and undermine the Abraham Accords until they altogether collapse.
The American attempted countermeasure to forge a military anti-Iranian defense partnership has failed as countries in the region are deterred by Tehran’s damaging power. Moreover, the Gulf states, Egypt and Jordan have stated that they have no intention of forming a military defense alliance against Iran alongside the United States and Israel. Nevertheless, the Jeddah Summit has successfully promoted regional security collaborations under American auspices – the setting up of joint naval task forces to defend international waterways, willingness to sell advanced air defense capabilities, and plan to accelerate the security-technological cooperation with Saudi Arabia and its regional allies.
Furthermore, the anticipated leap in relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel prior to the summit due to pave the way to future normalization between the two countries did not occur. Instead, the Saudi Foreign Minister had explicitly stated that the decision to open Saudi airspace to civilian flights to and from Israel was merely part of an overall Saudi policy, had “nothing to do with diplomatic ties with Israel… [and was] not in any way a precursor to any further steps”.
The Gulf states and Egypt have embraced a support diversification policy on both the great power and regional levels. Getting closer to Israel while retaining the U.S. source of support does not contradict the forging of strategic relations with Russia and China, nor the stabilizing and evolving of diplomatic as well as economic ties with Iran. On the great power level – Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE are disinclined to jeopardize their strategic relations with Russia and China despite Washington’s pressure. The civil nuclear program in Egypt established with Russian financing and guidance is one such example. Another manifestation is the call between Mohammed bin Salman and President Putin (22 July), during which the two leaders had agreed to remain coordinated on matters relating to the energy market. This telephone conversation casts a shadow on one of the Jeddah Summit’s greatest achievements as declared by the United States – the understanding reached with Saudi Arabia whereby it would increase its oil production.
In another, no less explosive context where Israel is concerned, Biden’s shuttle did not lead to any breakthrough with regard to Israel’s gas production dispute with Lebanon. In fact, no progress has been made with the Lebanese government on the "Karish" gas rig at all. Nasrallah has aggravated his threats against Israel recently, declaring that he would consider going to war should the talks fail. Nasrallah’s threat creates a new equation whereby any gas obtained from "Karish" before an agreement is reached with Lebanon on the maritime border constitutes as grounds for waging war.
16 years after the Second Lebanon War, Nasrallah seems to be setting the scene for another possible conflict with Israel entitled “Rights or War”, and the severe economic and political crisis in Lebanon may even legitimize and provide tailwind for a military campaign against Israel on the grounds of an energy dispute.
The Tehran Summit ended with a mixed balance sheet for its participants. On the one hand, President Putin can chalk down a significant feat by convening with Turkish President Erdogan, Iranian leader Khamenei and Iranian President Raisi. Moreover, progress had been made during the meeting with Erdogan on regulating the renewed export of Ukrainian crops out of Black Sea ports, leading to the official agreement signed in Istanbul between Russia and Ukraine (the very next day, Russia had already violated the agreement signed by bombing the Port of Odessa). Russia was fully and publicly sanctioned by the Iranian leadership and, according to the U.S. National Security Advisor’s reports, Tehran will also be supplying Russia with offensive drones.
On the other hand, the profound disagreements, historical rivalry and competition between these actors over resources and clout cast a shadow on the summit’s positive ending. Iran and Russia compete with one another in the global energy market, vying for the same resources in Syria. The two countries are historically and profoundly suspicious of one another. The summit is an accomplishment for President Putin and the Iranian leadership, but does not signal the establishment of a new anti-American coalition in the region.
Conclusions and recommendations
- The ongoing conflict between the United States and Russia, alongside regional developments and political instability in Israel pose a series of challenges for Israel on the political, security, and economic levels that project on its strategic condition. Concretely, as the Jewish High Holidays approach this September, Israel will be forced to grapple with the rising explosivity in both the Palestinian and Lebanese arenas, while preparing for the last phase of its domestic election campaign.
- The Palestinian issue was placed on the back burner during the U.S. President’s visit, primarily due to the realization that no peace process can be instigated under the current Israeli political circumstances, nor significant decisions made. Nevertheless, during the Jeddah Summit, Arab leaders have underscored the importance of the Palestinian issue as a key component of regional stability, as well as a precondition for normalization with Israel. The leaders’ speeches during the summit have demonstrated the fact that the Palestinian issue cannot be ignored, for it is a genuine obstacle on the path to normalization with the Arab world.
- The new Israeli government will have to form an overall strategy on the Palestinian issue, first and foremost for security as well as state-strategic reasons (preventing the realization of the “one state” idea), but also in view of the understanding that the path to Riyadh goes through Ramallah, and the ability to promote normalization with the Arab world – with all associated strategic implications – is conditioned upon developing a comprehensive solution for the Palestinian problem.
- The Israeli government and defense establishment are required to take immediate action to diffuse the explosives in the Palestinian arena by strengthening security coordination with the Palestinian Authority, taking focused action against Hamas infrastructure in the West Bank, and providing financial aid to stabilize the internal system so as to avoid a flareup before the Jewish High Holidays in September.
- Iran is on the verge of nuclear breakout (90% enrichment that would allow it to build a nuclear device), and the decision on this matter has been left primarily up to its own leadership, as the world’s attention has turned to the crisis in Ukraine, and in the absence of a deterring military option.
- Israel should actively attempt to render the drafted nuclear agreement more rigid, fully coordinating its actions with the United States, and in alignment with its overall action strategy vis-à-vis Iran. The IDF must continue to invest in force buildup to develop an independent military response, while deepening its security-strategic partnership with the United States in force buildup and operations.
- Europe may suffer from a cold winter this year due to Russia’s decision to minimize, or even cut, the supply of gas as strategic means of causing a rift between Western countries and weakening their cohesion. The Russian strategy aims to achieve its goals in Ukraine while gnawing at Western objection via energy and grains. The United States is trying to preserve the anti-Russian coalition’s cohesion by increasing the production of global oil, and exerting economic pressure on Moscow. The current state of affairs, coupled with both parties’ inability to take decisive military action, makes it more likely that an initial dialogue between the two sides on ending the conflict will be promoted as winter nears.
- In the context of an aggravating global conflict, Israel would do well to continue with its cautious policy, and refrain from “burning bridges” with Moscow in view of the possible toll it would have on its national security, such as the shutting down of the Jewish Agency office in Russia, the change in operative conduct vis-à-vis the Israeli war between wars, etc.
- Israel should pursue the resolution of the dispute with Lebanon over producing gas in the EEZ between the two countries, and avoid a military conflict with Hizballah as much as possible. To this end, Israel is advised to exhaust negotiations via the U.S., and do so more urgently, while indicating that such a step would serve the interests of both countries. Nevertheless, should Hizballah note any weakness in the Israeli position, it would make greater demands in an attempt to dent Israel’s power of deterrence, and concretize its own status as “Lebanon’s protector”. For the first time, and after 16 years of quiet in the northern arena, Israel must prepare for the possibility of a severe escalation vis-à-vis Hizballah.