The combined strategic challenge:
"A play in three acts"

Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS
Executive Director
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
April, 2022
26-3-20main-...

"History doesn't repeat itself, but it often rhymes" (Mark Twain)
 
The security stability act

The terror wave in recent weeks has demonstrated the challenge faced by the Israeli defense establishment when addressing "lone wolf terrorists" who are inspired by but are not affiliated with terror infrastructure or organizations. The risk of overall escalation grows even though the key actors lack the motivation to go down that road (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Palestinian public), in view of the terror led by "lone wolves", as well as the leap taken by the violent friction between the Israeli security forces and Palestinians in both West Bank and Jerusalem.

The terror attacks garner broad support among the Palestinian public, but are not translated into popular or organizational steps against Israel taken by Hamas or Islamic Jihad. Thus, at this stage, terror constitutes an outbreak of individuals unable to stir widespread popular outburst in the West Bank, or military escalation in the Gaza Strip. Thus far Hamas has restrained itself, and avoided taking escalating measures, although it does lead unconstrained incitement, and express unrestricted support of ongoing terror attacks against Israel.

The Palestinian public identifies with the attacks against Israel, but prefers to adhere to the status quo so as not to pay hefty economic prices; whereas the Palestinian Authority is once again emerging as a weak entity that has lost all ability to govern and any hold on the security situation in the areas it controls.

Explosivity in general has gone up a notch in view of recent events, and the road between the eruption of a tactical terror incident and full-scale strategic escalation is not long due to destabilizing dynamics, as well as the Palestinian Authority's and security apparatuses' feebleness. The present wave is similar in character to the "lone wolf intifada" (2015–2016) and requires a steadfast Israeli state security strategy that would curb terror attacks while strengthening the Palestinian Authority and its abilities to enforce governability in all its territories, and refrain from slipping down the slippery slope of full-scale escalation that stands to compromise its ability to address the growing Iranian threat.

The terror attacks have naturally focused public and political attention on the internal Israeli arena. However, the war in Ukraine and its destabilizing global implications, as well as the talks that aim to renew the nuclear deal between the great powers and Iran, pose no less of a complex strategic challenge for Israel's national security.

 
The global act and its implications on national security

The campaign in Ukraine continues and, to date, there is no implementable political process capable of ending the war. Russia has appointed its Southern Military District Commander as head of the Russian forces in Ukraine in order to enhance its military effectiveness, and heighten pressure in Eastern Ukraine for the purpose of yielding a clear decisive outcome on the battlefield, particularly in view of the Russian army's meager accomplishments thus far. Russian military actions in Eastern Ukraine are designed, according to western intelligence agencies, to lead to declared victory on 9 May (Victory Day commemorating the surrender of Nazi Germany in World War II) in a maneuver that aims to frame the war using the historical "fighting the Nazis" narrative.

The "image of victory" Putin seeks to create is challenged by the West's undisputed support of Ukraine, manifest in unprecedented economic sanctions and an overall political campaign. The British Prime Minister's, the American secretary of state and defense minister visit to Kiev, as well as the accelerated steps to include Ukraine in the EU, demonstrate the West's uninhibited support, but also its glass ceiling. For while the United States and the West are providing Ukraine with advanced weapons, and helping to enhance the Ukrainian army's capabilities on the battlefield, they are avoiding any direct military involvement for fear that the situation deteriorate into a full-fledged world war.

The world's horror at the sight of the citizens massacred in Bucha as well as the awful images of extensive targeting of unaffiliated civilians in air strikes and the use of imprecise artillery has not been translated into practical shifts in the West's use of force policies that are currently deterred by any direct military action. The current state of affairs raises the concern that the targeting of civilians, perceived as a Russian tool designed to break the Ukrainians' fighting spirit, will increase as this campaign continues in the absence of an effective western response by which to deter Moscow.

At the same time, the economic prices in the international arena are soaring, and undermine the sanctions' effectiveness. Russia continues to export energy to Europe, which, at this point, is unwilling to pay the price of ending the supply of Russian oil and gas, while China and India keep their vast economic ties with Moscow intact, thereby reducing the overall impact of the sanctions, and the Gulf states resist the pressure to increase their oil output in an effort to mitigate the rising prices.

In addition, the global economic crisis poses a threat to food security in Middle Eastern countries that rely on the supply of wheat from Russia and Ukraine; increases the rate of poverty due to skyrocketing prices, and leads to overall political destabilization in the region. Shockwaves from the Russo-Ukrainian war are washing over Cairo, Amman, Beirut, and other capitals in the region, forming an unprecedented strategic threat to their national security and stability.

 
The nuclear deal act

The return to the nuclear deal between the great powers and the United States is at an impasse in view of Iran's demand that the IRGC be removed from the list of terror organizations. The heads of the U.S. defense establishment (the Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CENTCOM commander) vehemently object to the removal of this organization from the list, as do the United States' regional allies, which have publicly protested against this intention, particularly in light of the series of terror attacks spearheaded by the IRGC only recently in the Middle East.

Nevertheless, the White House has yet to publish its final policy on the subject due to the repercussions of blowing up the talks on Iran's nuclear breakout time and overall regional stability. Mediating efforts are probably still being made to reach the formula of a compromise as the United States realizes that an agreement will serve the needs of the world energy market, deliver a blow to the Russian monopoly, and push off the risk of U.S. military involvement in the Middle East. However, the White House's concern about public criticism in Congress and the Senate over this step, which could have a negative effect on midterm elections (November), limits its leeway whilst engaging in the negotiations.

Iran's strategy is to insist on all declared terms and conditions for its return to the JCPOA whilst maintaining its technological capabilities and even enhancing them as it exerts military pressure via its proxies on the United States and its regional allies. This holistic strategy aims to project power and regional clout while preserving advanced nuclear capabilities and toppling the sanction regime to enable Iran to become a legitimized regional power both economically and militarily. Should the nuclear talks fail, Iran would be able to accelerate its nuclear program and achieve immunity while increasing friction with the Pro-American Sunni camp and Israel. Iran is exerting pressure on the United States and its regional allies and, at this stage, is undeterred by raising the stakes as it internalizes the weakening of U.S. deterrence in the region. Under any scenario, the threat posed to Israel is extensive, multidimensional, and long-term, requiring the development of an overall strategy.

 
Implications
  • The absence of an overall Israeli strategy vis-à-vis the Palestinian issue, beyond the current "conflict management" policy that uses "sticks and carrots", reduces Israel's ability to take action, limiting it to the operative and reactive space, and playing into the hands of Hamas in the Palestinian arena.
     
  • In the context of the current wave of terror, Israel must employ economic-civic tools that would generate calm, while enhancing security methods of thwarting and deterring potential terrorists. Thus, intense "lawnmowing" that includes entering violent centers of friction (such as the Jenin refugee camp) alongside an insistence upon alleviations for the general population during Ramadan, and a boost to the overall fabric of life will serve as a balanced policy by which to clip the wings of any prospects of slipping down the slope of an overall escalation.
     
  • Nevertheless, Israel should quickly and effectively restore the barrier in the seam zone, and provide an overall solution for the issue of illegal aliens in view of the ongoing security challenge, as well as the strategic problem posed by the "one state" perception taking hold on the Palestinian side.
     
  • Israel has experienced tough, long-lasting terror waves in the past that have claimed many painful casualties from among civil society. National resilience and social cohesion are paramount when addressing a wave of terror designed to gnaw at the fundamental sense of security in Israel, and spur a feeling of chaos and vulnerability. At this time, the state and defense leaderships must bear the heavy yolk of responsibility for, and play a key role in strengthening Israeli society's steadfast resistance to terror.
     
  • Israel should prepare for the scenario whereby a nuclear deal will be signed in the near future, while also preparing for the opposite scenario, whereby the talks fail, and the Iranian nuclear program is accelerated. Both options are dangerous, but while the first scenario requires force buildup and preparation for an aggravated Iranian threat in the next decade, as well as operative preparedness for an increased regional threat, the second speeds up both nuclear and regional clocks within the immediate timeframe.
     
  • Subsequently, a precondition for the development of an overall state and security strategy by which to address both scenarios is an enhanced strategic partnership with the United States enabling expedited force buildup to address a range of threats, and legitimization to take operative steps. Israel should avoid any direct confrontation with the United States over the nuclear deal, which could impact U.S. aid during said buildup processes required.
     
  • Furthermore, in view of the aggravating civilian crisis in Ukraine, and the uncovering of Russian war crimes, Israel is required to take a clear stand, and align itself with the United States and the West. Jerusalem must increase its coordination with Washington on the campaign in Ukraine. Remaining "on the fence" at this point could put a crack in the strategic alliance between Israel and the United States, and take a toll on the political and security arrangements vis-à-vis Iran too.
     
  • In addition, regional dynamics have created an opportunity for Israel to strengthen its strategic ties with countries in the region, and Jerusalem should help as best it can with the establishment of their (economic and security) stability, whether directly or by taking action in the international arena. Israel is currently establishing itself as a key factor in regional setups, as well as an effective mediator that mitigates growing tension between the Gulf states and U.S. Jerusalem would do well to bolster its valuableness to both countries in the region and Washington by formulating an overall state security strategy that would help curb Iranian clout and entrenchment in the region.