The Iranian Threat:
Which Cards Can Israel Play?

Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS
Executive Director
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
January, 2022
26-3-20main-...
Israel is at a strategic crossroads in view of Iran's plodding negotiations with the great powers, and the need to curb the progress made by the Iranian nuclear program. Strategic coordination with the United States is therefore a crucial component of impacting the draft of the future agreement. As Israel makes its concentrated effort to address the Iranian threat, it must manage the steps it takes in both Palestinian and northern arenas with caution, and mostly maintain relative calm in both, in order to avoid jeopardizing the actions and attention directed at the nuclear issue.
 
The nuclear talks – One step forward, two steps backward
The round of talks that ended in Vienna with the Iranian delegation's decision to return to Tehran for consultations was publicly criticized by European delegates and senior U.S. officials, as they reiterated that the time to strike a deal was running out in view of the rapid progress made by the Iranian nuclear program. The talks had advanced somewhat, for the parties agreed on the agenda and issues to be examined during the course of the negotiations, while Iran expressed its general willingness to replace the IAEA surveillance cameras installed at the Karaj facility, where parts used in uranium enrichment centrifuges are being manufactured. Iran had removed the cameras from the nuclear site last June following a sabotage attack against it, which was attributed to Israel. However, one camera's data storage medium has vanished, and the IAEA is therefore unable to discern whether the facility has renewed its activity since June.

The gaps between the parties remain large and significant, as the Iranian leadership continues to insist that all sanctions be lifted. It is also demanding to return to the original JCPOA signed in 2015, and receive guarantees that Washington will not abandon it a second time. The United States and Europe are interpreting the Iranian approach as a lack of commitment and blatant stalling attempt by Iran, as the latter refuses to acknowledge the progress made during the previous round of talks. The negotiations are expected to resume toward the end of the year (December 27) but it is evident that the gaps are material and fundamental.

The United States is pressuring Iran to return to the nuclear deal, signaling that other options are available besides diplomacy. Senior State Department officials have
leaked President Joe Biden's request two months ago that National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan review the Pentagon's plans for military action should the diplomatic efforts fail. Moreover, during Israeli Defense Minister Gantz's visit to Washington with his U.S. counterpart (December 2021), the two reportedly discussed plans of joint attacks against Iranian nuclear sites in the event that diplomatic channels should prove unsuccessful.

Senior officials have also added that Washington was looking into the possibility of imposing stricter sanctions on Iran. More concretely, an
American delegation led by senior position holders in the Department of the Treasury visited the United Arab Emirates to ensure that local banks were not breaching the sanctions on Iran. The U.S. Department of the Treasury stated that it would not hesitate to impose sanctions on UAE banks should it discover that they were violating the restrictions placed on Iran. These steps aim to convey a clear message to Tehran whereby time is running out, and it should display genuine willingness to proceed with the negotiations in view of the potential prices it would otherwise have to pay, both financially and militarily.

Israel objects to the diplomatic channel, which it perceives as an Iranian "nuclear blackmail" tactic, and calls for Washington's tightening of the sanctions in preparation for the activation of military options. Jerusalem is also concerned about the formulation of an interim agreement in Vienna, whereby parts of the nuclear program would be frozen in exchange for the suspension of some of the sanctions. Although the existence of such an offer has been denied by U.S. officials, Israel is worried that the dynamics that could evolve may lead to the return of such suggestions to the negotiating table. At the same time, senior Israeli officials are underscoring that Israel is preparing for an independent military strike, should the need arise, for it cannot accept the reality of a nuclear Iran.

The United States has reiterated its commitment to Israel's security; however, its approach to the Iranian nuclear program differs fundamentally from that of Israel. U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has noted that Washington was worried about the rapid progress made by the Iranian nuclear program, and another senior American official had expressed the Biden Administration's concern over Iran's relatively quick nuclear weapon
breakout time. Are American reports of "other options" designed to appease Israel and urge Iran to make concessions during the negotiations without actually reflecting Washington's genuine intention to use military force for fear of being dragged into yet another campaign in the Middle East?

 
The U.S. strategy in the Middle East
The world's attention is drawn to the crisis in the Ukraine, which puts U.S. and NATO's determination and deterrence capabilities to the test vis-à-vis Russia's aggressive moves. The Ukrainian crisis has implications on world order, as well as the United States' display of power in the Middle East. Should the Russian strategy succeed in the Ukraine, it would impact the behavior of Middle Eastern actors, including Iran.

The U.S. administration's Middle Eastern policy is to set modest, achievable goals using diplomacy and avoid the use of military instruments that could drag Washington into yet another campaign in the Middle East. This policy weakens American deterrence and influence, making the Arab world wonder how strong its support would prove to be when facing the Iranian challenge. Thus, some of the Sunni actors have opted to enhance their bilateral ties with Tehran.

Moreover, the absence of an overall regional American strategy, coupled with Washington's restraint following direct Iranian attacks against U.S. interests and targets, are weakening America's status, prompting countries in the region to reassert their own regional policy vis-à-vis Iran. Thus, the Iranian militia's strike against the American military base at Al Tanf (October 2021), and the attempted assassination of the Iraqi Prime Minister (November 2021) demonstrate Iran's willingness to take risks as it realizes that the United States wishes to refrain from being dragged into regional escalation.
The Palestinian issue: Increased friction with Washington?
The Palestinian issue has become a top priority for Israel in recent weeks due to a certain increase in "lone wolf terror", and the discovery of Hamas-affiliated terror infrastructure in the West Bank in tandem with progress made with regard to the arrangement in the Gaza Strip.

There is growing concern over broader escalation following the increase in the "lone wolf" terror attack trend emerging recently in Jerusalem and the West Bank, as well as in view of the Palestinian Authority's incapacity to keep the peace and govern. Hamas' repeated attempts to set the West Bank ablaze have been unsuccessful thus far, despite the Palestinian public's tremendous support for the organization; however, its force buildup processes in this area continue, as demonstrated by the discovery of the
large terror infrastructure financed and headed by Saleh al-Arouri in November 2021.

Simultaneously and paradoxically, the arrangement efforts between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip are advancing in view of Israel's broad leniency policy, whereby: goods are entering the Gaza Strip via the Kerem Shalom crossing; the workers' quota was raised to ten thousand; funds are being transferred from Qatar, including payments to clerks in a revolving deal with Egypt, and more. Thus, despite the policy of
strengthening the Palestinian Authority declared by Israel's Defense Minister, in practice, Israel has been taking steps that bolster Hamas' status in the Gaza Strip, and provide an opportunity to rehabilitate, and even further enhance its military force in preparation for the next campaign.

Undersecretary of State Victoria Nuland's visit to Israel and the Palestinian Authority has demonstrated the gaps between the U.S. administration and Israeli government on the Palestinian issue. Nuland underscored America's determination to open the U.S. consulate for Palestinians in Jerusalem, stating that the current administration views it as a top priority because it seeks to return to the traditional status-quo policy. In a meeting held with Abu Mazen, as well as in a series of interviews she gave, Nuland highlighted the Biden administration's desire to renew its relations with the PA, the weight attributed by Washington to the matter of the settlements, and its support of the two-state solution.

The disagreement between the two leaderships on the Palestinian issue could result in a crisis due to the Biden Administration's authentic commitment and Israeli government policy being incompatible with that of Washington. Furthermore, Nuland's visit to the region and her statements may indicate that Washington will no longer be waiting and being cautious, as it did prior to the passing of the budget in Israel, and that, from now on, one could expect it to be stricter with Israel on the Palestinian issue, particularly continued construction in Judea and Samaria. The matter of the U.S. consulate that Nuland said the Biden Administration was committed to reopening could also evolve into a stumbling block between Jerusalem and Washington, perhaps even in the near future.

 
Recommendations
  • Strategic coordination with the United States should be reinforced to establish Israeli impact on the Vienna talks, anchor Washington's commitment to the Israeli force buildup, and develop a systemwide response (militarily and financially) to increase the pressure on Iran, should the diplomatic efforts fail.

     
  • Israel should avoid publicizing the disagreements that emerge in its strategic dialogue with senior U.S. officials, and reduce Israeli officials' overt discussion on the campaign against Iranian nuclear to a minimum. These leaks are detrimental to American trust, while jeopardizing Israel's status and ability to impact the decision-making process in Washington.
     
  • Israel should pursue the signing of a new and effective nuclear deal that would address all aspects associated with stopping Iran's nuclear progress and delaying its breakout time. Such an agreement should address Israel's security needs, as well as those of the regional and international arenas, in view of the hazardous long-term implications of a nuclear Iran for the region and, indeed, the world.
     
  • At the same time, Israel should invest in accelerated force buildup to produce a reliable military response to the Iranian nuclear program. Stronger operational competence and preparedness would enhance Israeli deterrence, and establish a long-term independent capability in preparation for the appointed time.
     
  • "Eyes on the ball" – The Palestinian issue requires an overall strategy that takes the American view into account to avoid unnecessary friction due to the need of a focused effort on Iran. The crisis in Israeli-U.S. relations that could evolve from the Palestinian issue may be detrimental to the strategic coordination and trust between the two countries, while having repercussions for the negotiations with Iran as well.