Israel’s Strategic Freedom of Action is Being Challenged
Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS
Executive Director
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
January, 2023
As the new Israeli government enters office, Israel is facing significant challenges, primarily the aggravating Iranian threat, coupled with the political and security explosiveness of the Palestinian arena as was demonstrated in the resolution adopted by the UNGA requesting the International Court of Justice to examine Israeli “annexation” and the “legal status of the occupation" and the furious responses in the international arena and the Arab world regarding minister Ben Gvir's visit in Temple Mount.
At the same time, Israel is currently enjoying a range of strategic assets. First and foremost, its special relations with the United States, alongside the ties forged with the peace and normalization states, Israel’s military and economic power, as well as strong and independent justice system. These assets project on Israel’s image as a regional power, and allow it flexibility when using force and continuing to invest in force buildup in order to maintain its qualitative edge over its enemies and rivals in the area. Its security services are also extraordinarily capable of thwarting terror attacks.
The new government’s emerging policy, including its intention to change the organizational structure of COGAT (the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories) – and particularly its responsibility over the civil state of affairs in the West Bank via the Israel Civil Administration (ICA) – is expected to have broad strategic implications. First and foremost, it creates potential for increased tension vis-à-vis the Palestinian Authority, and could be harmful to relations with the U.S. administration, EU and Arab states, as such a step could be viewed as changing the state of affairs on the ground, and promoting a process, de facto, whereby areas in the West Bank would be annexed to Israel. Such a development would be detrimental to Israel’s legitimacy, undermining the strategic and security freedom of action it enjoys (including support with regard to the issue of Iran), as well as exposing it to legal actions.
The Palestinian system – Security explosiveness and a political-legal challenge
The Palestinian arena currently forms the most charged strategic challenge that the new Israeli government must address due to its security explosiveness (particularly in northern Samaria), which is on the verge of spilling over to other areas across the West Bank, as well as the threats posed on the political and legal levels.
Taking COGAT, which is fully and directly subordinate to the Minister of Defense, and forcing an incumbent general to report to a minister whose area of responsibility is not defense-related, could cause severe coordination difficulties vis-à-vis other defense units, primarily the IDF, as well as in interactions with the Palestinian Authority. Moreover, steps that would appear to be applying Israeli law in the territories, and certainly those that would promote the dissolution of the ICA, would provide evidence in support of the claims whereby this move was designed as a step toward illegal annexation, and that settlements indeed constitute a violation of international law.
Abu Mazen, whose public status is at an unprecedented low, has identified this time as an opportunity for promoting a political and legal campaign against Israel. Recently, Abu Mazen had even stated in an interview on Al-Arabia that he may consider a return to armed conflict in due course.
For years Israel has been able to ward off legal proceedings against it, among other means by claiming that its justice system is independent, compliant with international law, and reliably and objectively carries out its own investigations. Any decisions that would impede such independence could serve as a boomerang, exposing Israel, its leaders and troops, to charges and lawsuits on account of actions taken against Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.
Israel’s steps vis-à-vis the Palestinians could further fuel antisemitic incidents (that are on the rise as it is) against Jews across the globe, serving as ammunition in the arsenal of De-legitimization and BDS organizations seeking to promote anti-Israeli campaigns aimed at international institutions and companies, while spreading narratives of Israeli apartheid and war crimes.
Taking COGAT, which is fully and directly subordinate to the Minister of Defense, and forcing an incumbent general to report to a minister whose area of responsibility is not defense-related, could cause severe coordination difficulties vis-à-vis other defense units, primarily the IDF, as well as in interactions with the Palestinian Authority. Moreover, steps that would appear to be applying Israeli law in the territories, and certainly those that would promote the dissolution of the ICA, would provide evidence in support of the claims whereby this move was designed as a step toward illegal annexation, and that settlements indeed constitute a violation of international law.
Abu Mazen, whose public status is at an unprecedented low, has identified this time as an opportunity for promoting a political and legal campaign against Israel. Recently, Abu Mazen had even stated in an interview on Al-Arabia that he may consider a return to armed conflict in due course.
For years Israel has been able to ward off legal proceedings against it, among other means by claiming that its justice system is independent, compliant with international law, and reliably and objectively carries out its own investigations. Any decisions that would impede such independence could serve as a boomerang, exposing Israel, its leaders and troops, to charges and lawsuits on account of actions taken against Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.
Israel’s steps vis-à-vis the Palestinians could further fuel antisemitic incidents (that are on the rise as it is) against Jews across the globe, serving as ammunition in the arsenal of De-legitimization and BDS organizations seeking to promote anti-Israeli campaigns aimed at international institutions and companies, while spreading narratives of Israeli apartheid and war crimes.
Iran – The threat is aggravating
The Iranian threat posed to Israel is aggravating on all dimensions, particularly with regard to progress made by the nuclear program, and improved offense capabilities in areas such as missiles and drones, as well as in view of the evolving strategic partnership with Russia in military and technological areas. Current assessments whereby Iran needs just two years in order to develop weapons-grade nuclear capabilities could be correct, provided that Iran has not yet decided to develop such capabilities. Such a decision, once made, could substantially reduce this timeframe.
Moreover, as the world’s attention is directed toward more pressing issues, primarily the war in Ukraine, energy crisis and soaring inflation, alongside the support provided by Iran to the Russian war efforts, and its brutal response to domestic riots, the chances of reaching a new nuclear deal are extremely slim. Thus, unless a credible, tangible threat is generated, Iran will keep holding the key determining the pace of the progress it is making with its nuclear program.
The global arena – A growing competition between the great powers
It has been ten months since the war broke out in Ukraine, and there is no end in sight, despite the first signs of U.S. and Russian willingness to examine the possibility of renewing talks. For now, it seems, that both parties are taking advantage of winter to improve their positions and operatively regroup in preparation for a possible escalation in fighting this upcoming spring, while keeping up their efforts of fatiguing and crushing the other. On the one hand, the ongoing fighting is increasing the risk of Russian miscalculation and extreme actions, inter alia due to Putin’s insinuations that he may use nuclear weapons. On the other hand, these concerns may, in fact, drive the West to look for a diplomatic way of resolving this crisis.
President Xi’s visit to Saudi Arabia, and the economic agreements signed during it, reflect a leap in bilateral relations between Beijing and Riyadh. The Saudis have paid great attention to the visit and warm reception for President Xi (as opposed to the cool reception for President Biden six months ago) in what appears to be an attempt, inter alia, to defiantly show the U.S. administration that they have a strategic alternative that is just as valuable. These are all manifestations of the complex relationship the United States has with the Gulf states, as well as of the changes made in Saudi foreign policy in recent years, as demonstrated by Riyadh’s consistent refusal to meet U.S. requests and help reduce oil prices.
Implications and recommendations for Israel
The new Israeli government is entering office at a low starting point in view of the many concerns across the world and region with regard to its policies on a wide range of issues (the Palestinians, minorities, the justice system, and so on). The government will need to exhibit sensitivity and caution, avoiding steps that could gnaw at Israel’s clout and the efforts to curb proceedings against it in the international arena (primarily in the UN and international courts in the Hague), chip away at its security and economic collaborations (particularly with the EU and Sunni countries), limit its freedom to take action in the region, as well as its ability to promote a comprehensive solution for the aggravating threat posed by Iran.
In the Palestinian context, despite the government’s clear ideological positions, its leaders would do well to exhibit understanding with regard to the sensitive and fragile nature of the current state of affairs in the West Bank, which could rapidly develop into an acute strategic threat as far as Israel is concerned. At least for now, the government is advised to avoid taking revolutionary steps, particularly the kind that would cause detriment to the status of the Palestinian Authority, and alter the current state of affairs in the West Bank.
In this context, it is particularly preferable if it would avoid economically “punishing” the Palestinian Authority in a way that would lead to broad public participation in the wave of escalation that has been underway for the past six months. The new Israeli government should also beware of advancing actions in the context of Temple Mount that would project negatively on its relations with the Arab states (especially Jordan), and the already charged relations between the establishment and Arab Israeli public.
Israel’s strategic alliance with the United States is irreplaceable, and the ability to form a comprehensive solution for the growing threat posed by Iran is completely reliant upon the two countries’ cooperation. The Israeli government will have to do all it can to preserve the special relations and trust with both the U.S. administration (inter alia against the backdrop of the grim history between Prime Minister Netanyahu and the Democratic Party) and American Jewry in order to ensure their support, inter alia, in countering actions taken against Israel in international institutions, as well as in the legal arena.
In view of the growing conflict between the United States and China and Russia, the new government is advised to be extra careful when promoting collaborations with China, particularly in the contexts of technology and national infrastructures, increasing oversight over Chinese attempts to acquire Israeli companies. As for Russia, the government should continue to stand by Ukraine and provide it with assistance in accordance with Russia’s red lines with respect to the provision of air-defense systems.