Time to Think Differently

Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS

Executive Director
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead

The strategic reality is changing and requires a state security initiative that would address the threats and opportunities it brings with it. Israel enjoys security and economic stability, has a strategic alliance with the United States, engages in a strategic partnership with the Sunni states as part of the Abraham Accords, and has a distinct qualitative military edge (QME) over its regional opponents. However, the overall Iranian strategy that consistently strives, and more so in the past two years, to strengthen Tehran's regional influence by using force and pushing the United States and its regional allies out, while developing its technological capabilities in its pursuit of nuclear, is successfully establishing effective deterrence vis-à-vis the Sunni camp, posing a multidimensional and long-term security challenge for Israel. Israel is required to form an overall strategy for curbing Iran in the region that would prevent it from reaching nuclear threshold capabilities, while enhancing its strategic partnerships with the United States and countries in the region.

The current round of talks in Vienna, that began on December 27, is reaching its decisive stage, despite the remaining fundamental gaps between the parties. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently noted that he believes there is very little time left, a few weeks at most, in which to make a decision about returning to the JCPOA since Iran is getting close to the point where it could produce enough enriched material to break out to a nuclear weapon. Blinken warned that the United States would be willing to consider other options in the event that negotiations fail.

By contrast, Iran is maintaining a suspension strategy in its approach to the Vienna talks. It is demanding that the sanction regime be lifted beyond the understandings contained in the original agreement, that a reactivation of sanctions against it in future be prevented, that the advanced centrifuges be stored instead of dismantled, and so on. Tehran aims to return to the original nuclear deal on its own terms, while leveraging the American desire to get back to the agreement for economic gains, and the preservation of technological progress made to date by its nuclear program.

At the same time, Iran is pressuring the United States via its proxy forces and Shiite militia groups who launch rockets and suicide drones against American targets in Syria and Iraq. In the most severe event to date in a series of strikes attributed to the anniversary of Qasem Soleimani's assassination (3 January), 4 rockets were fired at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad's Green Zone. Although there were no casualties in this strike, it demonstrated Iran's growing boldness in its use of force against the United States. Tehran was subsequently warned by the Pentagon that if these attacks will continue, the United States will respond.

Nevertheless, American deterrence in the Middle East has weakened, and the lack of response thus far due to Washington's interest in progressing with the nuclear talks, while avoiding being dragged into a direct campaign against Iran, is prompting additional power-projecting steps by Iran-backed forces against the United States and its allies. In this context, the campaign in Yemen has escalated in recent weeks following the Houthis' firing of ballistics into Saudi territory (25 December), the seizure of the Emirati ship in the Red Sea (3 January), and the drone attack in both international airport and Abu Dhabi industrial zone (17 January), resulting in the death of three foreign workers and the injuring of six others.

The Security Council has vehemently condemned the seizure of the UAE-flagged sea vessel, calling for ensured freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea. However, a lack of military response by the United States and its allies to Iran's power-projecting actions in Syria, Iraq and Yemen are prompting the Sunni camp, particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia, to strengthen their bilateral ties with Tehran, and promote direct dialogue with it. The U.S. policy is forcing the Sunni camp to adjust and modify its regional policy vis-à-vis Iran in view of their assessment that the U.S. is an unreliable source of support.

Meanwhile, global attention is focused on the evolving crisis in the Ukraine. Russia has asked the United States and NATO for guarantees that the latter would not expand east to Ukraine or accept more countries from the former Soviet Union. It is also demanding that the military alliance remove weapons and forces from central and eastern Europe. Foreign Minister Lavrov underscored that Russia is "not ready to wait forever" for the U.S. and NATO to respond, and that Moscow has various options it can set in motion if its demands will be rejected. Most of Russia's requisites have been instantly dismissed so far by the United States and NATO, who reiterated the heavy price Moscow will pay if it should opt for a military course of action.

Growing tension is putting the United States' determination and ability to curb Russian displays of power to the test, as Moscow has already deployed more than 100,000 troops along its shared border with the Ukraine. Diplomatic efforts continue; however, an American failure in this arena could have repercussions vis-à-vis China, Iran, and the Middle East.

Thus, an understanding between the United States and Russia on the issue of Iranian nuclear is crucial to the ability to reach international arrangements in the Vienna talks, and later proceed to a full-fledged agreement. A U.S. display of weakness in the Ukrainian crisis would project on its status and stability in the Middle East, as well as its power of deterrence. This could have implications in terms of the Pro-American Sunni camp's reorganization in the region, Russia and China's greater weight and impact in the Middle East, as well as Iran and the radical axis' willingness to take risks in force buildup and friction with Israel.

In the local context, the Palestinian issue is a factor that could undermine Israeli strategy in the region as well as vis-à-vis the United States. The absence of an overall strategy and the Israeli desire to "minimize" the conflict and manage it with no promise of a peace process, create a sense of imagined stability based on the enhanced economic-civilian actions on the one hand, and the "grass-cutting" military actions on the other. The Palestinian Authority's fragility, inter alia in view of the growing discussion on the "morning after" Abu Mazen, as well as Hamas' ongoing efforts to feed the fiery atmosphere in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Israeli Arab public, aggravate violent clashes in the Palestinian system in a way that could diminish from the attention and focus on the issue of Iran.

More concretely, Hamas has been trying to establish a new action formula vis-à-vis Israel since Operation Guardian of the Walls. It threatens with the "red lines" on account of which it will breach the current quiet (Jerusalem, the prisoners, and now, the riots in the Negev), and forms the narrative of a comprehensive Palestinian national struggle against Israel (that will serve its leadership on "the morning after"), while also promoting the arrangement in Gaza which enhances its rule. The absence of an overall Israeli strategy in both Gaza and the West Bank, centering on the promise of a peace process that would fortify the status of the Palestinian Authority and align with the separation perception, as well as the ongoing "fighting round dynamics" plays into the hands of Hamas as it attempts to establish itself as the Palestinian arena's national leader.

Recommendations

The re-signing of the nuclear deal between the great powers and Iran could leave Tehran with advanced capabilities and technological know-how, while strengthening its economy due to the lifting of sanctions and broadening of trade with countries in the region as well as the international system. Under such a scenario, Israel's ability to take action would be limited in view of the pressure exerted by the powers, particularly the United States, to adhere to the agreement signed, and avoid regional destabilization. Israel must formulate a combined policy whereby it would actively pursue the tightening of its strategic alliance with Washington and enhance the cooperation axis as well as military-intelligence coordination, while building up a designated force that would enable it to take independent action in the event that the Iranian nuclear program would cross red lines.
Furthermore, the renewed nuclear deal is likely to lead to a conventional arms race among all countries in the region who would be clamoring for advanced western, Russian and Chinese weapons. Israel must form a balanced regional policy whereby it would deepen its security-military collaboration with the Gulf states, Egypt and Jordan in order to curb Iran's influence and regional subversiveness, while maintaining the IDF's qualitative military edge (QME).
Israeli policy should steer between contrasting interests, and create a flexible space that enables progress in regional collaboration alongside preservation of technological and human strengths. If the IDF's qualitative military edge (QME) would be compromised by advanced technologies, human capital, and unique methods of activation crossing over to its neighbors, Israel's long-term security would be jeopardized, despite the short-term advantages of such a step in the conflict with Iran.
Israel should seize opportunities presented by regional dynamics to bolster its strategic objectives, primarily pushing Iran out of Syria and Lebanon, reducing the threat of precise fire targeting it, and preventing Iran from reaching threshold nuclear capabilities. In this context, for instance, the expansion of the war between wars in Syria to include Iranian targets ("the stick") alongside the willingness to recognize Assad's regime and promotion of Syrian rehabilitation in state security coordination with the Arab states and Russia ("the carrot") could serve as an effective strategy by which to reduce Iranian influence in Syria.
Israel should keep strengthening the security coordination and civilian-economic assistance while bolstering the PA's governability, curbing Hamas on the ground and enhancing deterrence against it. As for the tension in the Negev, Israel should clearly signal to Hamas that its ongoing efforts to feed the fiery atmosphere among Arab Israeli citizens is unacceptable, and would take its toll on the organization, primarily in the form of limiting the comprehensive steps Israel is taking vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip. In the long range, Israel should formulate an overall strategy indicative of the promise of a peace process that implements the separation perception in order to halt the creeping process of the implementation of the "single state" solution, and avoid a crisis in its relations with Washington.
The crisis in the Ukraine has implications for the global and regional security architecture. The current crisis may be interpreted as the result of western desire for stability and disinclination to engage in military campaign during a global health and financial crisis. Israel should avoid intervening in the Ukrainian crisis as much as possible in view of the need to maintain strategic coordination with Russia on the war between wars in Syria, while strengthening its strategic alliance with the United States as much as possible.