Global and regional instability alongside possible domestic upheavals

Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS
Executive Director
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
July, 2022
26-3-20main-...
Photos:  Remix - Pixabay 

The international and regional system is undergoing shocking dynamics that destabilize world order and pose a growing risk of local escalation to Israel, alongside the opportunity to enhance strategic collaborations in the region. This complexity is further underscored by Israel’s ongoing political crisis, and preparations for the upcoming elections.
 
The Middle Eastern system is impacted by the implications of the war in Ukraine, the aggravating global energy and food crises, and the growing conflict between Israel and Iran. These shapers project onto the dynamics between the various forces, influencing the overall stability of the Middle Eastern system. This current state of affairs requires Israel to form a dynamic and holistic policy that takes the existing complexity into account, as well as the affiliations between its subsystems in a manner that promotes its national security interests.
 
The Iranian-Israeli conflict is expanding and turning more violent in the region and in Iran itself following the killing of senior members of the IRGC and Iranian nuclear scientists in recent months, attributed to Israel. Israel is therefore preparing for retaliatory terror attacks against Israeli targets that may be carried out in the immediate timeframe in Turkey.
 
At the same time, Israel, according to foreign press, has recently increased its strikes against weapon transfers and Iranian entrenchment in Syria. The last attack attributed to Israel in the international airport in Damascus has led to flights being grounded as runways were damaged, disrupting departures and arrivals, and is therefore being viewed as an unusual
leap in the war between wars, and as significantly detrimental to strategic civilian infrastructure in non-war times. The strategic message conveyed by Israel to Syria is that, as long as Damascus will continue to enable the transfer of advanced Iranian weapons and technologies via its international airport, it will pay a hefty price for doing so.
 
In contrast, the assault has led to poignant public Russian protest, and the drafting of a proposal to condemn Israel in the UN Security Council. Slim though the chances of the Russian proposal being promoted are, the fact that it has turned to the UN Security Council at all means a rung has been climbed up the strategic alert ladder for Israel, reflecting Moscow’s dissatisfaction with the air strikes. At present, it would seem that Moscow is content with making only declarative steps; however, it is signaling the possibility of greater harm, including compromising the ongoing operative coordination.
 
Meanwhile, the crisis between Iran and the great powers and IAEA with regard to the nuclear deal is worsening. In a
report published in May 2022, the IAEA states that Iran has accumulated enough 60% and 20% enriched Uranium to allow it to enrich weapons grade fissile material (90%) within a few weeks. It has yet to develop a nuclear warhead and place it on a ballistic missile (according to current estimates, it would take Iran at least two years to develop a nuclear weapon once it has decided to do so); however, this is a significant leap forward that demonstrates the capabilities and knowledge Iran has accumulated. Furthermore, the IAEA has uncovered three sites where unusual nuclear activity was identified (the presence of uranium particles), and has called upon Iran to provide explanations to the international community.
 
In response, Iran has disconnected all 27 surveillance cameras installed in its nuclear sites as part of the 2015 JCPOA. The
head of the IAEA said that if the cameras cannot be restored within three to four weeks, this would be a fatal blow to Iran's nuclear deal. At this stage, the negotiations toward a nuclear agreement between Iran and the great powers is dragging its heels, and talks between the parties are not expected to stop in the next few months; however, since the last round of talks was set in motion in Vienna – the keys to the renewal or annulment of the nuclear deal are in the hands of the Iranian leadership.
 
In the international arena, the war in Ukraine is the key strategic shaper on which global political, security, and economic energy is focused in the struggle to establish a new world order. To date, neither party has managed to reach decisive victory, and the gaps between them are unbridgeable, turning the conflict into a long and bloody war of attrition. The war is exacerbating the inter-bloc rivalry, demanding heavy tolls from all parties involved, and leading to a global economic crisis of historical proportions.
 
The war has caused a global energy and food crisis following the rise of oil prices and the shortage of grains. The
World Bank’s assessment on the global system’s economic stability in 2023 is far from optimistic. The surge in inflation rates, rising interest rates designed to address the problem of inflation, development of food insecurity in African and Middle Eastern countries, soaring poverty rates following the rising cost of living, risk of countries declaring bankruptcy due to their inability to pay national debts, and growing concern over world recession all underlie the assumption that 2023 will not be an easy year for the global economy.
 
Furthermore, the economic crisis in the Middle East is the key issues on local regimes’ agenda in view of the growing fear that this crisis will project onto their political stability to the point of spurring renewed regional turmoil. Countries in the Middle East suffering from high debt rates, rising inflation, and a weak fiscal state are facing an increased risk to their stability due to the financial tsunami that has yet to ebb. In this context, the Abraham Accords and Israel’s tightening strategic partnership with Egypt and Jordan, particularly in the field of energy, form basis for the development of economic ties, as well as an opportunity to deepen Israel’s valuableness to the regional system.
 
The U.S. President’s decision to visit the Middle East this month stems, first and foremost, from the administration’s need to address the strategic domestic and international challenges, led by the economic energy issue. The visit is designed to cement the United States’ status in the Middle East as a world power on the declarative level, establish its strategic security commitment to Israel and its regional allies, resolve the crisis with the Gulf states, and enhance Israel’s collaboration and normalization processes with the regional Sunni system. Yet the main undeclared purpose of the visit is to increase Saudi Arabia’s oil production so that it would mitigate the world energy crisis, and maintain the overall pressure exerted on Russia, while bolstering the anti-Russian coalition members.
 
During his visit, President Biden is expected to arrive at the Palestinian Authority, and even spend a short time at Al Makassed Hospital in East Jerusalem. This step is designed to reflect Washington’s basic commitment to the peace process, without offering an actual strategy for promoting it. During the visit, the U.S. administration is supposed to present political gestures to the PA, however, these are being perceived by the Palestinians as a “fig leaf” that brings nothing new.
The initiative raised by the U.S. delegation as part of its preparations for the visit to promote a summit between the parties that would set the wheels of the peace process in motion has been rejected due to the sensitive political situation in Israel, which does not enable it.
 
In the Palestinian arena, things seem to have returned to normal now that Ramadan is over. Yet the sensitivity and overall explosivity remain intact in view of the ongoing political stagnation, claims of the status quo on Temple Mount being challenged, and the growing discourse on “the morning after Abu Mazen”. Hamas is trying to destabilize the West Bank by fueling the fire of religious discourse, rallying the Palestinian public in Israel and the West Bank around religion, and, at the same time, gnawing at the PA’s status, and establishing its stronghold in the Gaza Strip. The IDF’s “lawnmowing” policy in the West Bank, and its containment of the Gaza Strip while distinguishing between the Palestinian systems is designed to preserve the overall quiet and focus on strategically addressing the issue of Iran, but also compromises Israel’s ability to initiate and shape processes that tally with its national security interests, primarily the prevention of the concretization of the “one state” idea.
Conclusions and recommendations
  • Israel must employ political, economic, and military tools in its campaign to curb Iran’s nuclear program and regional entrenchment. This is a long-range campaign that requires regional collaborations and a tighter strategic partnership with the United States, while preserving the security coordination with Russia. President Biden’s visit to Israel demonstrates Jerusalem’s valuableness to the U.S strategic posture in the Middle East, as well as the overall security architecture. 
     
  • The aggravating threat posed by Iran means Israel must invest in designated force buildup with the aim of establishing a realistic military option essential for bolstering its power of deterrence vis-à-vis Tehran. Relevant military capabilities will serve as basis for tangible levers that will motivate the United States and international community to promote “a stronger and longer” agreement, or, alternatively, advance comprehensive and effective international sanctions against Iran
     
  • The “black swan” of regional turmoil and economic collapse requires Israel to formulate a policy on assisting the Arab regimes directly and by influencing Washington
     
  • As part of this approach, the historical gas agreement signed by and between Israel, the EU and Egypt, whereby Israeli gas will be transferred to Egyptian LNG facilities and sent to Europe reflects the importance of promoting joint economic-energy ventures, and the need to enhance strategic partnerships in order to stabilize the local economic system. Moreover, collaboration on energy is of geopolitical importance as it anchors Israel’s valuableness to the region’s economic and energy stability
     
  • Israel should avoid taking contested steps in the Palestinian arena prior to President Biden’s visit to Israel and the Palestinian Authority, as these would increase the tension with the Palestinians, and embarrass the U.S. president during his visit, perhaps even leading to a crisis in relations at a sensitive time when Israel needs Washington’s support in view of the scope and magnitude of the strategic security threats it faces.