Israel’s Domestic Crisis Jeopardizes Strategic Power

Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS

Executive Director
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead

March, 2023

The combined threats that Israel faces internally and externally are aggravating rapidly in a way that could prove detrimental to its strategic power, and project onto its state security freedom of action.

First among them is the escalating threat posed by Iran. Reports of the existence of 84%-enriched uranium, the highest level found in Iran to date, and the closest it has come to weapons-grade, which is 90%, support the notion that Iran’s nuclear program continues to gradually and cautiously progress so as to allow it to break out and obtain nuclear capabilities within the shortest timeframe, subject to its leader’s decision to do so. At the same time, Iran is continuing to improve its missile array, while cynically using Ukraine as experimentation ground for bettering its UAV technological and operational capabilities. Moreover, the fact that a new nuclear deal does not seem likely, alongside the brutal squelching of the younger generation’s riots domestically, and tightening of relations with Russia and China, all increase Iran’s confidence to challenge Israel and other countries in the region.

An essential aspect of Israel’s ability to contend with these threats is its strategic alliance with the United States. Therefore, special importance should be attributed to the emerging threat of harm to the close relationship with the U.S. administration. The reiterated messages by President Biden, Secretary of State Blinken, Ambassador Nides, and senior senators whereby the special relations between the two countries are rooted in shared democratic values, as well as in Israel being the only democracy in the Middle East, reflect the administration’s growing objection to the steps being taken by the Israeli government by way of reforming the local justice system.

The implication is that, should the government continue promoting the legal reform unilaterally and without dialogue, it would cause fundamental detriment to the relations between the two countries, and hamper the U.S. administration’s willingness to cooperate on issues that are crucial to Israel’s security. The fact that the United States has joined the UN Security Council’s presidential statement criticizing the decision to expand settlements, and has yet to invite Netanyahu to visit Washington, indicates the emerging crisis in the bilateral relations, which is divorced from the strong and deep security-military-intelligence collaborations.

The government’s new policy vis-à-vis the Palestinians is yet another weakening factor. This policy, a manifestation of which can be found in the decisions to expand settlements and legitimize existing communities, as well as in the desire to reassign the responsibility over COGAT and the Civil Administration so that they are no longer subordinate to the Minister of Defense, aims to create the foundation for a future annexation of parts of the West Bank, and is met with fierce disapproval by both the United States and Europe. At the same time, there is severe friction with the Palestinian population in East Jerusalem, restrictions are being imposed on Palestinian prisoners incarcerated in Israeli facilities (“security prisoners”), and the terror acts in Huwara. All of the above form a particularly explosive bone of contention vis-à-vis the U.S. administration, fueling the already combustible relations with the Palestinians expected to become even more explosive as the month of Ramadhan draws nearer, brimming with religious and national sentiments.

The emerging trends pose a threat to Israel’s national security and resilience, enhance social polarization, weaken the economy, and should set off alarms in the Israeli government.

Yet, while they would require the Israeli government to change its conduct, these processes are still reversible, particularly with respect to the promotion of the legal reform, and unilateral steps vis-à-vis the Palestinians. Since it was formed, the Israeli government has proven that it is capable of making level-headed decisions (the evacuation of illegal outposts and undertaking to refrain from legitimizing others; disinclination to demolish houses and evacuate Khan al-Ahmar) to prevent escalation, and preserve its relations with the U.S. administration. Under the current circumstances, and in view of the multidimensional challenges it is facing, the government must, without delay, embrace a policy that would curb the erosion in Israel’s strategic power.

The Palestinian system is nearing its boiling point

The Palestinian arena is highly explosive due to the combination of multiple security frictions and the deepening crisis between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, resulting, to a large extent, from a series of steps taken by the government in an effort to change the fabric of the relations with the Palestinians. The PA, for its part, is promoting the soft campaign against Israel in the international theater (the UN and courts in the Hague), while exhibiting signs of increasing weakness when governing. Thus, there is growing concern over the Palestinian regime’s feebleness leading to extensive governmental voids (examples of which can already be found in northern Samaria and Jericho), in a way that could force Israel to deepen the IDF and defense establishment’s involvement in an effort to thwart terrorist attacks. The implication being, inter alia, that the friction with the local population will increase, and the IDF will be less available and prepared to address other threats.

Tension is particularly pronounced in East Jerusalem, where popular riots are also exacerbating in Arab neighborhoods due to the increased steps taken by the government (primarily home raids and demolitions) following the murderous attacks carried out in recent weeks. The concentrated tension in Jerusalem is charging the entire Palestinian system in anticipation of Ramadhan, due to begin in less than one month, and could set the West Bank ablaze, as well as project onto Gaza and Israeli Arab society.

A year to the war in Ukraine – No end in sight

A year into the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and in view of the inability to reach a victory, it is clear that both Russian and Ukrainian armies are preparing for the escalation of fighting expected in the next few weeks. President Biden’s surprise visit to Kiev, and his firm statements about the United States’ continued support for Ukraine, Vice President Harris’ accusations in the Munich Security Conference that Russia was committing war crimes, and the warnings given by Secretary of State Blinken to Chine lest it provide Russia with weapons demonstrate America’s willingness to continue standing by Ukraine, and provide it with substantial military and financial aid. Meanwhile, President Putin is exhibiting great determination to keep up the war, as manifest in his address before both houses of parliament, in which he had accused the West of being responsible for the war, warned that Russia would push western weapons away from its borders, and announced the suspension of the agreement with the United States (START) on nuclear weapon oversight.

The abyssal gaps between the two parties seem unbridgeable at present – Russia is demanding to maintain its hold on the territories it is occupying; Ukraine is demanding Russia’s complete withdrawal, even from Crimea; the United States and Europe wish to ensure that Russia is weakened strategically, so that it would no longer be able to take such aggressive steps against other countries (although they will probably be content with Russia’s return to its prewar borders); and China is interested in avoiding a situation whereby the United States will emerge from the crisis stronger than before. Thus, in the absence of a political horizon, the war is expected to last for some time. The implication being increased risk, potential loss of control, and the execution of extreme steps.

The expected escalation and broadening military ties between Russia and Iran are leading to increased pressure on Israel to change its policy and stand by Ukraine unequivocally. Through this prism one could interpret Ukraine’s repeated requests (as manifest in President Zelensky’s address in the Munich Security Conference too) that Israel provide Ukraine with air defense systems and other weapons.

In response to Ukraine’s demands and the West’s expectations, Russia is hinting at the prices that Israel might pay if it were to alter its policy. Thus, the Russian court is expected to resume its deliberations on the Jewish Agency’s local activity. In view of these proceedings, as well as the potential damage Russia could cause to Israeli interests in the Syrian arena, and the importance of maintaining freedom of action vis-à-vis the aggravating Iranian threat, Israel should continue to employ a cautious policy, and avoid providing Ukraine with firing weapon systems. At the same time, Israel should give Ukraine the most extensive aid possible in softer areas, and find ways of collaborating with it in sensitive areas too.