The War Against Hamas – What Lies Ahead?

Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS

Executive Director
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead

October 2023

Photos: Tasnim News Agency (CC BY 4.0) | Office of the Director of National Intelligence |

Israel faces fateful decisions with regard to the next phases of its war against Hamas. It has two main goals – to eliminate Hamas’ military and ruling capabilities while freeing the hostages. The two goals seem to contradict one another, but it is now clear that they can be reconciled based on a systemic plan that takes the need to continue crushing Hamas, as can be seen in the beginning of the ground activities in Gaza in the last few days. These activities are carried out at the moment on a small scale and described as the second stage of the operation against Hamas.

At the same time, Israel must define the hostages’ return as a supreme value, for it is morally obligated to bring them all back home. Israel should therefore allow for negotiation leeway, even at the price of postponing the massive ground offensive for some time, since the ability to engage in proper negotiation while fighting in the Gaza Strip is highly limited. Nevertheless, it must also understand that Hamas will make cruel and cynical use of the hostages, while engaging in psychological terror tactics vis-à-vis Israeli society and the international community, in an effort to postpone the ground offensive for as long as possible.

The Israeli government’s decisions must take into account several influential factors that will shape reality vis-à-vis the region in general, and the Palestinian system in particular, during the war as well as in its aftermath.

First and foremost is the realization that this campaign has broad global and regional implications that reach far beyond the Israel-Hamas War. It is a battle between the democratic liberal camp led by the United States and the radical one led by China and Russia, which includes Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas. It is no coincidence that the U.S. administration views curbing Russia and eliminating Hamas’ capabilities, and those of the radical axis in general, as part of the broader campaign for the preservation of world and Middle Eastern order.

The change in western countries’ view of Hamas, and its branding as ISIS, form the basis for the broad legitimacy that Israel now enjoys. They provide it with unprecedented military freedom of action by which to eliminate the movement’s capabilities. Under such circumstances, Israel must attain a decisive military victory. Such a development would have a substantial effect on the reality that will form in the Gaza Strip, as well as on Israel’s ability to promote a long-term arrangement. Moreover, the outcomes of the campaign will also project on the possibility of shaping a new Middle East, and could pave the way for advancing a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of the war. This could have an impact on Israel’s ability to divert its resources to the key threat posed to it by Iran and Hizballah. However, Israel should take into account that the legitimacy it currently enjoys will decrease as the campaign continues and the destruction in Gaza increases.

In concurrence, and in view of the operative challenges the IDF is expected to face in Gaza, it is advisable to focus the majority of efforts on the campaign against Hamas, and be very cautious so as not to get dragged into a broad campaign against Hizballah. At present, both Iran and Hizballah do not appear interested in a broad campaign. The use made by Iran of militia groups in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria to attack Israel as well as U.S. bases in the region is designed to increase the pressure to prevent, or, at the very least, delay a ground offensive, while remaining below the war threshold.

At the same time, Israel should ensure that a third front will not open by continuing its targeted and successful activity directed at thwarting terror attacks from the West Bank, and damaging Hamas terror infrastructures in the area, primarily in northern Samaria, while eliminating all expressions of nationalist crimes against Arab communities that could set the area ablaze.

Even before the ground operation is begun, Israel is required to formulate a long-term strategy on the basis of the realization that we cannot go back to the time when Israel was controlling the Gaza Strip. Such a scenario would drag the IDF into a prolonged stay in the Gaza Strip, thereby projecting onto its ability to prepare for grappling with the threats posed by Iran and Hizballah, requiring the investment of many economic resources, sabotaging Israel’s relationships with the peace and normalization countries, and evoking broad international criticism.

As for the matter of stabilizing the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of the war, the Israeli government must recognize the fact that no international or regional body would be willing to send forces to preserve the Gaza Strip’s stability. Moreover, the United States and moderate Arab states would strive to breathe life back into the two-state solution, and demand that Israel renew its peace process with the Palestinian Authority as the necessary solution for stabilizing the Palestinian system, and as a condition for providing extensive financial aid.

The United States’ unprecedented support and involvement continue to demonstrate that there is no alternative to the strategic alliance and multidimensional assistance offered by the United States. The state and military collaboration between the two countries must continue, and Israel should agree to U.S. requests with regard to humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip, and other issues as a condition for maintaining legitimacy, and deterring Iran and Hizballah. Consequently, optimal coordination with the United States over Israel’s strategic objectives vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip and how to attain them must be reached.

Israel must actively preserve its relationships with Jordan Egypt and the Gulf States despite the growing criticism on their part, for there is no substitute for its strategic ties with these countries. Jordan serves as its strategic depth, playing a crucial role in defending the eastern border. In view of Jordan’s heightened sensitivity to the Palestinian system, Israel should avoid statements and steps that could pose challenges to the stability of King Abdallah’s regime. At the same time, the peace treaty with Egypt enables Israel to focus on the key threats posed by Iran and its proxies in the region. Thus, Israel should avoid voicing ideas such as resettling Gaza Strip residents in Sinai. Egypt views it as a red line that could lead to considerable detriment to the bilateral relations.

Internally, although Israel is engaged in war at present, it must already begin preparations for the “day after” it. Israel entered into this war divided and polarized socially and civilly; however, during crisis, Israeli citizens had proven their might and ability to unite and mobilize for the cause. The next government and leadership members will need to actively mend the broken pieces, change national priorities, and reinstate social cohesion as an essential precondition to strengthening national resilience, which is a key component in Israel’s national security.