The “morning after” Abu Mazen: A Map of Threats and Opportunities
Dr. Michael Milshtein
August, 2022
Photo: Kremlin.ru | CC BY 4.0
Abu Mazen is one of the weakest leaders in the Middle East. He is 86 years old, and the ruler of a fundamentally limited entity, half of which he has lost to Hamas; he is not popular among the Palestinian people (for over a decade, public opinion polls have been indicating that over 80 percent of Palestinians wish him gone); his domestic adversaries denounce him for being corrupt and for collaborating with Israel; the international arena has despaired of him, and many in the Arab world despise him; unlike most other leaders in the region, he does not have huge military forces at his disposal; and, for the past 17 years, he has been heading a fossilized political system with imposed restrictions on freedom of expression and assembly despite not having been democratically elected.
A similar situation in most other countries in the Middle East would have led to a coup or popular revolt long ago, during which the leader would have been ousted. The fact that Abu Mazen has remained in the same capacity – almost twice as long as Yaser Arafat has – does not attest to power or popularity, but to the character of those around him, and that of the broader Palestinian system.
The senior officials closest to Abu Mazen have much to gain from this prolonged status quo. They accept his rule despite his weakness and flawed political order, contributing to its long-term preservation. Their acceptance highlights the gap in Palestinian leadership: None of the senior officials have the power or self-confidence to destabilize the current order, or motivate them to take such steps. To them, Abu Mazen is not an intimidating leader, but an effective solution by which to maintain the basic functioning of governmental systems, as well as legitimacy vis-à-vis external arenas.
Although the senior Palestinian officials are preparing for “the morning after”, they feel uncomfortable with the possibility that Abu Mazen’s departure would force them to take the helm, which entails having to assume responsibility, become directly accountable to the public, and compete with one another.
This lasting Abu Mazen era also attests to the inclinations of most Palestinians. They had despaired of their internal political system, and the possibility of ever achieving their strategic goals as part of a peace process, over a decade ago, and have become equally exasperated with their domestic battles and endless bouts of confrontation with Israel, as these have yet to result in any major accomplishment. They are therefore focused at present on achieving more modest objectives, primarily a comfortable fabric of life coupled with economic stability.
This trend is particularly prominent among the younger Palestinians – generations Y and Z – who display greater yearning for self-realization and material accomplishments than their fathers, alongside a cynical attitude toward past political and ideological actions. Abu Mazen, who is intent on preserving the status quo – including coordination with Israel despite the many crises between the two parties over the past decade – is meeting the Palestinians’ wishes in this department, and subsequently perceived as an effective, albeit unpopular, leader.
The Israeli discourse on the relations with Abu Mazen and the “morning after” requires a fresh, sober approach. As in many other issues, the discussion in Israel is one-dimensional and prone to dichotomous polarity: Either Abu Mazen is a partner who pursues peace zealously and presents the “last chance” to reach an agreement, after which the Palestinian system will fall into complete chaos, projecting onto Israel’s national security; or else he is an archenemy who refuses to recognize Israel’s right to exist, supports terrorism – as primarily manifest in the ongoing payments made to terrorists’ families – and a closeted antisemitic.
The truth – as in many cases – is much more complex. Abu Mazen’s policy can certainly be credited for much of the relative quiet in the West Bank over the past decade. The Palestinian leader is driven, first and foremost, by the desire to protect the interests of the Palestinian Authority and the traumatic memory of Hamas’ victory over Fatah 15 years ago in Gaza.
However, he himself is the last remnant of the Palestinian system’s founding generation, had personally experienced the 1948 Nakba, and is now struggling to play the role of the trailblazer paving the way to a historical accord, as seen in his rejection of the far-reaching Israeli proposal during the Annapolis talks (2007–2008), which painted him as yet another Palestinian leader who missed a fateful opportunity. Even if the negotiations over the permanent agreement were to renew all of a sudden, Abu Mazen would be very unlikely to take an interest in or feel confident enough to make painful historical choices on core issues that he has not made before, or which Arafat, whose public legitimacy was far greater than his, had refused to make.
Israel would do well to prepare right now – practically and conceptually – for the post-Abu Mazen era, which could begin at any moment. As part of its preparation, Israel should set aside the anxious assumption that historical opportunities will be lost, or that we are destined to enter a dark age. The “morning after” may well be similar to the morning that preceded it, and greatly depends on Israel itself, especially its willingness and ability to continue maintaining stability in the West Bank.
The majority of the Palestinian public is only vaguely interested in the discourse on the gallery of prospective successors (most of whom are perceived as unattractive, to say the least), and is concerned about its fabric of life being jeopardized, inter alia due to domestic struggles that could start forming. An effort on Israel’s part to preserve the civil-economic reality that is both visible and public could contribute to calm in the public sphere, even if severe crises were to form on the political level, for instance, between adversaries within Fatah, or between Fatah and Hamas, should the latter seek to utilize Abu Mazen’s departure to bolster its impact in the West Bank as part of its historical, long-range mission to take over the Palestinian system.
The ”morning after” could, under an optimistic scenario, strengthen the younger Palestinian generation who, unlike the founding generation, is no longer bound by the memories of its history. The young Palestinians’ road to ruling positions has not yet been paved, as Abu Mazen’s cronies – representatives of older generations who are in no hurry to risk their personal and group interests for an internal reform – remain rooted to their seats.
However, should the younger Palestinians succeed to break down this fortified barrier through public pressure without causing the Arab Spring kind of chaos, or having Hamas take advantage of the situation to promote an Islamic revolution in the West Bank (scenarios that are likely to require Israel’s intervention), a partner for grounded dialogue on some future political arrangement could evolve in Ramallah.
Transforming the “morning after” threats into strategic opportunities requires Israel to change and act responsibly too. First, there would be a need for a much more profound and poignant public and political discourse on an issue that seems to be repressed or unable to stir any interest these days unless it projects onto the security reality in Israel directly, or destabilizes its inner order.
Second, the Israeli leadership must understand that steps in the same vein as “economic peace” and “conflict management” that aim to improve the West Bank inhabitants’ fabric of life cannot serve as a lasting strategy, and are mere “temporary patches” disguised as components of a long-range vision under whose auspices the fundamental issues between the two societies exacerbate, first among them – the growing merger and progress toward a one-state reality, which is ironically being accelerated by the civil alleviations policy.
As the upcoming Israeli elections (November) draw near, and soon after the campaign ends, Israel will be required to engage in a sober, poignant discussion on the Palestinian arena. Israel is advised to recognize that progress is consistently being made toward the point of no return that would make it very difficult to physically separate the two nations; it must realize that reality constantly changes as time goes by, and that the range of strategic alternatives available to it is limited and growing perpetually more so.
The “morning after” therefore presents two strategic opportunities for Israel: The first – the chances of which are unknown – pertains to the change in character that the Palestinian leadership will undergo, which would enable it to engage in a more serious dialogue than before on a political arrangement between the two parties; the second, and more important of the two, is the hope that the discourse itself on the matter of the “morning after” would raise awareness of the historical crossroads between separation and merger for which Israel is headed, and lead elected officials to engage in making crucial national decisions in view of the understanding that continuing to avoid making them would have strategic implications.